ABSTRACT. Many historians of the Canadian West have given prominence to a tale in which the Plains Cree chief Piapot ignominiously submits to the moral authority of the North West Mounted Police. In reality, Piapot was a leader with a reputation for bravery in war and for tenacity in support of Indian rights. The popularity of this myth can tell us much about the Euro-Canadian society in which it was circulated.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, to many people on the Canadian Plains (both Indian and white), the name Piapot brought to mind a formidable Cree warrior, a strong-willed leader and champion of Indian rights. In the twentieth century, however, the name Piapot has been better known for an improbable incident which has both blackened his reputation and become a romantic feature in the lore of the Canadian West. The incident is, indeed, one of the best-known episodes relating to the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) and the European settlement of the West. Many historians of the Canadian West have included in their writings an incident in which Piapot is represented as pathetically attempting to halt construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) across the Plains. The attempt is shown as futile and the once-great chief is depicted as being forced to back down ignominiously by a heroic member of the NWMP.

There is no doubt that Piapot was one of several Cree chiefs who were disturbed by the thrust of an expansionist Euro-Canadian culture onto the Plains. It is also quite possible that the railway was viewed by him and by other Plains Indians as the embodiment of everything which threatened their traditional way of life. But the pitiful act which has been attributed to Piapot in 1883, while perhaps not an outright fabrication, was at most a colourful exaggeration of an incident of little significance in itself. Nevertheless, the incident has significance as a myth which has served the interests of Canadian nationhood for a long time.

The Incident

R.G. MacBeth’s account of the incident is typical. He describes Piapot as one “who had always been a source of trouble on account of his ugly disposition and his evident determination not to acquiesce in the incoming of civilized life.” He tells how Piapot finally decided that the Canadians and their railway must be halted, and thus had his band pitch its tipis directly on the construction route. The surveyors requested assistance from the NWMP, who sent out only two men, a sergeant and a constable. MacBeth relates how Piapot refused to move and, indeed, encouraged his men to provoke the police, even after the sergeant advised him that he had ten minutes to decamp. At the end of this period the brave Mountie, in MacBeth’s words,
leaped over Pie-a-Pot's head and, entering the chief's tent, kicked out the centre pole and brought it down in a hurry. He did the same with the four tents of the chief's head-men and then told them to get out at once. The Indians saw the kind of men they had to deal with and so they moved swiftly, and the Canadian Pacific surveyors and engineers went on with their work.  

The Piapot incident has been told and retold with slight variations over the years. The earliest known published version appeared in an article by William A. Fraser in the July 1899 issue of McClure's Magazine; the article was reprinted in the Canadian Magazine in February 1900. Six years later Ernest J. Chambers repeated the tale in one of the first full-length books written about the NWMP as an organization. In the following decades some details were added to the story and others altered. Cecil Denny, for example, claims that three policemen were involved, while Walter Liggett notes only one; A.L. Haydon purports to quote the actual orders of the Mounted Police. It seems as if almost everyone writing about the NWMP and the European settlement of the West in the first eighty years of the twentieth century used the story of Piapot's humiliation to enliven his book. By the 1980s, however, historians tended to disregard the tale altogether, and at least one has expressed doubts about its likelihood.

The origin of the tale of Piapot's showdown with the CPR and the NWMP is rather shadowy. There is no account of it in the annual reports of the NWMP or the Department of Indian Affairs, nor is there any trace of it in the records of those two institutions. Many documents of the early years of the NWMP were lost in a fire in 1897, but it is highly unlikely that Fraser, Haydon or any of the other writers could have had access to these records before the fire.

William Fraser (1859-1933), was a Canadian journalist and novelist whose interests lay in the Canadian West, horse racing and India. His 1899 article appears to have been the only nonfiction he wrote concerning the NWMP. In the article he chose several incidents from the history of the force to illustrate its remarkable accomplishments. His examples contain both exaggeration and novelistic dialogue. One incident, involving Sitting Bull and the Mounted Police, is to be found nowhere else in the literature on the police. It is possible that he did not invent the Piapot affair outright, but he may simply have inferred the idea from talks with Mounted Police veterans and embellished one of their yarns.

The story was given some credibility when John Peter Turner included it in his official history, The North-West Mounted Police, 1873-1893. Published in 1950, Turner's two-volume work was widely read and, for at least two decades, stood as the principal authority on the early years of the force. In his account, Turner identifies William Brock Wilde as the sergeant who kicked down Piapot's tipi. Royal Canadian Mounted Police records contain a memorandum noting that Turner had received the information in an interview with Robert N. Wilson, a former policeman who had served in the NWMP in the 1880s and later become an amateur historian of the Canadian West. Wilson recalled that, in the spring of 1883, Wilde and a constable were living in a tent at Maple Creek, awaiting the establishment of a post.
there, when they “received a wire to go down the line and get Piapot to move.” The memorandum, however, goes no further; there is no mention of anyone kicking down a tipi. Turner must simply have taken the colourful tale which had been in print more than fifty years and added Wilde’s name to it.

The tale may have had its source in an incident which occurred in 1883 and which did, indeed, involve Piapot, the CPR and the NWMP. On 26 April 1883, the *Manitoba Free Press* reported that a number of Indians under Piapot and Big Bear had threatened railway track-layers west of Swift Current. The two chiefs were the principal leaders of those Cree who had not yet settled on reserves; most of these Indians had spent the past winter in the Cypress Hills area, subsisting miserably on the meagre rations supplied by agents of the Department of Indian Affairs. The newspaper noted that the Indians had intended no harm but only wanted to draw attention to grievances which they held against the department. A small detachment of NWMP was said to have been sent to calm the situation. Two days later the *Free Press* reported that “there are no Indian troubles at the end of the track” and implied that the police detachment had actually been sent out to establish the new post at Maple Creek. Track-laying was described as “progressing vigourously.”

On 28 April 1883, the *Winnipeg Times* published the text of an interview which its correspondent had had with J.J. Egan, superintendent of the Western Division of the CPR, upon his return from the end of the track:

> The report as to the troublesome disposition of the Indians, due to their objection to the railway passing through their reservation is wholly unfounded. I saw some fifteen Tepees at the end of the track, and about the same number at Swift Current, and they [sic] were conducting themselves in a most ludicrous manner. The engines and cars appeared to be an endless source of delight to them, and it is with greatest difficulty the train men can keep them off the cars. They are expecting the buffalo to cross at these points in about a week and this has led to their congregating there.

The incident was obviously not one of great significance. The *Regina Leader*, closest newspaper to the scene, did not even mention the affair.

It may never be known exactly what happened at the end of the track, but one can conjecture. Perhaps some of Piapot’s men were boisterously intrigued by the novelty of railway trains and were at the same time still bitter at the manner in which Indian Affairs’ officials had treated them during the past winter. As well, perhaps some of the track-layers felt threatened and called for police protection when they saw this large, clamourous collection of Indians. It may have been true that a sergeant rode over from Fort Walsh or Maple Creek to talk with Piapot but it is most unlikely that the Mountie and the Indian confronted one another in a provocative manner. Moreover, Cree tipis had no centre pole which could be kicked down.

The NWMP sometimes felt that tense encounters with angry Indians could best be defused by a handful of policemen rather than a squad of heavily armed men. But the encounter described by Fraser, MacBeth and others, in which Piapot is personally humiliated, would probably have ended
in violence. After all, a chief who had spent a lifetime building a reputation as a warrior and strong-minded leader was unlikely to put himself in a position where he might have to back down. Fraser, in his explanation, was swept away in a flurry of triumphant imperialism. He contended that Piapot "had either got to kill the sergeant — stick his knife into the heart of the whole British nation by the murder of this unruffled soldier — or give in and move away. He chose the latter course, for Piapot had brains."\(^{12}\)

**The Chief**

In one respect, at least, Fraser's assessment of the chief was accurate, for his intelligence was widely acknowledged.\(^{13}\) Indeed, Piapot possessed most of the qualities expected in a Plains Cree leader of his time; he was as strong a leader as custom permitted. A Cree chief had no real power to hold people to his allegiance, for they could leave at any time to join another band leader. A chief could exercise influence over his followers only by means of persuasion, personal example and the benefits he could bring them. Reputation, then, was the foremost ingredient of leadership: a chief had to build a reputation for achievement in several areas in order to attract and retain a following.\(^{14}\) This, Piapot was able to do.

Over a lifetime, Piapot built a reputation by demonstrating his strengths in a number of ways; among these were his prowess as a warrior, his tenacity as a bargainer in dealings with the Canadian government, and his constancy as a defender of Plains Cree customs. With this reputation, Piapot remained the leader of one of the largest bands of Cree on the Plains for many years both before and after taking up residence on his reserve. Indeed, only months before his encounter with the CPR track-layers, the Department of Indian Affairs reckoned his following at about 1,200 people. Only one other chief, Lucky Man, had as many, while the renowned Big Bear had only 400.\(^{15}\) The Indian agent, Cecil Denny, felt that it was Piapot who held "the greatest influence over the Crees."\(^{16}\)

The year of Piapot's birth may never be established with certainty. Although records kept by the Department of Indian Affairs give his year of birth as 1833, his nephew claimed that he was born about 1816 (this date would have made him an unlikely 92 years old when he died, however).\(^{17}\) Piapot must have gained recognition as a chief by the 1860s at the latest, for in 1870 he was acknowledged as the leader of a large force of Cree and Assiniboine bands which joined together to attack the Blackfoot (Piapot, having had an ominous dream, may have withdrawn before the fighting began).\(^{18}\) Piapot and his band lived generally in the area between Wood Mountain and the upper Qu’Appelle River. Although commonly identified as Cree, the band contained a number of followers known as "Young Dogs," who were, like Piapot himself, of mixed ancestry — Cree and Assiniboine (a Siouan-speaking group). His name, which has also been transliterated as *Payepot*, means "a hole in the Sioux."\(^{19}\)

Piapot's reputation as a warrior was based on the ardour he showed in fighting the Blackfoot — traditional enemies of the Cree — and stealing their
horses. Indeed, his renown as a warrior was great enough for the Hudson's Bay Company to deny him recognition as a trade chief (war leaders were considered disruptive to commerce). After 1870 there were no large-scale Indian battles fought on the Plains but as late as 1882 Piapot and his band were still being accused of raiding the Blackfoot and rustling their horses.

In his later years Piapot delighted in showing people the many wounds he had incurred during his fighting days.

Whites were well aware of Piapot's warlike reputation. Even years after he had settled on a reserve, they continued to view him with fear and suspicion. In 1884, for example, there were reports that Piapot had set out to visit Louis Riel, who had recently returned to the North-West Territories.

In 1885, when the government feared the Indians would join the Métis in rebellion, a large force of NWMP went to his reserve to make sure of his loyalty. In 1890, when the authorities worried that the Ghost Dance phenomenon (which was arousing Indians in the American West) might spill across the border, police were again sent to Piapot's reserve, lest he encourage its spread into Canada.

In the mid-1890s, when the young Cree, Almighty Voice, killed a Mountie and eluded capture for nineteen months, rumours of impending Indian uprisings circulated across the Canadian West with Piapot's name cited as a possible leader. Clearly, Piapot's reputation as a warrior endured for years in the West.

Piapot's experiences in dealing with officials of the Canadian government added to his reputation for leadership among the Plains Cree. Although not always successful, he was a tenacious bargainer, particularly when interpreting treaty terms and negotiating a reserve site for his band.

In 1875, when Piapot agreed to sign Treaty No. 4 (he was a year late in doing so), he agreed only on the condition that the treaty commissioners would lay his demands for improvements before the government. His demands included medical supplies, technical instruction, agricultural equipment and higher annuities. Piapot also appears to have been among the chiefs who, in 1876 and 1878, insisted that additional verbal promises had been made to them when Treaty No. 4 was signed and that these were not being acknowledged by the government.

In 1884 and 1887 he pursued the matter, repeating his claims directly to the lieutenant governor and the deputy superintendent general of Indian Affairs. Though his efforts had no effect, his persistence brought him continued respect among Plains Indians.

After signing Treaty No. 4 in 1875, seven years were to pass before Piapot even considered settling on a reserve, and nine before he finally did; he was one of the last Cree chiefs to do so. Most of the intervening years were spent hunting in the Cypress Hills, the surrounding plains and Montana; he usually received his annual treaty payment at the NWMP's Fort Walsh.

Piapot, along with Big Bear and Little Pine (said to be his brother-in-law), were the leaders of those who were trying to carry on their traditional lifeways as long as the buffalo held out. Piapot and the others dreaded the day they would have to forego the freedom of the Plains and accept the confining life of a reserve. Still, Piapot was not the obstructionist depicted
by R.G. MacBeth, William Fraser and others. He did not reject the inevitability of settling on a reserve, he simply wanted to put off that day as long as possible.

By 1882, however, Piapot and his followers were ragged, hungry and weak. The band was almost totally dependent on government handouts of food and clothing. It was time to listen to Indian Affairs officials and their exhortations to settle on a reserve. In his previous dealings with the government — trying to win improvements to Treaty No. 4 — Piapot had had no success at all. This time, however, the outcome was different. By forceful action, he was able to gain the best possible reserve for his band.

Every year more and more Cree gathered in the Cypress Hills, near the international boundary, to hunt small game and receive government relief at Fort Walsh. In 1881 Piapot had been promised a reserve in the Cypress Hills. In 1882, however, the Department of Indian Affairs decided that all reserves should be located farther north. The department argued that locating the reserves farther from the boundary would preclude Canadian and American Indians crossing the line to raid one another. The historian John Tobias, however, has contended that the policy was changed because the department feared that if any Crees obtained a reserve in the Cypress Hills too many would demand land there, resulting in a dangerously high concentration of Indians in one area.

The government was particularly anxious to get Piapot onto a northern reserve. As one policeman observed:

Pie-a-pot's disappearance from these hills with his Indians will have the effect of hastening the departure of all the Northern Cree bands to their Northern reservations. ... His remaining here will only have the effect of drawing discontented Indians from their reserves and making these hills the rendez-vous for good-for-nothing Indians from all parts of the Territory.

In the spring of 1882 Piapot was persuaded to leave the Cypress Hills. In June he and 470 of his followers, escorted by a troop of NWMP, left for a reserve near Indian Head. Upon inspection, however, Piapot decided the location was unacceptable. By September he was back in the Cypress Hills where he spent the next winter. The following April he had his alleged encounter with the NWMP on the CPR line.

In 1883 the government took new measures to get the Cree out of the Cypress Hills and onto northern reserves. The Indians were told that Fort Walsh would be closed and henceforth rations and treaty annuities would be issued only on reserves. Again, it was Piapot who concerned the government most. The chief was offered free transportation for all of his people and their horses if he would move to another reserve site near Indian Head. He accepted, but, ironically, the transport chosen was rail and soon after the expedition set out two cars left the track, injuring several Indians. Piapot was furious and refused to go any farther by train. To make sure the band got to their new reserve, the government provided oxen and carts to take them the rest of the way.
In the spring of 1884, after a long, wretched winter on the reserve (forty-five people are reported to have died), Piapot and his band burned their dwellings and left, vowing they would never return. Local white settlers were alarmed by Piapot's behaviour, especially when he announced plans to hold a Sun Dance. The NWMP commissioner, A.G. Irvine, decided the chief must be forced to return to his reserve. He set out with a troop of fifty Mounted Police and, early in the morning of 19 May, came upon Piapot's camp. The Indians, fearing they were about to be attacked, hurried to arm themselves. Irvine, however, acted quickly to avoid a dangerous confrontation: he rode directly to Piapot's lodge and reassured him. He persuaded the chief to accompany him to Fort Qu'Appelle where they could discuss his grievances with Hayter Reed, the assistant commissioner of Indian Affairs.

At Fort Qu'Appelle, Piapot demanded a reserve with access to water and fish and, in later talks, he particularly mentioned land on the Qu'Appelle River adjoining the Muscowpetung reserve. Some of that land belonged to a colonization company but Reed promised to consider his demands. Piapot then left to celebrate his Sun Dance. Within a short time the government decided appeasement was the best policy, "appropriated" the colonization company's property, and granted the chief the land he desired on the Qu'Appelle. By the end of the summer Piapot and 550 of his followers had settled on their new reserve. All the other Indians who had not yet moved to a reserve were now expected to do so for, as one Indian agent said, "they have no recognized leader since Piapot settled down.

Twice Piapot had stood up to the authorities; twice he had rejected reserves which the government had picked out for him. In the end, he had succeeded in gaining a reserve on land of his own choice, one of the few Plains Indian chiefs to do so. Not only was the land Piapot chose more agreeable than the earlier sites, it was also contiguous to the reserves of two other Cree bands — Muscowpetung and Pasqua. The result was one of the highest concentrations of Indians on the Plains, a situation which the Department of Indian Affairs had tried to avoid in the Cypress Hills two years earlier. It was a situation which allowed a strong-minded chief such as Piapot to wield influence over a wide population. Piapot's forceful action undoubtedly enhanced his reputation for leadership among Indians of the Northwest.

Once settled on reserves, most chiefs found that they had little opportunity for independent action. Their importance in the daily life of their bands was superseded by the Indian agent, with all his economic and political clout, and they lost status amongst their followers. Piapot, however, although agreeing to live on a reserve, never acceded to the submissive role which the government anticipated for reserve chiefs. He may not have had much influence on the government bureaucracy but amongst his band members he was still able to maintain his standing as a leader, particularly as a defender of traditional Cree ceremonial practices.

Piapot had long been an ardent sponsor of the Sun Dance and the Give-away Dance. The Sun Dance (sometimes known as the Thirst Dance), which had once included rituals to prepare men for war, now usually
constituted a means of soliciting requests from the Spirit Power and giving thanks for favours received. The Give-away Dance, for its part, featured a redistribution of wealth among the participants — generosity by the givers bringing them prestige and supernatural blessings. Government authorities did not object to the dances which Piapot held between 1883 and 1885, his first years on a reserve. Thereafter, however, they tried to discourage the ceremonies throughout the North-West Territories. The dances were condemned not only for their paganism, but also because it was felt they distracted the Indians' attention from their farming duties and discouraged thrift and individualism.

Piapot's reserve was known as a bastion of paganism, or at least for its resistance to Christianity: as late as 1896, for example, 85 percent of the residents were officially listed as "pagan." And it was the chief himself who persisted in supporting the objectionable dances. In 1895 the Department of Indian Affairs noted that the only successful Sun Dance performed in the Territories that year was on the Piapot reserve. That same year the Indian Act was amended outlawing the Give-away Dance. In 1901, when some of his followers organized such a dance on the reserve, Piapot was arrested and sentenced to two months in prison at hard labour for inciting resistance. As further punishment, the following year Indian Affairs removed him from its rolls as chief of his band. These penalties were no humiliation, however; on the contrary, they only enhanced the old chief's standing among Plains Indians as a champion of Indian rights.

At the time of his imprisonment Piapot was at least 68 years of age and perhaps much older. When he died on his reserve in April 1908 his name was still well known in the West. But it was at about this same time that writers in the East were beginning to spread the tale of his ignominious encounter with the NWMP, a tale which destroyed the reputation he had built through a lifetime.

Piapot was a proud man, one to whom honour and esteem were the paramount values. He had spent a lifetime building a reputation for courage, tenacity and strong-minded leadership. It would have been extraordinary for him to have risked personal humiliation at the hands of two lone policemen in front of so many of his followers. Since reputation was the basis of Plains Cree leadership, to suffer humiliation would mean losing much of his band. Indeed, it was unlikely that either the chief or the Mounties would have put themselves in such a precarious position in the first place, a position where they might have had to use force; both parties were too prudent to do so. Commissioner Irvine had avoided hostile confrontation at Piapot's camp in May 1884. Piapot, for his part, had promised he would never fight whites. On one occasion, in a dispute with government officials, he had used strong language but then had sworn that he would "fight for all his rights with his tongue and not with Bullets." 

The Myth

While it is evident that the Piapot incident as reported in numerous
histories was highly embellished, other questions remain. For example, why was the story so widely circulated? And why were Canadians so ready to believe it? The answers to these questions might be found by viewing the story as a contribution to national mythology — that is, as one in a collection of narratives which both support and express a community's set of beliefs. When considered as a national myth such a tale can reveal many things. It can show, for example, how a community justifies its collective action and it can show how a community develops a concept of itself — its assumptions, its values, its ideals, its aims. (It can even reveal its uses of history.) When viewed as myth, the incident of 1883 can be interpreted as serving at least two purposes for the Canadian community. First, it helped Canadians justify their right to hegemony and development in the West. Second, it bolstered Canadian trust in the ideal of a nation built on respect for order and authority.

In 1883 Piapot had a reputation among whites as an influential and strong-minded leader, one of the most refractory Indians in the West. In Canadian mythology, he represents those who wished to hold back the forces of progress, particularly as symbolized by the CPR. His defiant confrontation with the track-layers and the NWMP could have threatened Canada's destiny as a nation spanning the whole continent. His bravado, however, was shown to be empty and pathetic; such behaviour only served to demonstrate the irrationality of Indians and confirmed that they were unsuited for any role in the “new West.” They were destined to fade away. Piapot and his band are portrayed as so weak they could not withstand the determination of two lone policemen, so perhaps their culture was unworthy of further consideration. Any claim to additional compensation from Canadian authorities — for example, better treaty terms — could be disregarded. The chief’s alleged abject submission can be seen as an acknowledgement of Canada’s rightful hegemony over the West and its development by the CPR and other forces of progress. The Piapot myth, then, served to validate Canada’s rights in the West; it helped remove any doubts which might have lingered in the minds of Canadians over the legitimacy of expropriating these former Indian lands. It demonstrated their right, indeed their destiny, to create a modern, transcontinental nation.

In the incident of 1883, the two Mounties play out a distinguished role in mythology. They portray the unflappable, unnamed hero who embodies the ideals of the larger community in a perilous world. They are the just and courageous agents of the new Canadian nation, the firm but temperate expression of a land where order and peace are meant to prevail. Faced with a potentially dangerous situation, they defend the interests of the community yet avoid the spilling of blood. They had no need even to draw a weapon, for just a few words from a Mountie was sufficient. Even Piapot, one of the most powerful Indians of his time, was moved to acknowledge the irresistible moral authority of Canadian law. He is shown as being totally in awe of the law. Canadians have long wanted to believe that they live in a peaceable kingdom where conflicts are resolved without violence, and here the supreme authority of the law is shown to have worked. The myth of this
Mounted Police success, repeated many times in print, served to advance and certify Canadians' trust in authority.

In short, the tale of Piapot's submission, initiated by W.A. Fraser, was repeated and believed because it fitted the plan of the country which Canadians believed they were building. It was exactly the kind of story Canadians wanted to hear. Similarly, if the Piapot myth has been forsaken by writers in recent years, it may be because it no longer conforms to our community belief systems. To the surprise of many Canadians, the Indians managed to survive the twentieth century. They are still active and visible on the Canadian landscape, demonstrating that their culture had more validity than the Piapot tale suggested. In light of this tenacity, readers today probably find it difficult to accept that an Indian leader of such acknowledged reputation could have acted in such a pathetic manner. The Piapot myth is no longer strong enough to buttress the assumptions of an earlier day.

NOTES


2. Ibid.


13. See, for example, Indian agent A. Macdonald, in Dept. of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (Ottawa: MacLean, Roger and Co., 1884), 67.

15. Dept. of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (Ottawa: MacLean, Roger and Co., 1882), 202-03.

16. NAC, RG 10 (Dept. of Indian Affairs records), vol. 3744, file 29506-2, Denny to Assistant Commissioner, 6 December 1881.


19. *Treaty No. 4 between Her Majesty The Queen and the Cree and Saulteaux Tribes of Indians at Qu’Appelle and Fort Ellice* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 11; Watetch, *Payepot and His People*, 10-14.


22. NAC, RG 10, Scrapbooks, I, Acc. 78-9/16, (c. 1890), p. 79; Regina Leader, 13 July 1899.


29. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3662, file 12667, Dewdney to superintendent general, 28 April 1884; vol. 3761, file 32248, Lash to commissioner, 7 December 1887.


32. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3744, file 29506-2, McIlree to Dewdney, 28 February 1882.


35. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3745, file 29506-3, Norman to Dewdney, 29 December 1882.

36. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3745, file 29506-2, McIlree to commissioner, 27 June 1882; Macdonald to Galt, 29 July 1882; RG 18, vol. 2905, Walsh to Macdonald, 28 July 1882, pp. 80-81; Dept. of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1882, p. 5; NWMP, Annual Report, 1882, pp. 3-5.


39. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3686, file 13168, Macdonald to commissioner, 15 May 1884; Reed to
superintendent general, 20 May 1884. Ibid., vol. 3745, file 29506-4 (pt. 1), Irvine to White, 27 May 1884.


41. Dept. of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1884, part I, pp. 66, 67, 204-205.


45. Dept. of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (Ottawa: MacLean, Roger and Co., 1896), 438.

46. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3761, file 32248, Lash to commissioner, 7 March 1887; Reed to superintendent general, 12 March 1887; Lash to commissioner, 7 July 1888; Lash to Commissioner, 8 July 1889. Dept. of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (Ottawa: MacLean, Roger and Co., 1892), 150; ibid, 1895, 199.

47. Canada, Statutes, 58-59 Victoria, cap. 35.


50. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3745, file 29506-2, A. MacDonald to E. Galt, 29 July 1882.