The CCF Government and the Formation of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians

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ABSTRACT. The formation of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians in 1946 resulted from the conjuncture of two developments — the increased political activism of Indian people caused by their participation in World War II and the support given the Indian cause by the Saskatchewan CCF government. Despite cultural differences and misunderstandings, the involvement of non-Indians assisted the process of establishing a provincewide Indian political organization. In some respects, however, the Union was undermined and weakened by activities of non-Indians who often assumed that they knew the Indians' interests better than did the Indians themselves. The voices of well-meaning, but paternalistic, non-Indian politicians and clerics sometimes drowned out the voices of Indian people. On balance, however, the results of the CCF government's intervention were positive in that the Union of Saskatchewan Indians allowed Indians to articulate their views and express their demands for change more effectively than had previously been the case. The Union also laid the groundwork for the evolution of a powerful provincewide instrument of Indian self-government, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations.

SOMMAIRE. C'est la conjoncture de deux courants qui mena à la création de l'*Union of Saskatchewan Indians* en 1946: le militantisme politique accru des Amérindiens résultant de leur participation à la Seconde Guerre mondiale et l'appui de l'administration provinciale CCF à la cause autochtone. Malgré l'écart entre les cultures et en dépit de divers malentendus, l'action des Blancs facilita l'établissement d'un organisme politique amérindien à l'échelle provinciale. Pourtant, selon certains points de vue, le mouvement fut affaibli et sapé par l'action de Blancs croyant souvent discerner les intérêts des Autochtones avec plus d'acuité que les principaux intéressés. Le discours d'hommes politiques et de religieux bien intentionnés quoique paternalistes occulta souvent la parole de l'Amérindien. Au bout du compte, l'intervention de l'administration cécéfiste fut positive, en ce sens que l'*Union of Saskatchewan Indians* permit l'articulation d'une vision autochtone et l'exposition d'une volonté urgente de changement d'une manière plus efficace qu'auparavant. C'est aussi l'*USI* qui prépara la voie à un instrument plus puissant d'autodétermination amérindienne, la Fédération des Premières Nations de la Saskatchewan (*Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations*).

The formation of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians in 1946 resulted from the conjuncture of two developments — the increased political activism of Indian people caused by their participation in World War II and the support given the Indian cause by the Saskatchewan CCF government. An estimated 6,000 Indians enlisted in the Canadian armed forces from 1939 to 1945, a proportionately higher number than for any other ethnic group.[1] Their military experience gave them a greater degree of worldliness and sophistication than they would otherwise have had, and their battlefield accomplishments provided self-esteem and confidence.[2] Having served on equal terms with non-Indian comrades in various branches of the armed forces, they returned to the reserves where the stifling, paternalistic Indian Affairs regime still prevailed. Rapidly demoted from the status of war hero to that of second-class citizen, Indian veterans felt deeply the need for fundamental changes in the way Indians were treated. They had a sharpened sense of identity, new self-confidence, and a determination to take up the challenge of political organization and leadership.[3]

At the same time, non-aboriginal Canadians were becoming more concerned about the way aboriginal people were treated. The heightened concern was in large part a response to the major Indian contribution to the

war effort, but it may also have arisen, as J.R. Miller has argued, because "in the midst of a war against institutionalized racism and barbarity, it was impossible not to notice that the bases of Canadian Indian policy lay in assumptions about the moral and economic inferiority of particular racial groupings."[4] J.A. Glen, the federal minister responsible for Indian Affairs, observed in 1945 that at no time in recent memory had the public mind been more focussed on the plight of Indians.[5] The Toronto *Globe and Mail* in February 1946 called for major changes in Indian administration: "We have reached a period now, however, where mere paternalism is not enough. Treaty money and protected reserves can no longer be accepted as the proper treatment of a sadly declining and passively loyal section of our population. ... The reservation has in effect become little more than a concentration camp."[6] Responding to public opinion and the lobbying efforts of veterans' organizations, churches and citizens' groups, the federal government in 1946 appointed a Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons to make proposals for the revision of the Indian Act.[7] The Committee's report led in 1951 to the removal of some of the obnoxious features of the Act, such as compulsory enfranchisement and bans on the potlatch and Sun Dance, but did not alter the general policy of assimilation.[8]

The Saskatchewan CCF government elected in 1944 had a strong interest in Indian issues. The interest emanated mainly from Premier T.C. Douglas himself, rather than from the party grassroots. There was no mention of Indian issues in the resolutions discussed at the 1944 CCF provincial convention, and only one resolution concerning Indians was presented and passed at the 1945 convention. It called for the extension of the franchise to Saskatchewan Indians.[9] Douglas, however, had a long-standing and deeply felt concern about Indian issues. Prior to becoming premier, he had served as a federal Member of Parliament and had taken an active part in the debates on the estimates of the Indian Affairs Branch. He was on record in 1943 as being in favour of "full rights of citizenship" for Indians.[10] When he assumed the office of premier, Douglas continued to make Indian issues a priority, even though constitutional responsibility lay with the federal government. His frequent interventions in Indian matters provoked the federal minister for Indian affairs to ask Douglas why he was encroaching on Ottawa's jurisdiction. He replied that the welfare of Indians was of concern to his government "firstly, because any epidemics or unhealthy conditions amongst them affect the people who come in contact with them, and, secondly, because we are trying to tackle a problem of the Metis people who usually live and work in close relationship with Indians."[11] The Premier addressed the Legislature in March 1946 on a resolution urging the federal government to set up a royal commission to look into conditions among Indian people, with particular reference to health, education, social welfare and civil rights. He said that the treatment of Indians was "one of the blackest pages" in Canadian history and that a new deal for Indians was long overdue. He felt that the principles espoused by the CCF, whose motto was "Humanity First," obliged his government to take action: "It has been said that the measure of any society is what it does for the least fortunate

group. It is not enough to establish a cooperative commonwealth and to raise the standard of living if there continues to remain like a canker a small, underprivileged, diseased, illiterate minority in society."[12]

Since Indians could not vote, the CCF did not stand to make immediate political gains from a pro-Indian policy, but this would change if the franchise were extended to Indians. Whether this was part of the CCF government's long-term political calculations remains a matter for speculation. The Liberals had a strong grip on the Metis vote, and the CCF may have spotted an opportunity to counter that influence. The Metis population was largely Roman Catholic as were more than half of the province's Indians.[13] This fact made it more difficult for the CCF to win Indian political support, given the Church's antipathy to the party's policies.[14] Thus, if the CCF's motives for intervening in Indian affairs were based to some degree on political expediency, the prospects for gain were not particularly good.

The formation of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians is an interesting case study in Indian-white relations. Despite cultural differences and misunderstandings, the involvement of non-Indians assisted the process of establishing a provincewide Indian political organization. In some respects, however, the Union was undermined and weakened by activities of non-Indians who often assumed that they knew the Indians' interests better than did the Indians themselves. The voices of well-meaning non- Indian politicians and clerics sometimes drowned out the voices of Indian people. On balance, however, the results of the CCF government's intervention were positive in that the Union of Saskatchewan Indians eventually evolved into an effective instrument of Indian self-government, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations.

The Union of Saskatchewan Indians was the merger of three predecessor organizations: the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan, the Protective Association for Indians and their Treaties, and the Saskatchewan section of the North American Indian Brotherhood. The latter's provincial leader was John Tootoosis, a grand-nephew of the famed Chief Poundmaker, who died in 1886 after being unjustly incarcerated for his role in the 1885 resistance. Before the North American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) came into being, Tootoosis worked for the League of Indians of Canada, which was founded at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario in 1919. The League held its first meeting in western Canada in 1920 and, in the course of the decade, westerners took an increasingly prominent role in the organization, with the Treaty 6 area having the most active membership.[15] The western Indians in 1929 formed their own organization, called the League of Indians of Western Canada, and held annual conventions at Poundmaker Reserve and other locations. The 1931 gathering at Saddle Lake, Alberta, for example, drew 1,344 delegates including twenty-two chiefs and councillors from thirteen Saskatchewan reserves.[16] Tootoosis, who was elected secretary and organizer for the prairie region in 1932 and president in 1934, spent much of his time travelling, attending band meetings, holding workshops, and generally trying to build the organization.[17] In 1944, Andrew Paull, a Squamish Indian from British Columbia,

invited Indian leaders from across the country to a meeting in Ottawa to form a national Indian organization. Six Saskatchewan members of the League of Indians of Western Canada, including John Tootoosis, attended the conference. After consulting with his membership, Tootoosis threw his support behind Paull and joined the NAIB.[18]

Another Indian organization in Saskatchewan was the Protective Association for the Indians and their Treaties. It traced its beginnings to the post-World War I period, when three bands in the Qu'Appelle Valley — Pasqua, Piapot, and Muscowpetung — allied to fight the seizure of Indian land under the Soldier Settlement Act.[19] The leaders were Ben Pasqua and Andrew Gordon (Pasqua), Pat Cappo and Charles Pratt (Muscowpetung) and Harry Ball and Abel Watetch (Piapot).[20] The Protective Association stood for the protection of Indian treaty rights, lands and resources, and the improvement of Indian education and economic welfare.[21] In the fall of 1945, these ideas were incorporated into a brief prepared with the assistance of Morris Shumiatcher, legal counsel to the Saskatchewan government, and presented to the federal minister responsible for Indian affairs.[22] Unlike the NAIB, which was based primarily in the Treaty 6 area, the Protective Association represented Treaty 4 Indians.

The Association of Indians of Saskatchewan was the third and newest of the Indian organizations. Although without a large membership, it included prominent Indians who favoured a closer integration of Indian people with the general population, and, therefore, had the ear of the provincial government. One of the first pieces of evidence of its existence is a letter of 17 June 1944 from Dan Kennedy, whose Indian name was Ochankugahe, to Zachary Hamilton in which Kennedy asked for an army tent "for us to hold another conference among ourselves during the Regina fair — for the purpose of forming an Indian organization."[23] Dan Kennedy, an Assiniboine from Carry-the-Kettle Reserve, had attended both the Qu'Appelle Indian Residential School and St. Boniface College in Winnipeg and was described as "an exceedingly successful, progressive farmer and probably the best educated Indian in Saskatchewan."[24] Hamilton was a newspaperman, amateur historian and failed real estate speculator.[25] The two men came together through their common membership in the Saskatchewan Historical Society, a voluntary organization dedicated to searching out and preserving the records of the pioneer era. The Society's "Indians of Saskatchewan" subcommittee had one Indian member, Dan Kennedy, who regarded his participation "as an opportunity and means of correcting errors and misinterpretations of the intimate life history of my people."[26] He and Hamilton carried out historical research together. For example, believing that history books had not dealt fairly with Sitting Bull, they journeyed to South Dakota and interviewed people who had known the Sioux Chief.[27]

Zachary Hamilton believed that Indians had not received a fair deal and, in particular, the Canadian government had not lived up to the spirit of the treaties.[28] Not surprisingly, therefore, he and Kennedy began to collaborate

on political, as well as historical, projects. The selection of the Regina fair as the occasion for a political meeting made sense because every year the Regina Exhibition Board invited Indians to set up their teepees in the centre of the fairgrounds. The Indians were, at one and the same time, guests of the fair, with free access to the exhibits, and one of the exhibits themselves. A Regina newspaper described the scene in August 1945: "Guests of the Regina fair board, about 90 of them — men, women, and papooses — have pitched their teepees in the camp ground west of the Grain Show building and for the entire week will take in the sights. The encampment is attracting hundreds of fair patrons, and on Monday children swarmed around the 13 teepees all day long, viewing with wonderment their red brothers."[29] The Indians attending the fair were a ready-made audience for a political meeting.

About thirty people attended the 1944 conference to form the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan.[30] They elected as president Joseph Dreaver, chief of the Mistawasis band near Prince Albert. He had been awarded a military medal for bravery at the Battle of Ypres in World War I and during World War II served as a member of the Veterans' Guard, guarding German prisoners at the camp near Medicine Hat.[31] Even though Dreaver was from the Treaty 6 area, the great majority of the Association's members came from the south. Vice-president and secretary-treasurer respectively were Hector Brass and his wife Eleanor from the File Hills Reserve. Her father was Fred Dieter who had been the first boy admitted to the File Hills farming colony, which had been set up by the Department of Indian Affairs for hand-picked graduates of Indian residential schools.[32] Also attending the meeting was Joseph Ironquill, a well-established farmer from File Hills. He had clashed with the Department of Indian Affairs in the past over such issues as the banning of dances and the admission of more farmers into the colony.[33] He now pointed out that the war had brought great changes to Canada and the period of reconstruction would bring greater changes still. There had to be changes for the Indians, too. However, he added cautiously, "I would like to be fully understood that this is in no sense an agitation. We desire in every way possible to cooperate with government officials and education authorities and we want to thank them for what they have already done."[34]

The Association of Indians of Saskatchewan decided that its membership "should consist of those who are generally considered Indians and associate members."[35] The wording is interesting because it implies that non-treaty Indians were eligible for full membership. Non-Indians could not be full members, but they were allowed to take part in the discussions and were appointed to honorary executive positions. They included Lieutenant-Governor A.P. McNab, honorary president, and A.E. Whitmore and Mrs. W.R. Motherwell, honorary vice-presidents. Whitmore was a wealthy Regina businessman, former president of the Regina Exhibition Board, and honorary Cree chief "Smiling Face." His close association with Indians began during his childhood in the 1880s in Moose Jaw when Sioux women supplied practically all the domestic help in the settlement. A fluent Sioux speaker, he gave advice and financial aid to the Association.[36] Mrs.

Motherwell, widow of William R. Motherwell who had served as federal minister of agriculture, was the former Kate Gillespie, at one time a teacher at the File Hills Presbyterian Indian Residential School.[37]

Members of the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan, representing five of the nine Indian agencies in the province, met in Regina in January 1945.[38] Among the topics discussed were equal treatment for demobilized Indian servicemen and white ex-servicemen after the war, better schools for Indian children, a voice for Indians in the administration of their own affairs, and better health facilities.[39] An executive meeting followed in April. The fact that it was held in the Regina office of the Saskatchewan Historical Society indicated the continuing assistance of Zachary Hamilton.[40] Although many of the same topics were canvassed, a new issue, the franchise, sparked some controversy. The only Indians allowed to vote at the time were veterans of the two world wars and their spouses. While some Indians welcomed the vote as a sign of equality with other Canadians, others feared it would lead to assimilation and the loss of Indian status. The controversy arose in part from confusion over the words "enfranchisement" and the "franchise." "Enfranchisement" was a term used in the Indian Act to describe the legal process whereby an Indian renounced his Indian status, gained the vote, moved permanently off the reserve, and became liable to pay taxes like any other citizen. Since enfranchisement meant the loss of identity as well as material losses, very few Indians voluntarily agreed to it. Many Indians did not want the franchise because it raised the spectre of enfranchisement and assimilation.

Dan Kennedy alluded to a split between pro-vote and anti-vote Indians in a letter to Hamilton:

> Perhaps it is apparent to you by now that we have two schools of thought sharply at variance with the issues confronting us. Of these, one proposed to recede within the shells of Treaty provisions and trust to providence — but the enlightened element would like to see a progressive movement toward the ultimate emancipation of the Indian. Whether we like it or not we are building only one Nation — heterogeneous in character, perhaps, but composite — Canadians. In the great task of nation building there is no room for a segregated group, who are prone to isolate themselves with racial differences or inferiority complex as in the case of my people.[41]

This is a revealing letter because it shows that Kennedy associated the vote with the integration of Indian people into one Canadian nation. In other words, those who perceived a link between the franchise and "enfranchisement" were not so far off the mark. Even if voting did not mean enfranchisement in the strict legal sense defined by the Indian Act, it was still a step toward desegregating Indian people and merging them into the rest of Canadian society. The franchise issue simmered and occasionally flared up during the formative years of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians. In addition to its intrinsic importance for Indians' citizenship rights, it symbolized a much larger issue — namely, would Saskatchewan Indians continue as a separate and distinct entity or would they increasingly integrate with the general population?

In the minds of some Indians, the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan was suspect because it contained pro-franchise elements. A group of chiefs and councillors meeting at Punnichy in July 1945 declared their opposition "to the plan of [Association President] Joseph Dreaver for the enfranchisement of the Indians." They feared that the vote "would cause the Indians to lose their Treaty rights, and that the Indians, leaving the reserves, would be at a loss to compete with white men sufficiently to guarantee them a living."[42] The presence of non-Indians as associate members of the Association did nothing to allay the suspicions of Indians who wanted to resist integration and assimilation. When the provincial government became involved in Indian politics these suspicions were exacerbated.

Premier T.C. Douglas began to take a more direct role in Indian affairs after July 1945, when the Indians of Carry-the-Kettle Reserve (Dan Kennedy's reserve) conferred on him the honorary title of Chief We-a-ga-sha (Red Eagle). In accepting the chieftainship, Douglas said he did not regard it as an "empty honour," and he encouraged his fellow chiefs and the tribe to share their problems with him.[43] True to his word, Douglas gave the welcoming address on 1 August 1945 at a meeting of the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan held this time, not in an army tent, but in the City Hall council chamber. With the Premier's moral support, the convention drafted a petition asking the federal government to appoint a royal commission on the administration of Indian affairs.[44] They also affirmed that all Indians in Saskatchewan should unite in one organization so that their views and proposals for reform could be more clearly heard in Ottawa.[45]

In December 1945 the call went out from Premier Douglas's office, inviting Indians from across the province to an assembly in Regina at the beginning of the new year.[46] The invitation was issued at the prompting of Chief Joe Dreaver, President of the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan, who later explained: "I personally wrote to him [Douglas] asking him for his assistance because of the fact that if I had asked the executive of the other organizations to attend a meeting where I was going to unite them they would have thought I was trying to submerge them in my organization. ... We had to get outside assistance, a man who had been an honorary chief of the tribe and ask him personally to assist us."[47] Douglas's involvement was bound to raise some eyebrows in the Indian Affairs Branch. In the first place, the Branch at this time had no enthusiasm for independent Indian political organizations. The paternalistic authority of the Indian agent and the wisdom of the Indian department's policies were not to be questioned.[48] Secondly, the federal government interpreted Douglas's actions as provincial meddling in an area of exclusively federal jurisdiction. Douglas defended his intervention in a letter to federal Indian minister J.A. Glen. The Premier identified two benefits from his facilitating a union of Saskatchewan Indians. Divided, Indians had not accomplished much, but brought together into a single organization they would have the opportunity of making "reasonable and practical suggestions to the Department of Indian Affairs regarding their conditions."[49] Here, Douglas was being polite; his real opinion was that the administration of the Department of Indian

Affairs was appallingly backward and desperately in need of improvement.[50] The other reason Douglas gave for encouraging Indians to organize was that their engagement in the process would help them lose the "attitude of mind, which depends entirely on the Dominion Government for assistance and rehabilitation."[51]

The conference to build a unified organization for Saskatchewan Indians opened on 4 January 1946 at the Legislative Building in Regina. The delegates were overwhelmingly from the Treaty 4 area of the province; only four of the approximately fifty Indians in attendance came from Treaty 6.[52] Chief Joseph Dreaver and Chief John Gambler, presidents respectively of the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan and the Protective Association for Indians and their Treaties, were present, but John Tootoosis of the North American Indian Brotherhood conspicuously was not. War veterans were very much in evidence, underscoring the linkage between Indians' political action and their wartime experiences. The Regina *Leader-Post* estimated that half a dozen delegates wore khaki, and others wore service ribbons indicating they had borne arms in World War I. Several of the delegates who were not veterans had sons and daughters who had served in the armed forces. For example, John McArthur of Moose Mountain lost two of his three sons overseas. Some chiefs wore the Queen's uniform, the uniform given each Indian chief when treaty was signed. Chief Ed Poor Man wore his treaty medal embossed with a portrait of Queen Victoria.[53]

In addition to the Indian representatives, there were several non-native delegates: Premier Douglas; the Hon. J.L. Phelps, Saskatchewan Minister of Natural Resources; Member of Parliament G.H. Castleden (CCF-Yorkton); Dr. Morris C. Shumiatcher; Zachary Hamilton; A.E. Whitmore; Frank Booth, Indian Agent, Qu'Appelle Agency; John Laurie, and a few others. Apart from Douglas, the key figure in this group was Shumiatcher, the Premier's 28-year-old executive assistant. Since Douglas had not assigned Indian issues to a cabinet minister, responsibility rested with the Premier's office, which meant, in effect, that Shumiatcher did the work. As a child growing up in Calgary, he had become acquainted with Indians through visits to the Sarcee reserve and to the Indian teepees set up at the annual fair. One of his high school teachers had been John Laurie, the dedicated secretary of the Indian Association of Alberta.[54] Shumiatcher kept in touch with Laurie and invited him to the Regina meeting to lend support to the organizational efforts in Saskatchewan.

In his opening remarks to the conference Premier Douglas was careful to say that he did not want to impose solutions on the Indian people ("for you know better than we what your problems are"), but rather to "cement you together so that you may speak with one voice in the councils of our nation."[55] After speeches from Phelps and Castleden, the floor was given to Chief John Gambler from Muscowpetung, who pointed out that many of the Indians present could not understand English. Arrangements were made for Cree translation, and, at a later stage in the meeting, Saulteaux. The meeting proceeded slowly, not only because of the time needed for

translations, but also due to Indian unfamiliarity with the Euro-Canadian way of running a meeting. Chief Gambler cautioned, "We must go slowly. The ways of the white men are strange in meetings." The format was set by non-Indians, whites occupied the chairs at the head table, and Shumiatcher chaired the proceedings. The Indian consensus style of discussion and decision making was not followed. Instead, resolutions were moved, seconded, debated, and voted, with victory going to the majority and defeat to the minority.[56]

Chief Joe Dreaver moved that "this assembly go on record as favouring the establishment of a single Indian organization in the Province of Saskatchewan for the purpose of expressing and advancing the views of all Indians of this Province, members of the new organization to enjoy the right to maintain their membership in present organizations." Ahab Spence, a Cree Anglican minister and teacher at Little Pine Reserve, began the discussion. He regretted that while presidents of two Indian organizations were present, the third one was not. It clearly bothered him that the northern Indians were being left out and that a consensus had not been achieved. He asked, "what differences, if any, are there in the organizations?" Dreaver replied that there was a misunderstanding that the organization he led wished to have all Indians enfranchised: "You will not find any in our group who wish to have the Indians enfranchised." Dreaver's defensiveness was evidence of the unease delegates were feeling about the issue. Spence observed, "Before, I thought that Joe Dreaver wanted to get his Indians out of the reserves to compete with the white man. He says this is not so, and that all have the same interests, all of the same blood, and all should stand together." However, the tension between the desire for equality and the fear of assimilation had not disappeared. Chief John Gambler of the Protective Association, responding to Ahab Spence's question about differences between the two associations, bluntly said, "the difference that exists is the difference between daylight and darkness." Nonetheless, for the sake of unity and in order to "fight together as a team," differences were put aside, and Dreaver's motion carried unanimously. The convention also decided to broaden the base of the organization by reaching out to "our brothers in the North."[57]

In the evening the provincial government hosted a banquet for the delegates. Once again, as in the business meetings held during the day, two different cultural styles were in evidence. According to Mervin Dieter, who years later wrote an account of the event for the *Saskatchewan Indian*, the custom of the "give-away" dictated that if Indians attended a feast offered by their chief, they carried home whatever was not eaten:

> The delegates had made their assessments of the white man's values. So it was that they came to this conference with preconceived ideas regarding the ways of the white man and that is if they were going to be fed, it was going to be only enough to whet their appetites. It, therefore, was with great delight and surprise that they found something akin to their customs when they sat down to dine at this great table laden with food — more food than they could possibly eat and there they sat with no means to carry away the left overs. ... The food was set upon a tablecloth of the finest material with matching serviettes. At this feast the

> serviettes served a totally different purpose than what they were intended for. ... these beautiful napkins were used to carry away the surplus food. On leaving the banquet area the Premier stood at the exit shaking hands and bidding the delegates farewell, if he noticed his beautiful napkins carried away laden with food and I am most certain that he did, he never batted an eye.[58]

After the Regina convention, a meeting of northern Indians was held at St. Michael's Indian Residential School at Duck Lake on 10 January 1946. The meeting was called by Chief Donald Gamble of Beardy Reserve and Chief Almighty Voice of One Arrow Reserve to discuss matters relating to the welfare of Indians and the unification of different groups into a single Indian organization.[59] The union was apparently to occur under the auspices of the NAIB.[60] Thus, there were two competing nuclei for Indian unity, one in the Treaty 6 area and one in the Treaty 4 area, with the latter supported by the CCF government. John Tootoosis chaired the Duck Lake meeting and spoke strongly in favour of the North American Indian Brotherhood. In particular, he emphasized the Brotherhood's opposition to the franchise for Indians, hinting that other organizations might not be equally sound on this issue. Two CCF Members of Parliament, Max Campbell (Battleford) and G.H. Castleden (Yorkton), exhorted the delegates to support the organization formed in Regina on 4 January at the meeting called by Chief Red Eagle (Premier Douglas). In the course of their remarks, they criticized the work being done by the Indian Affairs administration and the church-run residential schools. The lengthy speeches by CCF politicians provoked Chief Donald Gamble to demand that the deliberations of the conference be strictly limited to Indians only.[61] The delegates then voted down affiliation with the Indian federation organized in Regina and, by a huge margin, endorsed the NAIB.[62]

The fact that the Duck Lake meeting was held in a Catholic residential school undoubtedly put the CCF politicians at a disadvantage. The principal of the school, Father G.M. Latour, advised the Indians to stay away from anything connected with the socialist government.[63] According to Father Gontran Laviolette, teacher at the Qu'Appelle Indian Industrial School and editor of *The Indian Missionary Record*, the Indians at Duck Lake were worried about being "enslaved" to a political party: "Some thought that the Premier wanted the Indian administration to be transferred to the Province of Saskatchewan, that he wanted to give to the Indians the right to vote in the next provincial election."[64] Laviolette wrote that the Indians were "shocked" at the idea of replacing Catholic residential schools with "a new system of pagan education, independent from missionary control and influence."[65] Although Laviolette differed sharply on policy with CCF MP's Castleden and Campbell, they had one thing in common — they thought they knew what was good for the Indian people.

The Duck Lake meeting was a setback for the unity movement started at the Regina convention. To save the plan, Douglas issued an invitation to a third meeting of Indians to be held in Saskatoon at the Barry Hotel on 23 and 24 February 1946. The provincial government agreed to pay for delegates' accommodation in Saskatoon hotels and at the YMCA and for a banquet at the Elite cafe.[66] The Saskatoon meeting had broad representation from both

the Treaty 6 and Treaty 4 areas of the province.[67] As at Regina, Morris Shumiatcher occupied the chair. He read a message from Premier Douglas who said that the only object of the conference was the uniting of all Indian bands into one federation. He insisted that the conference had not been called by a political party and had no political agenda.

Andrew Paull, the national president of the North American Indian Brotherhood, wasted no time in outlining his opposition to provincial federation and appealing instead for the establishment of a provincial council of the NAIB. CCF Member of Parliament G.H. Castleden plunged into the debate to remind delegates that provincial federation did not imply the disbanding of the NAIB, the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan, or the Protective Association. Supporters of the Union did not have to give up their memberships in these individual organizations. John Tootoosis interjected that he understood the meeting "was to be a purely Indian conference with an Indian chairman to speak our own language, for half of the Indians here do not speak English." He switched to Cree, but what he said was not recorded in the minutes. Chief Almighty Voice asked, "We want to know who this convention belongs to. Does it belong to the Indians or does it belong to the white men?" Castleden rejoined that "if we left this convention to be called by the Indians, it would never have been called." He promised that as soon as a resolution was adopted to have an Indian organization, the constitution would state that every active member would have to be a full-blooded Indian. A white man could be only an honorary member.[68] Castleden had not only prejudged the outcome of the convention; he also had advance knowledge of what was in the constitution.

His presumptuous intervention probably harmed his own cause. However, the mood of the convention, articulated by Allan Ahenakew, John Gambler and others, favoured provincial unity. There was only one minor amendment to the motion creating the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians. Because the word "federation" was too suggestive of the CCF, the delegates substituted the word "union" and voted 76 to 9 to establish the Union of Saskatchewan Indians. Shumiatcher declared "the Indians of Saskatchewan will have a federation and will speak with one strong voice henceforth from today. Friends and brothers, I think this is the greatest decision the Indians in the West have made since the signing of Treaties in 1874."[69]

A committee was struck to write the constitution, with Shumiatcher acting as legal advisor. Based on a draft submitted to the Regina conference the previous January and approved by the convention, it stated that the Union would be "democratic and non-sectarian, and shall not directly or indirectly be affiliated to, or connected with any political party." Its principal aims were protecting treaties and treaty rights, fostering progress in all fields of the economy, education, and social life of Indians, and promoting respect and tolerance for all. As Castleden predicted, voting members had to be treaty or non-treaty Indians, but persons of any race were eligible for non-voting honorary membership. Active members were required to pay a fee of one dollar. The Executive Council, elected at a general meeting of the members for

a two-year term, consisted of a president, two vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer, two provincial organizers, and two councillors from each of the nine Indian agencies in Saskatchewan and one non-treaty councillor.

The election of officers took place on the final afternoon of the conference. The vice-presidents were John Gambler and Ernest Goforth; the secretary-treasurer, Gladys Dreaver, a student at a Saskatoon business college and daughter of Joseph Dreaver.[70] The choice of John Tootoosis as president sealed the success of the convention, bringing together the north (Treaty 6) and the south (Treaty 4) into one united organization. Andrew Paull of British Columbia, the president of the NAIB, had opposed the federation. Since Tootoosis was the dominant NAIB figure in Saskatchewan, his election to the presidency signalled that a degree of unity had been secured. It may have been the trade-off by which the north was reconciled to the south. After the Union was established, Andrew Paull continued his opposition, and Tootoosis resigned from the NAIB executive.[71]

By accepting the presidency, Tootoosis showed that he thought the CCF government deserved a measure of trust. Initially, he had been wary and had given Shumiatcher a "hard time."[72] As Tootoosis's biographers point out, his organizing work over the years had consistently met with active hostility from Indian agents and government authorities. Just the year before, he had asked the Indian Affairs Branch for a list of the addresses of the chiefs and councillors in Manitoba and had been refused. It was a novel experience for Tootoosis to find a white politician who wanted to foster Indian political activity.[73] At the same time, Tootoosis kept his distance from Douglas and the CCF and told well-meaning provincial government officials not to intrude on Indian autonomy.[74]

One of Tootoosis's goals was to win recognition and respect for the Union of Saskatchewan Indians. It happened that the day after the Saskatoon convention, federal Indian agents were scheduled to meet in that same city. Tootoosis decided to pay a visit: "We walked in on their meeting and told them that we were sent here by Chiefs and yesterday I was elected president of the association and no doubt they had heard it on the radio. I told them we came to meet with them since they were talking about the issues that concern us and that you will be talking about us anyway. We want to know what is going on and we may be able to assist you and work with you somehow."[75] As the Indians were being whisked out, they heard the chairman say, "We do not want those fellows here." Tootoosis immediately issued a press statement, deploring the fact that the democracy for which Indians had fought in the recent war had not yet penetrated the Department of Indian Affairs.[76]

The Union of Saskatchewan Indians held its first executive meeting on 5 May 1946 at Lebret and set up a committee to draw up a brief for submission to the federal parliamentary committee that had been appointed in lieu of a royal commission to consider revisions to the Indian Act.[77] On 31 May and 1 June 1946 the executive and committee members discussed the contents of the brief in some detail and directed Morris Shumiatcher, the Union's

legal advisor, to incorporate their ideas in a formal document.[78] Shumiatcher also exchanged ideas with John Laurie who was assisting in the preparation of the Indian Association of Alberta's brief.[79] The Union's general membership studied Shumiatcher's draft and offered suggestions at meetings in October and December 1946.[80] Yet another meeting for the same purpose was held in Saskatoon on 28 April 1947. One of the most contentious clauses dealt with the franchise. The final wording was the result of a compromise between the pro-vote and the anti-vote factions: "This Organization does not favour the enfranchisement of Indians in Canada but does recognize the necessity of eventually assuming the responsibilities and duties of citizenship, as well as the rights thereof, but the franchise itself is a thing of which the Organization cannot approve as such."[81] It was obvious that real unity on this issue had not been achieved.

In May 1947 John Tootoosis, John Gambler, Joseph Dreaver and Ahab Spence went to Ottawa to present the brief before the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs. The document's basic premise was that the treaties had been abrogated by the Indian Act and the way the Act was administered. At the time the treaties were negotiated, the Crown treated the representatives of the Indians as capable of dealing with their affairs to the extent of surrendering large tracts of land. However, after the treaties were signed, Indian chiefs and councillors were no longer deemed capable of handling their own affairs and, instead, were treated as children. The brief called for a number of amendments to the Indian Act to restore the spirit of the treaties, limit the powers of the Indian agent, and increase the rights of Indian self-government. For example, the Indian band itself, and not the Superintendent-General (Minister), should determine who was a member of the band and who was not. The band should be allowed to choose their chief and councillors as they saw fit rather than having their form of self-government dictated by the Indian Act, and the band should have the right to make expenditures from its trust fund without the consent of the Superintendent-General.

In addition to these and several other specific amendments to the Indian Act, the brief proposed initiatives to improve the socioeconomic welfare of Indians. Asserting that about one thousand Indian children in Saskatchewan were without schooling, it asked that a commission be set up to study the needs of the Indian educational system. Furthermore, the Union of Saskatchewan Indians recommended the closing of church-run schools: "Though parochial schools have contributed much to the education of Indians, the time has now come when it is necessary to separate education from religion, in order that the fullest time and energy may be devoted to the former, and in order that the principle of freedom of religion and of conscience, may become meaningful for the Indian. Abolition of parochial schools is therefore recommended, and public schools interdenominational in character should replace the existing institutions."[82] The brief also addressed needs in the areas of health, social assistance, housing, veterans' aid and economic development.[83]

Some of the members of the parliamentary joint committee attacked the credibility of Tootoosis and the Union delegation. It was alleged that the Indians were not the true authors of the brief; it had been written by the Premier's executive assistant. Shumiatcher denied the allegation, saying that the Indian leaders "are not men who are likely to take kindly to insinuations that the representations they made are not their own and do not reflect the wishes of their people ... every sentence of the brief was carefully read in English, translated into Cree, discussed at length, and where necessary, revised."[84] Senator J.F. Johnston (Liberal-Saskatchewan), quoting a newspaper article about the Union's organizational meeting in Saskatoon, charged that the Union itself was a product of CCF machinations: "Mr. Shumiatcher is a very bright lawyer in the employ of the Saskatchewan government. In my opinion, Mr. Castleden and Mr. Shumiatcher are the men largely responsible for this new organization. You know what can be done with Indians. This organization is the result of that effort. That is my candid opinion."[85] Tootoosis defended the Union's claim to represent Saskatchewan Indians by saying that during the winter of 1946-47 he had travelled all over the province explaining to the Indians of every band the purpose of the organization and the contents of the brief.[86] He said that the Union had 456 signed-up members, and many more would join if they could afford the one dollar membership fee.[87] Tootoosis received support from J.P.B. Ostrander, Inspector of Indian Agencies for Saskatchewan, who assured the Committee that the Union delegates represented the majority of the Indians in the province.[88]

Tootoosis told the Committee that the Union would be better organized were it not for "the interference from certain people in the province of Saskatchewan."[89] He referred to a dissenting brief submitted by the chiefs and councillors of Beardy's, John Smith, James Smith, and One Arrow bands of the Duck Lake Agency. It differed from the Union brief in requesting that "residential schools be continued and operated in the future by our various denominational missionaries."[90] Tootoosis said that Rev. Fr. G.M. Latour, principal of the Duck Lake Residential School, had advised the people in the agency not to have anything to do with the Union because it was connected with the CCF, and persuaded the bands to write their own brief.[91] N.J. McLeod, an Indian agent, took part in the Duck Lake meeting where the dissenting brief was discussed. When some of the Indians expressed support for the Union, McLeod, according to a notarized statement by two Indians who were present, threatened "that those who are in favour of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians or are connected with that CCF outfit had better pack up and go."[92]

Another anti-Union brief came from Tootoosis's home Poundmaker Reserve. It was sponsored by an organization called the Queen Victoria Protective Association, which had been formed "because we did not like the briefs made by the Union of Saskatchewan Indians and because we don't like the Union as it was formed by the CCF."[93] Tootoosis suspected that the local priest, Father Bouchard, was behind the organization.[94] Later that same year, tensions rose when Shumiatcher condemned the residential

schools for "callous treatment bordering on cruelty." *The Indian Missionary Record* shot back that Shumiatcher was guilty of "fostering a spirit of dissatisfaction" among the Indians,[95] and in another editorial claimed that "the Indians are in danger of becoming mere toys in the hands of the CCF government."[96] Tootoosis cited as an example of the church's anti-Union activities an offer that was made to Henry John Agecoutay, one of the committee members who had helped prepare the Union's brief: "Henry John, being in the hospital, the priest went to see him. The priest told him apparently to start up another organization, we'll give you all the money you need and all the missionaries will work for you to organize the Indians and you will be the leader. He told me this himself. He said no and told the priest, I can't do that, I was the one that chose the present leader and I'm supporting that organization."[97]

The Saskatchewan CCF government's intervention in Indian politics had both benefits and disadvantages for the Indian people. On the negative side, the enemies of the government sometimes became the enemies of the Union. The antipathy of Roman Catholic authorities, who detected a socialist conspiracy behind the proposal to close the church-run residential schools, damaged the Union. The grilling and questioning of his *bona fides* that Tootoosis received from Liberal Senator Johnston and other members of the Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee were fuelled by partisan animosity to the CCF. It is also possible that Indian Affairs personnel were hostile to the Union because they resented the provincial government's interference in what they considered to be their exclusive preserve. The Indian agent at Duck Lake made anti-Union and anti-CCF statements and encouraged local Indians to sign a petition dissociating themselves from the stand being taken by the Union. However, the evidence is not all clear-cut. J.P.B. Ostrander, the senior Indian Affairs official in Saskatchewan, backed Tootoosis and said the Union could speak authoritatively for the majority of Indians in the province.

There were other problems arising from CCF involvement in Indian politics. At some of the organizational meetings Indians complained that too much English was being used and that non-Indian delegates were talking too much. Indians felt at times that their meetings had been taken over and an agenda imposed on them.[98] When this happened, Indian leaders asserted themselves and took control. An example of this type of incident occurred at the Saskatoon meeting when John Tootoosis interrupted a long oration by a CCF MP to inform him that half the Indians in the audience did not speak English. Tootoosis then spoke in Cree, effectively blocking out the non-Indian participants. At another level, however, the non-Indian influences were not negated. The structure of the meetings, the rules of procedure and debate, the business of writing constitutions and drafting briefs — all of these were imposed by the non-Indian culture on the Indian culture. The clash of cultures was even in evidence at the social functions, for example, when the banquet at the Regina conference was subtly transformed into an Indian feast.

Douglas claimed that all he wanted to do was to help Indians organize themselves and that, once the Union was established, it would be free to determine its own policies and chart its own course without guidance or interference from the provincial government. However, Douglas did have his own view of what the future of Indians in Canada should be, namely, integration with the rest of the population. In 1956 he wondered aloud why Indians were on reserves: "We don't settle all the Chinese people out in some corner of Canada or some corner of the province."[99] Members of his cabinet were equally forthright. J.L. Phelps, the Natural Resources minister, during a Legislative debate in 1946, expressed the view that Indians clung to the treaties because they were insecure. They should lose ward status and be granted citizenship. He also suggested that responsibility for Indian affairs administration be transferred to the province and that the sale of liquor to Indians be legalized.[100] These opinions were shared by a number of CCF backbenchers.[101] However, in the 1940s and early 1950s, Douglas was not prepared to push the Indians to accept integration if they did not want it. His policy was to help Indians organize, but leave them alone to make their own decisions. Thus, while introducing legislation in 1947 to create a provincial Bill of Rights, Douglas made the comment that "it would be inconsistent for the government to introduce a bill of rights and at the same time have people under its jurisdiction who are denied the franchise,"[102] but when Indian leaders stated they were not interested in the franchise, he did not press the issue. Despite this "hands off" policy, the involvement of the CCF government in the affairs of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians could not help but influence the organization, if only in indirect ways. For example, the franchise issue was extremely sensitive and divisive for the Union, and the disunity was likely aggravated by the fact the CCF government took a pro-franchise position. Later on, during the late 1950s the CCF government, frustrated by the lack of progress on Indian issues, adopted a more aggressive and integrationist strategy. It pushed for the extension of the vote, equal liquor rights, and the delivery of services to Indians by the provincial rather than the federal government.[103] However, at the time of the formation of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians and for more than a decade after that, Douglas's Indian policy was to encourage Indians to organize and speak with a united voice.

The drawbacks to the CCF government's involvement in Indian politics, though significant, were outweighed by the benefits. Premier Douglas's moral support and material assistance helped to establish, for the first time, a united and independent provincewide Indian organization. His government called and financed the Regina and Saskatoon conventions, CCF politicians participated in the debates, and a provincial government official chaired the meetings, helped draft the constitution and the Union's brief to the Joint Committee on Indian Affairs. Joe Dreaver acknowledged the government's contributions when, at the close of the Saskatoon convention, he moved a vote of thanks by the Indians "to their white friends who had assisted them in accomplishing a work which would have taken them a long, long while to complete, if they had not received help."[104] Another

tribute came from Francis Pegahmagabow, a member of the Parry Island band in Ontario and the most highly decorated Indian of World War I.[105] Pegahmagabow, upon hearing of the attempt to organize the Union of Saskatchewan Indians, praised Douglas as the first Canadian politician "since the influx of white people into our country" to recognize native people as human beings. The Indian veteran said he was praying for the well-being of the CCF government "hereafter forever and ever."[106]

The formation of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians, the predecessor of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, was a major accomplishment. Although the Union later fell on hard times, was challenged by rival organizations, and endured prolonged periods of inactivity, an important precedent had been set. The Indians of Saskatchewan had come together in a single organization to discuss matters of common interest, assert their rights, and call for fundamental reforms in the way they were treated. The foundation was established for the development of an effective provincial mechanism for Indian self-determination and self-government.

NOTES

1. Olive Dickason, *Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 328.
2. Jean Goodwill and Norma Sluman, *John Tootoosis*, 2nd ed. (1982; Winnipeg: Pemmican Publications, 1984), 185.
3. Fred Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers* (Penticton, B.C.: Theytus Books Ltd., 1985), 72.
4. J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 220.
5. Regina *Leader-Post*, 15 December 1945.
6. Cited in Regina *Leader-Post*, 16 February 1946.
7. John Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy," in J.R. Miller, ed., *Sweet Promises: A Reader in Indian-White Relations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 139.
8. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, 221-22.
9. *Saskatchewan Commonwealth*, 28 November 1945, 9; Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB), T.C. Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XXVIII 684 (18-15) 1/12, *Delegates Handbook Tenth Annual CCF Provincial Convention, November 5, 6, 7, 1945: Resolutions and Proposed Amendments to the Constitution*. The same file contains a mimeographed copy of the resolutions presented at the 1944 CCF provincial convention.
10. Regina *Leader-Post*, 24 July 1943.
11. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XXIII 733a (23-12), J.A. Glen to T.C. Douglas, 14 February 1946; T.C. Douglas to J.A. Glen, 18 February 1946.
12. Regina *Leader-Post*, 22 March 1946.
13. The 1951 census indicated that 13,658 of Saskatchewan's 22,253 "Native Indians and Eskimos" were Roman Catholic. *Ninth Census of Canada 1951*, Vol. 2, Table 35-18.
14. Two Indian leaders, Angus Mirasty and William B. Charles, warned Douglas that the influence of Catholic priests would ensure that Indians would not vote CCF. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XLV 864 (49) 3/6, Angus Mirasty and William B. Charles to T.C. Douglas, 9 April 1956.

15. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, 217.
16. Stan Cuthand, "The Native Peoples of the Prairie Provinces in the 1920s and 1930s," in Miller, ed., *Sweet Promises*, 383.
17. Delia Opekokew, *The First Nations: Indian Government and the Canadian Confederation* (Saskatoon: Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, 1980), 34-35.
18. Goodwill and Sluman, *John Tootoosis*, 179-82.
19. Ibid., 146.
20. Harry Ball and Abel Watetch, both World War I veterans, were later involved in the Association of Indians of Saskatchewan. Watetch was a godson of Father Hugonard, the founder of the Qu'Appelle Industrial School. Hugonard was so fond of the boy that he wanted to take him on a visit to France in 1895. The trip was cancelled when Watetch's parents disapproved. Watetch eventually made it to France — as a soldier in the Canadian army in 1916. Harry Ball, one of the first graduates of the Regina Indian Industrial School, lost a leg at Vimy Ridge. *The Indian Missionary Record*, November 1944, 10; Regina *Leader-Post*, 11 February 1948.
21. Opekokew, *The First Nations*, 31-34.
22. *The Indian Missionary Record*, October 1945, 5.
23. SAB, Saskatchewan Historical Society (SHS) 30, Dan Kennedy to Zachary Hamilton, 17 June 1944.
24. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XLV 864a (49), Z. Hamilton to T.C. Douglas, 31 July 1945. See also Dan Kennedy, *Recollections of an Assiniboine Chief* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972) and *Saskatchewan Indian*, March 1973.
25. SAB, Mary Weekes Papers, R-100-XV, Scrapbook 3. Regina *Leader-Post* clipping. See also Zachary MacCaulay Hamilton and Marie Albina Hamilton, *These are the Prairies* (Regina: School Aids and Textbook Publishers, 1955).
26. SAB, Records of the Saskatchewan Historical Society, R-151, Box 3, File 213-1, Dan Kennedy to Zachary Hamilton, 28 December 1936.
27. Ibid., W. Perkins Bull to Zachary Hamilton, 20 October 1936.
28. Ibid., Box 2, File E, Zachary Hamilton to J.A. Gregory, 26 June 1943.
29. Regina *Leader-Post*, 1 August 1945.
30. Ibid., 24 July 1944.
31. *The Indian Missionary Record*, 15 October 1943, 2; *Saskatchewan Indian*, December 1972.
32. Sarah Carter, *Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 242.
33. Ibid.
34. Regina *Leader-Post*, 24 July 1944.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 7 January 1949, 9 March 1949; *The Lemberg Star*, 21 August 1931.
37. Eleanor Brass, *I Walk in Two Worlds* (Calgary: Glenbow Museum, 1987), 18, 38.
38. *The Indian Missionary Record*, February 1945, 7.
39. Regina *Leader-Post*, 8 January 1945.
40. Ibid., 16 April 1945.
41. SAB, SHS 30, Dan Kennedy to Zachary Hamilton, 17 June 1944.
42. *The Indian Missionary Record*, July-August 1945, 8.

43. Regina *Leader-Post*, 27 July 1945.

44. *The Indian Missionary Record*, September 1945, 7.

45. SAB, Douglas Papers, R.33.1 XLV 864a (49), D. Kennedy to M. Shumiatcher, 25 September 1945.

46. Regina *Leader-Post*, 28 December 1945.

47. Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Indian Act, (hereafter Special Joint Committee), *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 20, 9 May 1947, 1054-55.

48. Harold Cardinal, "Hat in Hand: The Long Fight to Organize," in Miller, ed., *Sweet Promises*, 395. The obstacles that federal officials put in the path of John Tootoosis as he tried to organize Indians in Saskatchewan are described in Goodwill and Sluman, *John Tootoosis*.

49. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XXIII 733a (23-12), T.C. Douglas to J.A. Glen, 18 February 1946.

50. Douglas and his assistant, M.C. Shumiatcher, wrote so many letters to the federal minister responsible for Indian affairs relaying the grievances expressed by Indians that the federal minister James A. MacKinnon wrote the Premier on 19 July 1948: "I have noticed since I took charge of this department an unusually large number of letters on file here relating to the administration of Indian Affairs in Saskatchewan received from you and from Mr. Shumiatcher. ... What disturbs me at the moment is the tendency on the part of certain Indians to ignore the Indian Superintendent and the steadily increasing tendency to bring problems of administration direct to your office." SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XXIII 733b (23-12), James A. MacKinnon to T.C. Douglas, 19 July 1948.

51. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XXIII 733a (23-12), T.C. Douglas to J.A. Glen, 18 February 1946.

52. The numbers were as follows: from the Treaty 4 area — Pasqua (2); Muscowpetung (3); Piapot (3); Standing Buffalo (2); Sakimay (6); Cowessess (2); Kahkewistahaw (2); Crooked Lake (1); File Hills (8); Assiniboine (7); White Bear (1); Poor Man (2); Day Star (1); Gordon (3); from the Treaty 6 area — Sturgeon Lake (1); Tweedsmuir (1); Red Pheasant (1) and Mistawasis (1). There was also one delegate from Chapawance. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians: The Record of the Establishment of Indian Unity in Saskatchewan*, March 1946.

53. Regina *Leader-Post*, 5 January 1946.

54. Interview, Dr. Morris C. Shumiatcher, 29 July 1992; Hugh A. Dempsey, *The Gentle Persuader: A Biography of James Gladstone Indian Senator* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1986), 120-22.

55. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946.

56. Regina *Leader-Post*, 5 January 1946.

57. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946.

58. *Saskatchewan Indian*, July 1973.

59. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946.

60. *The Indian Missionary Record*, March 1946, 2.

61. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946.

62. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XLV 864a (49), *Indian Missionary Record Supplement*, February 1946.

63. Special Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 19, 8 May 1947, 945.

64. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XLV 864a (49) *Indian Missionary Record Supplement*, February 1946.

65. Ibid.

66. Regina *Leader-Post*, 11 February 1946; *The Indian Missionary Record*, March 1946, 6.

67. The Treaty 4 area was represented by delegates from the following reserves: Assiniboine (9); Cowessess (1); Crooked Lake Agency (1); Daystar (4); Gordon (1); Keeseekoose (1); Kahewistahaw (1); Muscowpetung (5); Muskowekwan (1); Okanese (4); Pasqua (1); Peepeekisis (7); Poor Man (3); Sakimay (3); Standing Buffalo (2); Star Blanket (4); Cote (2); and the Treaty 6 area by Beardy's (6); James Roberts (1); James Smith (3); John Smith (3); Little Black Bear (2); Little Pine (2); Mistawasis (5); One Arrow (7); Onion Lake (1); Poundmaker (4); Red Pheasant (1); Sturgeon Lake (2); Sweetgrass (2); Thunderchild (1); Ahtahkakoop (1); Moosomin (2); Shoal Lake (1). Unidentified were Big Island Lake (1); Dundurn (1); McLeod Agency (2); Mosque (1); Mosquette (1); Musqua (1); New Reserve (1); Peenees (3); Rock Pheasant (1); Sand Lake (1); William Jowts (1). SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946.

68. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.; Regina *Leader-Post*, 25 February 1946.

71. Special Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 19, 8 May 1947, 942.

72. Interview, Dr. Morris C. Shumiatcher, 29 July 1992.

73. Goodwill and Sluman, *John Tootoosis*, 188.

74. SAB, T.C. Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XLV 864a (49), E.A. Boden to T.C. Douglas, 24 June 1946.

75. Saskatchewan Indian Federated College (SIFC) Library, University of Regina, Indian History Film Project Records, interview, John Tootoosis, #IH-ST.02, 14 July 1976.

76. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946. Extract from the Saskatoon *Star-Phoenix*, 27 February 1946.

77. Special Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 19, 8 May 1947, 947. The committee members were Chief John Gambler, Muscowpetung; Emil Dubois, Avonhurst; Hector Brass, John Keewatin and Henry John Agecouty, all of Lorlie; William Bear, Tweedsmuir; Alex Bear and Horace Seewab, Pelican Narrows; Ed Stonechild, Qu'Appelle; John Pelly; and Chief Joe Dreaver.

78. Special Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 19, 8 May 1947, 947; Regina *Leader-Post*, 3 June 1946.

79. Interview, Dr. Morris C. Shumiatcher, 29 July 1992.

80. Regina *Leader-Post*, 30, 31 October; 6, 7 December 1946.

81. Special Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 19, 8 May 1947, 1000.

82. Ibid., 979.

83. Ibid., 971-1002.

84. Regina *Leader-Post*, 1 May 1947.

85. Special Joint Committee, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 6, 21 March 1947, 247.

86. Ibid., No. 19, 8 May 1947, 941.

87. Ibid., No. 20, 9 May 1947, 1054.

88. Ibid., 1079.

89. Ibid., No. 19, 8 May 1947, 942-43.
90. Ibid., No. 41, 9 July 1947, 2074.
91. Ibid., No. 19, 8 May 1947, 945.
92. Ibid., 943-44.
93. Ibid., 934.
94. SIFC Library, Indian History Film Project Records, interview, John Tootoosis, #IH-ST.02, 14 July 1976.
95. *The Indian Missionary Record*, December 1947.
96. Ibid., March 1946.
97. SIFC Library, Indian History Film Project Records, interview, John Tootoosis, #IH-ST.02, 14 July 1976.
98. This resonates to a degree with the interpretation given in Murray Dobbin's *The One-And-A-Half Men: The Story of Jim Brady and Malcolm Norris, Metis Patriots of the Twentieth Century* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1981). He argues that CCF government activity among the Metis in northern Saskatchewan was well intentioned but ultimately paternalistic and unhelpful.
99. Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, *Debates*, T.C. Douglas, 2 March 1956.
100. Regina *Leader-Post*, 22 March 1946.
101. Ibid., 8 March 1946.
102. Ibid., 25 February 1947.
103. These issues are explored in James M. Pitsula, "The Saskatchewan CCF Government and Treaty Indians, 1944-1964," *Canadian Historical Review* 75 (1994): 21-52.
104. SAB, R-834, Indians of North America, file 37, *The Union of Saskatchewan Indians*, March 1946.
105. Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers*, 28.
106. SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1 XLV 864a (49), Francis Pegahmagabow to T.C. Douglas, 30 December 1945.