

puisque les prêtres ont toujours prêché contre l'emploi de la force armée. Ceux-ci se dissocient de Riel lorsqu'il rejette le pape et veut fonder une nouvelle Eglise. Riel les fait prisonniers. Pourtant, dès le cessez-le-feu les missionnaires reprennent leur rôle de pasteurs et de guides moraux auprès de leurs paroissiens, et, contrairement à ce qu'on pourrait s'attendre, la communauté métisse reflorit et prend de l'expansion, même, pendant un certain temps.

Grâce au travail de bénédictin de Diane Payment, nous pouvons mieux comprendre l'arrière-plan sociologique, religieux et économique de la communauté de Batoche qui fut impliquée de première main dans l'insurrection de 1885. Dorénavant, personne ne saurait écrire l'histoire-bataille de Batoche sans se référer d'abord à cette étude primordiale.

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1885: Métis Rebellion or Government Conspiracy? by Don McLean. Winnipeg: Pemmican Publications, 1985. Pp. 137.

Don McLean, a researcher at the Gabriel Dumont Institute, has produced a short book on the events leading up to the Métis resistance of 1885. He seeks to demonstrate that the federal government deliberately provoked the uprising in order to save the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) from bankruptcy and Canada from absorption by the United States. (Pp. 72-73) The author's introductory chapters are heavily loaded with judgements about the federal government's nefarious intentions to "exploit" the west, to impose a "process of controlled underdevelopment," (Pp. 11, 18) and to transform "the western region into a colony of eastern industrialists and merchants." (Pp. 44) The CPR and Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald were the main villains in the author's Manichaean parable, although other accomplices were involved in the provocation of the Métis resistance.

If there is any substance to this revisionist argument, McLean utterly fails to demonstrate it. Indeed, his approach is one-sided and tendentious, while his arguments are based on clumsy tautologies or the technique of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. The author accepts what is yet to be proved as already proven, or he cites insubstantial or derisively inadequate sources to establish a point which is thereafter taken as given.

The examples of McLean's technique are sown throughout the book, but consider just a few. The author suggests that the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) was established entirely as a result "of the lessons learned during the Red River conflict" (P. 51), not also because of the American threat to Canadian sovereignty, the Cypress Hills

massacre, or the more general destabilizing activities of whiskey-trading American freebooters.

McLean also declares that the National Policy was "designed to ensure that the West would be developed primarily for the benefit of the CPR syndicate and the colonization companies. . . ." (P. 51) The movement of the railway to a more southern line was due *uniquely* to CPR wishes to thwart speculators who had bought land along the proposed northern route and to rake off the profits solely for its own stockholders. (Pp. 76-78) Among other desiderata, McLean does not mention that the southern route might have been quicker and cheaper to build (he claims it was more expensive, though without citing any evidence), or better placed to compete with potential American rivals. Nor does McLean make much use of common sources on the CPR even though his own views are quite categorical. In fact, no one would dispute that the CPR was a privately held, profit-seeking corporation, but it was also a state-sponsored enterprise with a national purpose. In this book, there is no recognition of any legitimate state interest in the settling of the North-West Territories.

McLean often uses "clear," "clearly," or "quite clearly" in describing conclusions he has drawn from his alleged evidence. A case in point is the assertion that the CPR was vital to British political, military, and economic interests. (Pp. 82-83) Apart from the author's firm conviction, however, the reader will discover as evidence of this view only one article from the *Regina Leader-Post* and another from the *Prince Albert Times*. There is no reference to cable traffic or other communications which may have been exchanged between London and Ottawa nor even to standard secondary sources on British foreign policy.

The same can be said of Hudson's Bay Company factor Lawrence Clarke's role in provoking the uprising. Again, whatever Clarke's role may have been, McLean discredits his argument by drawing overblown conclusions from flimsy or non-existent evidence. Clarke, on the one hand, welcomed the return of Riel and, on the other, warned the government of a possible rebellion and planned to set up Riel as a "scapegoat." (Pp. 88-89) "A government plot" was prepared: Macdonald declined to bribe Riel to leave the country because the Métis leader "was needed" for Ottawa's machinations. (P. 95) But there is scarcely any evidence presented to establish these points save for a telegram that makes little sense, even according to McLean, but which he claims, nevertheless, "pinpoints Clarke as the man responsible for bringing on the armed conflict of 1885." (P. 99) This conclusion is almost as baffling as the jumbled telegram upon which it is based, although, to be sure, it is all "clear" to the author. Henceforth, McLean takes it as given that Clarke "engineered" the rebellion and that the government in Ottawa knew of his activities. (P. 106) Whether Ottawa or Clarke was the main inspiration of the plot, however, is not explained.

Prior to publication of this book, McLean presented his views in a paper at the Métis conference in Saskatoon in May 1985. The paper was greeted with some skepticism and heckling, but McLean assured his audience that the book would adduce sufficient evidence to quiet any doubts. Although the book has now been published, the evidence which McLean promised is not brought forward.

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Attorney for the Frontier—Enos Stutsman by Dale Gibson. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1983. Pp. 166.

It is always refreshing to have a prominent legal scholar and professor undertake the challenge of writing in a discipline other than the law. Although the book bears the name *Attorney for the Frontier—Enos Stutsman*, the title is deceptive because only limited references are made to Stutsman's involvement as an attorney. Professor Gibson gives credit to his wife, Lee, and a colleague, Cameron Hardy, as collaborators. By virtue of the extensive, in depth research on a broad source base, the need for this group effort was clearly required.

There is a tendency for North American historians to talk about Canadian history and American history as disjunctive subject matters. In terms of the Western Plains of North America prior to 1870, it is very clear that influential historical figures very often transcended the now existing United States-Canada border. Enos Stutsman's contribution to the history of the Red River Valley was truly unique and distinctive. Prior to the publication of Professor Gibson's book, he was a figure known to historical scholars dealing with the 1868-70 Manitoba period. However, virgin soils were ploughed in terms of this exhaustive review of the true contribution of a remarkable person, supported by in excess of four hundred source documents, with ample quotations by the author to justify his interpretation of certain actions and positions taken by Stutsman.

Stutsman was severely physically impaired, having been born without legs. One would naturally assume that this type of physical handicap would have resulted in a sedentary life. This was not the case. Stutsman travelled extensively through the Western Plains with the most primitive type of transportation, suffering the severe rigours of climate with ongoing, undaunted determination. His role in life was truly multifaceted—businessman, lawyer, journalist, politician, customs agent and bonvivant. Probably his robust appetite for companionship, melded with song, food and drink, provided a strong motivational force.

Stutsman started his political career as a democrat in 1847, at the age of twenty-one. By 1851 he had been called to the Bar in Illinois. In