

“It’s My Duty ... To Be a Warrior of the People”: Kainai Perceptions of and Participation in the Canadian and American Forces

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ABSTRACT. The participation of Aboriginal soldiers in the Canadian Forces (CF) is an historic fact that largely went unnoticed in the political sphere until the 1990s. Reflecting on this failure to acknowledge historic military relationships at a time the CF is seeking increased Aboriginal recruitment, the present study seeks to reveal why Aboriginal people are less likely to enlist in the CF or the American armed forces, on the basis of interviews conducted with Kainai service personnel and potential recruits during the spring of 2006.

SOMMAIRE. La participation des soldats autochtones dans les Forces Canadiennes est un fait historique qui jusqu’aux années 1990 est passé en grande partie inaperçu dans le domaine politique. La présente étude, en examinant cette incapacité à reconnaître des relations militaires historiques au moment même où les Forces cherchent à augmenter le recrutement autochtone, tente de dévoiler pourquoi les Autochtones sont moins susceptibles de s’engager dans les forces canadiennes ou américaines. Des entrevues poursuivies au printemps 2006 avec le personnel de service et des recrues en puissance de Kainai nous ont servi de base.

The participation of Aboriginal soldiers in the Canadian Forces (CF) is an historic fact that largely went unnoticed in the political sphere until the 1990s.¹ Beginning in 1995, the CF responded to Aboriginal Veterans demanding federal consideration for what they claimed to be the poor treatment of both Aboriginal and Métis veterans by establishing a Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples to examine their claims more closely.² The final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) followed in 1996, and while it echoed the Standing Senate

Committee's conclusions in principle, it strongly advocated that the Canadian government both acknowledge its pitiable treatment of Aboriginal and Métis veterans and recognize their corresponding contribution to the CF.³ Historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer has argued that "the military must recognize its living presence in Aboriginal communities and acknowledge that Aboriginal and military attitudes towards one another are rooted in the past, discussed in the present, and shaped in the future."⁴

The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) embraced these ideas, and in June 2006 sponsored a two-day conference entitled "Aboriginals and the Canadian Military: Past, Present, Future." Conference organizers sought to "celebrate, raise visibility and increase awareness of Aboriginal contributions to the Canadian Forces" while endeavouring "to build bridges between these communities and develop ideas that will help strengthen Aboriginal-military relations in the future."⁵ The workshop enabled participants to discuss future strategies to promote Aboriginal peoples' participation in the CF. Reflecting on these issues, the present study seeks to reveal why Aboriginal people are less likely to enlist in the CF or the American armed forces, on the basis of interviews conducted with Kainai service personnel and potential recruits during the spring of 2006.

Methodology

A distinctive feature of this study is that the results are based primarily upon the views and attitudes of Aboriginal people. Members of the Kainai First Nation of southern Alberta were selected to provide Aboriginal perspectives concerning the interests, preferences, and factors that influence Kainai First Nation members to join the CF, or, for that matter, to reject enlisting. The informal interview, an exploratory, discussion-based research method, proved conducive to engaging Kainai elders and reserve residents usually hesitant to interact with university researchers. The interview findings were then triangulated against the available academic literature and government case studies. An Aboriginal researcher from the Blood Reserve was employed to guide the project's development and implementation in view of his previous experience working with Kainai youth and elders. Personal interviews were conducted with sixteen individuals comprising four groups: (1) former Kainai CF veterans; (2) Kainai individuals who expressed an interest in enlisting with the CF; (3) Kainai individuals who eschewed the CF for enlistment in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) or US Army; and (4) Kainai veterans who could provide us with detail about what compelled them to participate in World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the Vietnam War.

In all, 15 males and one female, aged 23–85, in the Canadian Forces, the Bold Eagle Program (a four-day culture camp followed by the standard Canadian military recruit training course), the USMC, or the US Army, were selected to participate in this project. A brief follow-up interview was conducted following initial contact to inform each participant of his or her rights and responsibilities. This was done to build trust and to collect basic data such as the participant's age, current home and life situation, and employment status. The personal interview represented the final stage of the data-gathering phase. This followed a general format whereby the researcher engaged the participant in a general discussion while posing, in no particular order, a number of pre-determined questions designed primarily to keep the interviewer attuned to the major themes being investigated. Each participant was provided with a \$50 honorarium as an expression of our appreciation for the time they provided and in honour of the knowledge they made available to us.

A Brief History of Aboriginal Canadian Forces Participation

Aboriginal people historically allied themselves with European powers, the British, and later the Canadian government, a theme prevalent in the RCAP's presentation of historic Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal interface. Aboriginal people maintained their independence and entered into various political arrangements with other nations, while the French engaged various Aboriginal peoples as trade partners and military allies. These relationships continued despite shifts in the overall patterns of Aboriginal-government relations after 1815. Historians Scott Sheffield and Whitney Lackenbauer, in their recent overview of the historiography on Aboriginal peoples in the world wars, observe that the literature on this more recent period has grown but that it remains, as historian Michael Stevenson categorized in an earlier article, fairly "limited in scope."⁶ Further inquiry confirms that the majority of the writing tends to focus on what Rob Innes has characterized as "the issue of unequal distribution of veterans' benefits between non-Indian and Indian veterans," resulting in writers highlighting "the victimization of the veterans in the post-war period." His concern is that "a negative consequence of the concentration of studies on this subject has been to create the perception of Indian veterans as victims" and that such a "one-dimensional view of Indian veterans grossly misrepresents, underestimates and undervalues their role and place in Indian society."⁷ Despite a long and impressive history of CF participation, it was 1979 before two reports were released highlighting the CF role Aboriginal people played while also identifying the implications of federal

policy associated with the Veteran's Land Act (VLA).⁸ In particular, the VLA benefit policy that entitled non-Native veterans and Aboriginal veterans living off reserve to a \$6,000 loan upon their return to Canada simultaneously limited Aboriginal veterans returning to the reserve to a \$2,321 grant.⁹

Several authors have commented on Aboriginal CF participation during World Wars I and II. In World War I, for instance, 4,000 of a potential 11,500 Aboriginal men across Canada enlisted.¹⁰ This is impressive considering that prior to 1916 Aboriginal volunteers were deemed undesirable recruits.¹¹ Following their acceptance into the military, attempts were made to establish an all-Aboriginal battalion, although pressure from other battalion commanders ended this endeavour.¹² As historian James Walker illustrates, palpable within the CF was a racist ideology even though "Canadian history itself should have suggested" that the image of Aboriginal people take on a more neutral characterization, more in line with the existing Aboriginal political ideology stressing cultural inclusion and working together. As such, "the stereotypes derived from Britain and the United States were more powerful than the domestic experience."¹³ This ultimately clouded the Canadian understanding of where Aboriginal people fit into Canadian society, the CF included.

Impressive military participation rates notwithstanding, federal officials still believed that Aboriginal people could contribute more. In response, the Indian Act was amended to permit alienation of reserve lands to augment the Greater Production Campaign. Nine bills to amend the Act were subsequently presented to the House of Commons from 1914 to 1930, the overall purpose being to increase the powers of the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (DSGIA) while permitting greater access to Indian lands in western Canada.¹⁴ This included an amendment established to permit further acquisition of reserve lands to enable the Soldiers Settlement Act (1919),¹⁵ established to reward returning veterans with easy access to homestead and farm lands alienated by government from reserves in western Canada. But Aboriginal war veterans were deemed ineligible for consideration due to conflicting Indian Act legislation excluding Aboriginal people from acquiring private land holdings on reserves. Many Aboriginal veterans as a result were disqualified from alienated reserve land allocations non-Native veterans were privy to, at low interest rates. According to historian Jonathan Vance, Aboriginal veterans found that upon their return to Canada "their service did not put them on an equal footing with their white comrades," adding that "all too many Indian ex-soldiers discovered that, despite their years of service at

the front, they were no closer to enjoying the rights that they had ostensibly fought to defend."¹⁶ For example, the minister of Pensions and National Health determined in 1932 that the War Veterans' Allowance did not apply to Aboriginal people living on reserves because they were viewed as akin to any other individual living on a reserve, or that "such men are wards" of Indian Affairs. It was later determined that Indian Affairs must deliver settlement privileges.¹⁷ It was 1936 before Aboriginal veterans would enjoy equivalent benefits to those of non-Native veterans under the War Veterans Allowance Act and the Last Post Fund.¹⁸

The memory of such treatment appeared to be short-lived if World War II Aboriginal volunteerism is any indication. For instance, the 35% enlistment figures parallel similar numbers from World War I, and it is further estimated that 3,090 Aboriginal men and women saw action, of which 213 died and 93 were wounded in the CF's three service branches. The desire to enlist prompted 46 recruits to join the US forces after they learned that education requirements barred them from the CF.¹⁹ Aboriginal people contributed \$23,596.71 to the war effort, adding to the \$44,000 collected during World War I.²⁰ Yet again Aboriginal peoples came under fire, this time vis-à-vis federal conscription policies. During the conscription debates, Department of Justice officials clearly defined Aboriginal peoples as British subjects and therefore predisposed for military service.

One of the few projects to examine Aboriginal CF participation during World War II is an oral history survey of the reasons compelling Saskatchewan Indians to volunteer for overseas service. Reasons given by the veterans included escaping poverty, the fact that a wife was entitled to her husband's allowance, and a sense of loyalty to the Crown borne of treaty relationships.²¹ It was found that Aboriginal volunteers enlisted for a variety of different reasons: they were angered by the oppression they faced, in addition to feelings of isolation from both mainstream Canadian society and other reserve community members. Yet upon their return, "there was much animosity directed toward the veterans in their home communities that has not been recorded in the secondary literature."²² James Dempsey claimed that "the government acknowledged that the war helped bring nations into their own by broadening the outlook on life for Indians who had served overseas, as well as the home-front. The government further believed that this change indicated a willingness to understand and to get to know the white man's ways through education."²³ But Innes is critical of this commentary. First of all, he argues that it does not recognize that the Canadian public's attitude toward Aboriginal people

changed significantly following the war. Secondly, it fails to acknowledge the pre-existing Aboriginal work ethic. Finally, Indian participation in the war effort "did not signal a new attitude among Indian people: this was just another example of Aboriginal people adapting to their situation," which, in this case, represented "the government's public recognition of Aboriginal people's adaptability."²⁴

Arguably these factors combined to help shape the foundation of the existing First Nations-Canada relationship, especially when framed by a comprehensive federal assimilation agenda aimed at facilitating the rapid integration of Indians into Canadian society. The literature fails to conclude, however, whether these tensions were further aggravated by an historic lack of federal recognition of Aboriginal CF contributions. The question that arises is this: Did these events engender within Aboriginal society a belief equating their participating in any facet of mainstream society as potentially destructive, in particular their participation in the CF? Did the latent effects of these historic events come to inform the current Aboriginal decision to avoid enlisting in the CF? And what of the impact of a number of federal policies aimed at appropriating reserve lands during the two World Wars? Did Aboriginal people come to acknowledge that their participation in the war efforts could ultimately facilitate an individual's territorial dispossession, thereby undermining cultural saliency and political stability? And finally, how did the lack of federal recognition afforded Aboriginal veterans contribute to current Aboriginal perceptions of the CF?

The Kainai and the Canadian Government

The Kainai First Nation, located on the Blood Reserve in southern Alberta, is a member nation of the Blackfoot Confederacy.²⁵ Organized into small bands typically no larger than 20 or 30 people, each community was historically a self-governing and self-sufficient entity that occupied demarcated territories for its exclusive use and benefit.²⁶ Each community fended off parties challenging its sovereignty by attempting to broach its territorial boundaries, specifically nations such as the eastern Cree or the southern Shoshone.²⁷ Prior to their mid-18th-century acquisition of the horse, the Kainai traversed their territory on foot, a period of limited mobility known as the "dog days."²⁸ The introduction of the horse was a technological revolution of sorts, permitting the development of more efficient hunting techniques while also enabling the Kainai to expand their territorial claims.²⁹ Such movement led to their acquiring guns from the French, resulting in the Kainai being quickly positioned as a pre-eminent military

power in the northwestern region of the plains. A rapid and aggressive period of territorial expansion followed as the Blackfoot Confederacy's member nations pushed the Shoshone to the southwestern corner of the Montana territory while forcing the Flathead and Kootenai across the Continental Divide. This was followed by the rapid displacement of the Cree further north and east.³⁰ By the end of the 18th century the Blackfoot Confederacy controlled a considerable expanse of the Montana territory, extending into modern-day Alberta and western Saskatchewan.³¹

Beyond territorial protection, warfare fulfilled a variety of roles in Kainai society. It was a means of acquiring personal wealth, of protecting tribal hunting grounds from outside incursions of neighbouring tribes, and of obtaining status within one's own tribe.³² Children were raised to consider war an opportunity to acquire fame and riches,³³ so that warfare was an integral part of Kainai political economy.³⁴ Proficiency as a warrior through demonstrated acts of bravery was requisite to gaining acceptance into one of the many societies (e.g. Horn, Brave Dog), for several required men who had distinguished themselves in battle.³⁵ When battles were not available, counting coup was practiced, which could include stealing horses from an enemy's camp. Most importantly, however, warfare was extended into another community to avenge loss of life or material wealth that occurred as a result of another tribe bringing hostilities to Blackfoot territory. This was the nature of Plains Indian warfare up until the arrival of the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) in 1874, followed quickly by the Crown agreeing to Blackfoot Confederacy treaty requests. The Kainai, the North Piikuni, and the Siksika signed Treaty 7 with representatives of the British Crown and the Canadian government in September 1877. In return for annuities, promises that the last buffalo herds would be protected, and the establishment of sheltered reserves, the Kainai, North Piikuni, and Siksika agreed to cede close to 40,000 square kilometres of territory to facilitate settler migration. Most importantly, the Blackfoot Confederacy member nations agreed to abstain from engaging Canada, the Crown or neighbouring tribes militarily.

The Kainai never challenged the Canadian government post-treaty, even following the loss of the buffalo in the early 1880s. By this time, the Kainai were dependent on government rations and Indian Agent generosity for their survival. As part of Treaty 7, the Crown provided farming implements and minimal training to aspiring Blackfoot farmers. During this period the warrior's role steadily eroded as Indian Agents did everything in their power to abolish horse raiding and intra-tribal warfare. Ceremonies were still being practiced, events designed to arouse courage

and enthusiasm; yet there was no corresponding outlet for these emotions, and therefore they may have briefly lost some significance. With the exception of a few episodes of sporadic violence, warfare on the plains was severely curtailed.³⁶ Also, from 1896 to 1902 Indian Affairs exerted tremendous pressure on Chief Red Crow to surrender portions of the Blood Reserve. In addition to promoting western settlement, a secondary objective was to rid the federal bureaucracy of the dreaded "Indian problem."³⁷ In 1913, Shot-Both-Sides, grandson of Red Crow, took over band council leadership following his father Crop Eared-Wolf's death, and was immediately inundated with federal and local surrender requests.

Resistance to land surrenders occurred following the start of the Great War, and impressive volunteerism and reserve agricultural production notwithstanding, DSGIA Duncan Campbell Scott believed Aboriginal communities could be doing more. The resulting federal Greater Production Campaign was formulated, whereby "idle" land and resources on reserves were conscripted and leases assigned without the permission of tribal leaders. The release of a Department of Agriculture report indicating that the Blood Reserve contained "without a doubt, the best stock raising land in western Canada" generated in surrounding farmers and ranchers increased interest in the reserve.³⁸ As of May 30, 1918, nearly 4,800 acres of the Blood Reserve were alienated under the aegis of Greater Production.³⁹ The Soldier Settlement Act followed, designed to allocate land to returning veterans as a reward for their efforts on the European front. And while it did not exclude Aboriginal peoples outright, the Act conflicted with a 1906 amendment to the Indian Act, which stated:

No Indian or non-treaty Indian resident in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, or the Territories shall be held capable of having acquired or of acquiring a homestead or pre-emption right under any Act respecting Dominion lands, to a quarter section ... in any surveyed or unsurveyed land in the said provinces or territories.⁴⁰

The fact that Kainai men were enlisting in such impressive numbers while their leaders were rejecting the Greater Production Campaign and later the Soldier Settlement Act (the former aimed at improving domestic agricultural production to aid in the war effort, the latter to assist returning veterans in establishing farms and homesteads in western Canada in appreciation of their efforts overseas) must have appeared somewhat paradoxical to federal officials. On the one hand, by enlisting, Aboriginal men

appeared to be patriots; yet they were simultaneously demonstrating an antagonistic attitude in rejecting federal programming. Despite Chief Shot-Both-Sides' resistance to federal initiatives aimed at alienating reserve territories, by 1922 there were 16 leases of reserve land, most of which were granted without Kainai leadership's consent.

The interwar years were difficult for the Kainai, due in part to federal efforts aimed at dispossessing the reserve residents of their lands through illegal leasing and the allocation of land to non-Native veterans.⁴¹ Shoddy treatment of the Kainai did not stop them from again rising to the challenge and enlisting in the CF following the outbreak of World War II. In 1941, the tribal council in good faith negotiated military access to the Blood Reserve, thereby permitting the CF to establish a 50,000-acre bombing and gunnery range (approximately one seventh of the total reserve land base). The endeavour proved disappointing, however: during the four-year run, several fires broke out, razing thousands of acres of productive farmland; several animals were killed during military exercises; and CF administration inadequately responded to the Kainai leadership's concerns.⁴² According to one veteran, following their return from Europe "we were having a hell of a time" because the "government didn't even look at the Indians." He also mentioned that non-Native men he served with were entitled to the full \$6,000 under the Veteran's Land Act, something he claims "Natives were not included in."⁴³

The theme of participation in the CF resulting in one's own territorial alienation and cultural annihilation begins to emerge. Yet central to Kainai cultural stability is the need for men to exhibit bravery if they are to join various societies and take part in vital ceremonies. Hence, CF participation that historically represented political empowerment and cultural preservation eventually became a voluntary act of assimilation. It is not without irony that the Kainai warriors interested in combating villainy left the reserve unprotected during a period in which Indian Affairs aggressively sought to acquire additional reserve lands. As such, participating in the war effort could ultimately result in one's disenfranchisement or outright territorial dispossession: those interested in demonstrating acts of bravery in battle for the purpose of strengthening local societies were also put in the position of having to possibly choose territorial alienation for the purpose of preserving cultural saliency; however, to be dislodged from the territory would undermine any attempts at strengthening the culture.

Contemporary Kainai CF Perceptions

Warrior Ethic

A Blackfoot adage states, "It is better for a man to be killed in battle than due to old age or sickness."⁴⁴ Employing this maxim as his catalyst, James Dempsey argues in *Warriors of the King* that impressive Aboriginal military enlistments during World War I were directly attributable to a pervasive warrior ethic among Plains Indian cultures. He also asserted that Aboriginal men enlisted as a means of maintaining this ethic within Plains Indian cultures, out of a strong loyalty to the British Crown, and for the opportunity to escape the stagnation of reserve life.⁴⁵ This is a provocative theory that has long gone unchallenged with the exception of Canadian historian Scott Sheffield's criticism, aimed at what he describes as Dempsey's "conspicuous lack of evidence." He adds that while there "may be something to this assumption," failing "any convincing support ... this pillar of his argument rests on tenuous foundations."⁴⁶ Even so, the image of the bloodthirsty savage, Hollywood's stereotypical Indian scout, and events such as the 1876 annihilation of General George Custer's 7th Regiment of the US Cavalry at Little Big Horn by the Cheyenne, Sans Arcs, Miniconjoux Sioux, Oglala Sioux, Blackfeet and Hunkpapa Sioux helped reinforce the popular conviction that Aboriginal people were inherently warlike.

The goal of this study is to determine why Kainai First Nations members resist enlisting in the CF today, as opposed to trying to prove the existence of or determine the potency of Dempsey's warrior ethic. Nevertheless, of the 16 participants in this study, 12 Kainai men alluded to or directly mentioned the idea of the warrior spirit and their desire to become a warrior to honour their ancestors as a primary reason for enlisting in the CF, the USMC or the US Army. While this is admittedly a limited sample, these data strongly suggest the presence of the warrior ethic Dempsey hinted at. "It is imbedded in our blood being native as a Blood Indian," stated one 23-year-old Kainai male, who added, "we hear our elders talk to us about old warrior stories about how we traveled just to go fight."⁴⁷ One Kainai veteran, when asked why he enlisted in the CF, explained: "my military history kind of starts probably a few thousand years ago. The stories have been told to me of those that came before me that were warriors and how they ensured the survival and the continuing existence of our people." He added, "we have stories of ... a Blood Indian that just happened to be ... visiting people ... and he took part in the annihilation of the 7th Cavalry. Down the line, World War I, World War II, Korea

... every other major war that broke out, somebody in my family was there." He concluded that "it's my duty ... to be a warrior of the people."⁴⁸

Another 23-year-old male said that his ancestors "left a path where we follow them. My grandfathers talk to me about war. It runs in my family, my uncles, my great-uncles, my grandfathers, my grandfather's dad, his grandfather's dad, they've all been to war since the 1800s." He spoke of "the old man that always talked to me when I was a little boy, he lived to be 111 years old"; but this old man also said, "My son, you shouldn't go to war."⁴⁹ This participant was alluding to a major theme to emerge during the interviews: warfare as a means of protecting family and home. As described by one Kainai male, "if you're going off to fight another war, you're not protecting your people and your home. In fact, you're taken away from your home and your home is not protected at that time."⁵⁰ Half of the participants agreed that a true warrior must remain at home to protect the community. One 27-year-old Kainai male put it succinctly:

We're needed here, we are not needed to go fight at these places, but we could better protect ourselves by being at home here with our families ... if we're over there, then these guys can come by this way with their army and stuff, and you know, we won't be able to help our families.⁵¹

He was referring to what he described as "a battle going on in the political front between our nation and the nation that surrounds us," one that transcends history and dates back to the first broken treaty promises of the 1880s. Nine of the participants stated that the true warrior needs to remain at home to protect the community at this tenuous period in Kainai history, one in which the Canadian government can come in and complete its project of Indian removal and land alienation once the warriors have been removed from the community.

To protect their territory is a great honour to the Kainai, and their philosophy of warfare is closely linked to their homelands. Kainai political philosophies identify land as a key reference point.⁵² According to one informant, the Canadian reasons for engaging in battle are not related to protecting homeland, or about proving bravery. In his opinion, you are only supposed to go to war for a reason, not simply to fight. One participant described it this way: "The Blackfoot wars were about ... territory. I felt my family was out there and they died out on that battlefield so today I could be here. I could be here today to talk about what we are talking about: is why my family was in that war fighting."⁵³ The battlefields are found within what has been described as "sacred geography," where "every

location within their original homeland has a multitude of stories that recount the migrations, revelations, and particular historical incidents that cumulatively produce a tribe in its current conditions."⁵⁴ These stories suggest there had "to be a good reason" to go to war, as "it wasn't right to kill the people."⁵⁵ It wasn't about fighting, added a Kainai male, "it was about the land that mother earth grew. It was about our medicines that we held. That's what it was all about, you know, what our wars were about."⁵⁶

Recent recruits who chose to leave the reserve to join the Canadian or American forces were not ridiculed, however. One participant stated that he is "very proud ... when one of our community leaves and joins the forces and they come back; we honour them, we are proud of them."⁵⁷ Yet five of the participants raised the issue: are the wars that Canada or the US fights actually Kainai battles? One Kainai male stated that he would "not go pick on somebody in their territory; that is their grounds! Whatever happens in their grounds happens."⁵⁸ To bring war to the Kainai was another story completely. According to a Kainai male, Canada's involvement in these wars is wrong, for there is no honour involved: "nowadays, push a button, push this button, push that button, and 10,000 people die over here. They don't ride into battle no more."⁵⁹ Most of those interviewed identified that they wanted to honour the warriors of the past, while also stressing that they would not fight people who bear no animosity toward the Kainai, even if this stymies an individual's chances at joining a society or being honoured by the community. This will be discussed in further detail below.

Concern was also expressed over the ideological nature of contemporary warfare, in particular the reasons for Canada's presence in Afghanistan and the US occupation of Iraq. Some identified parallels with what they considered to be the colonial oppression currently occurring in Afghanistan, and their participating with the CF representing little more than the repression of an indigenous people's language and government; hence, as a Kainai CF member, you would be playing the role of indigenous oppressor. This was the question many alluded to: Why do I want to engage in the same colonial enterprise that resulted in our current living conditions? One Kainai male compared the colonial enterprise with its impact upon his people and what is currently occurring in Afghanistan, suggesting that the Americans "are trying to take over this country," which is resisting in an effort "to protect their cultural background; they're fighting for their word of mouth, their speech, their tongue ... their political views. It's not our war."⁶⁰ After considering enlisting, another male upon further investigation concluded that "the US is pushing a bunch of shady

issues in other parts of the world and shady conflicts that are really unnecessary," that for these reasons alone he would not enlist with the American or Canadian forces, and that going to "fight another man's battle started to seem a little absurd after a while, you know."⁶¹

Warriors nevertheless remain an integral part of the ceremonial and political life of the community, and demonstrations of bravery in battle are required to help strengthen and to propagate central societies and ceremonies. For instance,

any kind of a veteran that served in the war can do these capturing ceremonies. The only ones that do that at the Blood Reserve, the Blood Tribe, to initiate other people into like Chieftainships, or to get a name, or to get a headdress. That's the special ceremonies, that's done by a veteran, not just any person can do that. If you're not a veteran, or you know, you can't do these kind of ceremonies. And at the Sundance too, cutting that tree, a veteran has to do that, he has to tell his stories there before he can cut that tree, not just anybody can do that. That's why they call these old veterans to tell their stories. I've done that once at the Sundance.⁶²

Another noted that upon his return from service,

I was given an honour dance, I was noted by the elders as having completed a journey, and then in that same sense, I was given special privileges also. I can go to a powwow drum, hit it, stop the powwow and tell four stories. As a warrior, having completed my journey, people come to me and they hand me their children and say, you know, give a name to our child, you know, based on one of your adventures.⁶³

Kainai Perspectives on CF Injustice, Past and Present

A 24-year-old Kainai male and former US Marine studied the history of Blackfoot participation in the CF prior to enlisting, citing a 30% World War II Aboriginal enlistment rate "higher than any population of any Canadian group at the time." Disturbed by what he considered to be the Canadian government's poor treatment of returning veterans, he indicated that he "didn't want to join the [Canadian] army because of the way they treated our people in World War I and World War II," adding that their participation occurred at a time when "they weren't even allowed to vote, ... and when they came back, they were denied almost citizenship and they were brushed aside."⁶⁴ Added another, "all I hear about on the

news, they're honouring these White people that go to war? It's never the Indian that gets honoured, ever. It's always the White guys." He surmised that honouring Native people would lead young people on the reserves to "think about going to wars because the government is honouring them. But now they don't think about going because they don't get the honours from them." Succinctly put, "I think if the government would start honouring our people there would be a lot that would be going to this military training."⁶⁵

As suggested, the federal government is still viewed as suspect by many Kainai participants, and the lack of recognition for Kainai veterans' past deeds is contentious for many. This reflects that most Kainai believe that the Crown has permitted its treaty and political relationships with the community to deteriorate. One Kainai male suggested that federal representatives "should come out and listen to the Native people. They want to succeed in life ... and be equal to the rest of the world," although he was convinced that the Canadian government wanted "to advance over us, you know?" More importantly, in his opinion, prior to his considering enlisting in the CF, "there would be a number of wrongs that need to be set right, let's say, a number of promises that need to be fulfilled and so on and so forth."⁶⁶ One Kainai Vietnam veteran claimed he was angry at his treatment by the federal government, while expressing pride "that I served the Blood Reserve, not Canada, my people. I served for them, even if I'm not recognized in Canada."⁶⁷ Another lamented, "I don't know why we're not recognized," and while he suggested that it "doesn't matter to me," at 57 years of age he had yet to see Kainai World War II veterans "being honoured here in Lethbridge or any place. It's always the White veterans."⁶⁸ None of the participants was able to fully articulate how Kainai veterans should be honoured, although one suggested that having the government acknowledge past actions "would be an honour for especially our people ... because they did it for the people and for all of the other people."⁶⁹ Something as simple as coming "to our reserve and shake our hands and say, 'I respect you people ... or to even listen to us'" would go a long way in securing Kainai goodwill.⁷⁰

Lack of CF Warrior Tradition

Many of the project participants indicated that the Canadian Army lacked traditions they found meaningful. Two Bold Eagle Participants and eventual CF members who participated in the Tommy Prince Training Initiative somewhat undermine the tradition argument. The Initiative was named after Sergeant Thomas George Prince, MM (1915–77), one of the most

decorated non-commissioned officers in Canadian military history (who was awarded eleven medals in all, including the Military Medal and US Silver Star). The Aboriginal members of the Initiative were regaled with Prince's exploits as their commanders attempted to generate a sense of unity.⁷¹ What was disturbing occurred later in basic training, when a 23-year-old Kainai male and former CF member claimed that Tommy Prince's heroics were undercut by a non-Native warrant officer's portrayal of Prince as a "big Native war hero" who "died a drunk in the street ... like a drunk in the gutter." He further described his experience:

I remember a warrant officer said you won't hear this in a manual or history books or anything about Tommy Prince, 'cause he was a sergeant and he had eight guys under him. He would use those eight guys as decoys and the Koreans would start shooting at them and he'd go up and start sniping guys.⁷²

As recently suggested by Lackenbauer, Prince suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and was clearly not operating at peak efficiency during this period.⁷³ Nevertheless, the name Tommy Prince that in the beginning helped to galvanize Bold Eagle recruits had in the end become a source of embarrassment and shame for Aboriginal CF participants.

According to one Kainai male, in the USMC and the US Army "everybody is green."⁷⁴ Another male echoed this sentiment when he stated, "in the service, you are just one colour and that's green. No segregation, nothing, everybody was the same. As long as you wore a green uniform, you were all the same, no matter what you was—we were all friends, it was a family. We all fought under one colour. Everybody was your brother."⁷⁵ The veterans interviewed for this project who served prior to 1975 shared the same sentiments. According to one, there was "no racial discrimination" in the forces, where he "was treated equal ... with everybody."⁷⁶ An established sense of brotherhood is an attractive quality to the project participants, something that means: "you work hard, you are part of a team, a group, like a clan ... you are part of an elite family." This extends to each member, "looking out for each other, you take care of each other, you're brothers." This was a drawing feature, which they claim the Canadian Army currently does not offer. According to one participant, Canada "just says, 'well you can join us, and you can go all over the world and have different types of adventures'."⁷⁷ Beyond that the offer falls flat.

Unlike in the USMC, where participants claimed they were never subject to racism or ridicule, each of the recent Kainai CF members participating

in this project described experiencing at least one incidence of racism. Citing non-Native suspicions that Aboriginal people were being afforded special treatment as the military struggled to meet affirmative action quotas, one 23-year-old Kainai male indicated that members of his battalion refused to speak to him until their arrival in Afghanistan. He further described a tension-filled atmosphere, one in which Aboriginal and non-Native soldiers tended not to interact willingly. He also reported that he was court-martialled following an incident in which he fended off two Cree soldiers who broke into his barracks looking to fight, striking one in the head with a beer bottle. Facing a potential 14-year sentence, he was later honourably discharged and does not plan on re-enlisting.⁷⁸ Another Kainai Marine and former Canadian Army Cadet stated that he was treated "like crap" and that there is no sense of brotherhood in the CF: "They didn't take care of you. If you fell behind they didn't care; ... they left you to fend for your own." In his opinion, there "was a lot of racism involved."⁷⁹

The corresponding lack of visibility on reserve, combined with the USMC's aggressive recruiting style, puts the CF at a distinct disadvantage. In each case, the four Kainai under the age of 30 who chose to enlist in the US Armed Forces were approached on the Blood Reserve by American recruiters. When queried, none of these individuals remembered seeing Canadian recruiters on reserve or even in Lethbridge. Further, none knew where to find the Lethbridge CF office. A 23-year-old Kainai female and former U.S. Army recruit portrayed the recruiter she worked with as friendly—an individual who remained in close contact with her, even during periods of self-doubt concerning her potential enlistment.⁸⁰ A Kainai male traveled the 70 kilometres to Lethbridge to participate in a USMC workshop held at Lethbridge Community College (LCC), one of several annual events, and expressed an interest in their program. In addition to already considering joining the Marines to be "one of the highest honours, if you are going to join any source of military," he claimed that the recruiter spent plenty of time comparing the U.S. and Canada military situation, "pretty much just showing you the difference between the two."⁸¹

In one instance, Marine recruiters drove nearly two hours to the Canada-US border to meet a Kainai recruit from the Blood Reserve, following which time they drove him down to Great Falls to finalize his paperwork. This experience convinced him that the American forces had more to offer. In addition to their constant presence, the US Army and USMC are not above trying to dazzle potential recruits. Following the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq, US military personnel started arriving at the Blood reserve, following recruiters who were making regular trips there.

Arriving in Humvees, twin choppers soon were flying in overhead to deliver tanks to the nearby reserve high school. Students and reserve members were then invited to inspect the "helicopter and all these marines standing around with machine guns." According to one Kainai male, "to see these guys flying around makes you wonder. I would like to do that someday, I want to be a part of those guys."⁸² The lack of CF presence on reserve could also explain why almost all Aboriginal CF recruits are non-status Indians, since most status Indians live on reserve. An amplified recruiting program aimed at the reserve and making the CF regular visitors to the community could have a positive impact on the numbers of status Indian enlistees.

In terms of general opportunities, the CF is again considered wanting. American recruiters' aggressive pursuit of potential Kainai recruits included promises of a fully-funded government education, and that each recruit would be taught the skills required to ensure their employment following their return to the reserve. According to a US Army and CF veteran, the former "really fulfilled that part in educating me and then in the very end, I was even sent into classroom situations where I had to sit there and learn math, you know, the basic subjects that would get me into university, college. When I was with the Canadian Army, they really didn't offer me anything of the sort."⁸³ A former Kainai Marine was informed that the USMC "pays for your books, tuition and ... gives you a living allowance."⁸⁴ Another admitted that he chose the wrong profession, becoming a welder, a skill that is not in high demand on the reserve. However, a more sceptical informant claimed that despite CF and American Forces claims that they will provide an individual with "\$50,000 to \$100,000 to go to college or university and go to school," he doesn't know anyone to have received this funding.⁸⁵

When the CF does happen to become temporarily more visible it is usually due to media reports of downsizing or to the latest Sea King inquiry. Study participants suggested that reports such as these influence their decision when the time comes time to enlist in the CF or choose to wait or enlist in the US. When the time came to decide whether he would enlist in the CF or the USMC, a Kainai male explained, "the Canadian Armed Forces were going through a big massive downsizing and plus, they had a lot of the hazing [incidents]. We had helicopters that were pretty much falling apart, tug boats ... for sea ships. It was pretty ridiculous as a military branch."⁸⁶ Canada is also viewed as a peace-keeping nation, one that is "never really involved in any real major confrontation; they don't go to war with anybody." This Kainai veteran viewed the CF as "a stepping

stone" to joining the Marines or US Army since he realized he "would never encounter anything extreme."⁸⁷ Generally, the majority of the project participants, even those current and former members, did not view the Canadian Army in a positive light. For instance, some of the commentary to emerge from the interviews included, but was not limited to, the "Canadian Army's a bunch of fags."⁸⁸ Another added that while training at Wainwright, "they gave us crap equipment" and soldiers learned how to evacuate helicopters even though "we actually never had helicopters to train with."⁸⁹

CF as Employment

Pragmatic issues were also mentioned. For example, while most informants knew that enlisting in the CF would result in a paid job, those interested in enlisting did not know that there was potentially money available to further one's education. None knew what those wages and benefits were, or how to access that information. Some wanted to know where to go to enlist. According to one Kainai male, military skills often do not translate in the reserve environment. In his opinion, "there is not one Marine that I know that has a good job, because he has Marine training, or he has military skills or he has been there."⁹⁰ All but three of the project's participants indicated that they joined the CF or American Forces to become a warrior, to get off the reserve, to see the world, or because they had nothing else to do. The other three enlisted to find work or improve their education. In each case, however, they have since left the CF without improving their academic standing.

Recent events in Afghanistan have caught the attention of project participants, who have expressed an interest in enlisting. Interestingly, despite the consistent derision of the Canadian government, a unique sense of nationalism begins to emerge, now that Canadians are involved in a war and "getting bombed and this and that."⁹¹ There is interest to go and defend Canada, even if it is considered an oppressive nation from a Kainai perspective. One Kainai male has also noticed more Canadian recruiters on reserve as well in the popular media: "I've started to see on the news and through ads and stuff like that, recruiters, like the Canadian Forces are recruiting."⁹²

Final Thoughts

Among Kainai young men a warrior ethic is clearly evident. Nine of the Kainai men interviewed alluded to or mentioned directly the idea of the warrior spirit and their desire to become a warrior to honour their ancestors. These individuals are concerned that the only battles available

to demonstrate their bravery require that they fight another man's war. The type of warfare and the reasons for engaging in battle were different historically, and to simply join the CF today does not mean that the same battlefield experience will be forthcoming. The Kainai philosophy of warfare is linked to their homelands; to protect their territory is a great honour, whereas the Canadian reasons for engaging in battle are not related to protecting homeland, or to prove bravery. You are supposed to go to war for a reason, not simply to fight. A tension exists between wanting to honour the warriors of past and perhaps joining a religious society that requires of certain members battlefield experience, and the desire to avoid fighting people who bear no animosity toward you and your people.

The informants were clear in that they consider themselves and their people to be a nation trapped within a nation. Here, the battle is political. It was further suggested that leaving to enlist in the CF is nonsensical, for Canada is viewed as an oppressive regime that refuses to acknowledge Kainai political beliefs and objectives. Accordingly, the true warrior needs to remain at home to protect the community at this difficult time in Kainai history. One interesting trend, and an idea expressed by all informants to date, is the notion that joining the CF would result in their removal from the community, meaning that there would be no one left to protect the homeland against Canadian encroachment or even outright invasion. This is viewed in many cases as the last step to Canada taking over the reserve land base for good. For these reasons, most informants expressed a reluctance to enlist. In sum: (1) the CF in this instance is viewed as another means of assimilating into Canadian society; and (2) a real warrior will protect his/her family, and that is a motivating factor keeping many Kainai from enlisting.

A handful of informants drew an interesting parallel between the colonial project as practiced in Canada (where Indians were forced to surrender their homelands, had to renounce their political processes, and stop speaking their language) and what is occurring in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is further related to the expressed reticence to joining the CF, which required you to sign your life away, thereby abdicating your independence and/or individuality. This reflects the fear associated with signing paper, paralleling the events that followed the signing of Treaty 7 in September 1877 and that resulted in loss of land and freedom. Signing papers of any kind is deemed problematic.

Four informants stated that they would avoid enlisting due to the lack of federal recognition of Kainai contributions to the CF. One individual suggested outright that Ottawa's recognition of past CF acts and of the

bravery exhibited by Aboriginal people in general, and by the Kainai in particular, would go a long way in generating goodwill. The idea of renewing what the informants considered an historic yet currently dormant military relationship with Canada was an important theme in all of the interviews. According to one informant, receiving recognition for these deeds "would be an honour, especially for our people," thereby generating local and personal pride. For those wishing to enlist the general lack of personal resources is problematic. From a more pragmatic perspective, while the Kainai First Nation is 70 kilometres from Lethbridge, the cost of getting into town is oftentimes prohibitive, and few recruiters enter the reserve. Those who understand military protocol have stressed that Aboriginal people are intimidated and that the CF should consider adjusting its policies to acknowledge and accommodate this cultural difference, thereby ensuring that the Kainai CF experience be successful. Perhaps the most important theme to emerge from this study is this: it is time for the CF to learn and understand Aboriginal ways.

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Notes

1. The term Aboriginal will be used exclusively throughout this paper. Its usage will conform to the section 35(2), Constitution Act, 1982, definition whereby Aboriginal represents Indians, Inuit, and Métis, unless otherwise indicated. The term Indian is used in legislation or policy and hence in discussions concerning such legislation or policy; and in its historical context whereby Native and Aboriginal people were described within the popular and academic literature as Indians; and in such cases where it is used in quotations from other sources. First Nations is used to signify an organized Aboriginal group or community, specifically a band officially recognized by the Canadian government.
2. Canada, *The Aboriginal Soldier After the Wars: Report of the Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples* (The Senate of Canada, Ottawa, 1995).
3. Canada, *Looking Forward, Looking Back: Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 1* (Ottawa: Communication Group, 1996), 590.

4. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Aboriginal Claims and the Canadian Military: The Impact on Domestic Strategy and Operations." Paper presented at Conference of Defence Associations Institute, First Annual Graduate Symposium, November 13–14, 1998.
5. Canadian Defence Academy, "Aboriginals and the Canadian Military: Past, Present, Future" (online). See: http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/aborig_conference_autoch/engraph/home_e.asp
6. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and R. Scott Sheffield, "North American Aboriginal Peoples and Twentieth Century Warfare: An Analysis of the Historiography and a Research Agenda for the Future?" in P.W. Lackenbauer and C. Mantle (eds.), *Aboriginal Peoples and Military Participation: Historical Perspectives* (Kingston: CDA Press, 2007), pp. 209–231; and Michael D. Stevenson, "The Mobilisation of Native Canadians During the Second World War," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 9 (1996): 206.
7. Robert A. Innes, "The Socio-political Influence of the Second World War: Saskatchewan Aboriginal Veterans, 1945–1960" (MA thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2000).
8. Alistar Sweeny, *Government Policy and Saskatchewan Indian Veterans: A Brief History of the Canadian Government's Treatment of Indian Veterans of World War Two* (Ottawa: Tyler, Wright and Daniel Ltd., 1979); Native Law Centre, *Indian Veterans' Rights* (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1979); the latter report also examined Soldier Settlement Act benefit administration inequity following World War I.
9. Sweeny, *Government Policy and Saskatchewan Indian Veterans*, 55, 68. Responsibility for Indian Affairs at Confederation was vested with Secretary of the State Responsible for the Provinces. In 1873, responsibility for Indian Affairs was transferred to the Department of the Interior. The Department of Indian Affairs, a branch office of the Department of the Interior, was created in 1880. It operated until 1935, when it was dissolved as a cost-cutting measure and responsibility for Indian Affairs transferred to the Department of Mines and Resources and a sub-department was established—The Indian Affairs Branch (IAB). Responsibility for Indian Affairs was reassigned to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship in 1950 where it remained until an independent Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was established in 1966.
10. James Dempsey, "Problems of Western Canadian Indian War Veterans After World War One," *Native Studies Review* 5, no. 2 (1989): 1.
11. James W. St. G. Walker, "Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force," *Canadian Historical Review* 70, no. 1 (1989): 4.
12. *Ibid.*, 9.
13. *Ibid.*, 25.
14. S.D. Grant, "Indian Affairs Under Duncan Campbell Scott: The Plains Cree

- of Saskatchewan," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 18, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 29.
15. See E.J. Ashton, "Soldier Settlement in Canada," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 39, no. 3 (May 1925): 488–98.
 16. Jonathan F. Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 259.
 17. In Dempsey, "Problems of Western Canadian Indian War Veterans," 11.
 18. Fred Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers* (Penticton, BC: Theytus Books, 1985), 36–38.
 19. James Dempsey, "Alberta's Indians in the Second World War," in Ken Tingley (ed.), *For King and Country: Alberta in the Second World War* (Edmonton: Provincial Museum of Alberta, 1995), 39.
 20. Dempsey, "Alberta's Indians in the Second World War," 43; also Janice Summerby, "The Sacrifices and Achievements" in *Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields* (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs/Government of Canada, 1993), 20.
 21. Robert A. Innes, "'I'm on Home Ground Now. I'm Safe': Saskatchewan Aboriginal War Veterans in the Immediate Postwar Years, 1945–1946," *American Indian Quarterly* 28, nos. 3 & 4 (Summer & Fall 2004).
 22. *Ibid.*, 696.
 23. Dempsey, "Alberta's Indians in the Second World War," 49.
 24. Innes, "I'm on Home Ground Now," 698–99.
 25. Four distinctive political groups comprised the Blackfoot Confederacy: the South Piikuni, the North Piikuni, the Kainai, and the Siksika.
 26. For an extended discussion, see Andrew Bear Robe, "The Historical, Legal and Current Basis for Siksika Nation Governance, Including Its Future Possibilities Within Canada," in *For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* [CD-ROM] (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1996).
 27. For a brief but useful overview, see Hugh Dempsey, "Blackfoot," in Raymond DeMallie (ed.), *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 13, Plains* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, US Government Printing Office, 2001), 604–28.
 28. For this discussion, see John C. Ewers, *The Horse in Blackfoot Indian Culture* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1955).
 29. Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council with Walter Hildebrant, Sarah Carter and Dorothy First Rider, *The True Spirit and Intent of Treaty 7* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996); see also Betty Bastien, *Blackfoot Ways of Knowing: The World View of the Siksikaitsitapi* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004).
 30. Theodore Binnema, *Common and Contested Ground: A Human and Environmental History of the Northwestern Plains* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
 31. Clark Wissler (ed.), "Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians," *Anthropological Papers*, American Museum of Natural History 5, no.1 (1910), 17.

32. Frank Raymond Secoy, "Changing Military Patterns on the Great Plains (17th Century Through Early 19th Century)," in *Monographs of the American Ethnological Society* (New York: J.J. Augustin, 1953), 34–63.
33. James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1999), 2.
34. Ibid., 3. This material originally appeared in John C. Ewers, *The Blackfeet: Raiders of the Northwestern Plains* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 40.
35. Walter McClintock, "Blackfoot Warrior Societies," *The Masterkey* 11 (1937): 148–204; and McClintock, "Blackfoot Warrior Societies," *The Masterkey* 12 (1938): 11–23.
36. See generally Hugh Dempsey, *Charcoal's World* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979); and his *The Amazing Death of Calf Shirt and Other Blackfoot Stories* (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1994).
37. For discussion about the Indian problem, see Noel Dyck, *What is the Indian "Problem": Tutelage and Resistance in Canadian Indian Administration* (St. John's, NF: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1991).
38. Keith Regular, "Trucking and Trading with Outsiders: Blood Indian Reserve Integration into the Southern Alberta Economic Environment, 1884–1939; a Case of Shared Neighbourhoods" (PhD dissertation, Memorial University, 1999).
39. Dempsey, "Problems of Western Canadian Indian War Veterans After World War One," 4.
40. Consolidated Statutes of Canada, 1906, Clause 81, sec. 164.
41. See Yale D. Belanger, "'An All 'Round Indian Affair': The Native Gatherings at MacLeod, 1924 & 1925," *Alberta History* 53, no. 4 (Summer 2005): 13–23.
42. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG10, Vol. 8059, File 773/32-2-148-54 (1941–1944).
43. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 19, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant A).
44. John C. Ewers, "Primitive American Commandoes," *The Masterkey Bi-Monthly* 17, no. 4 (July 1943): 118.
45. See also James Dempsey, "The Indians and World War One," *Alberta History* 31, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 3; and his "Persistence of a Warrior Ethic Among the Plains Indians," *Alberta History* 36, no. 1 (Winter 1988): 1–10.
46. See Scott Sheffield, "Review of James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I*," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 71, no. 1 (2002).
47. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
48. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant C).
49. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 25, 2006, Kanai First Nation (Informant B).

50. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 25, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant D).
51. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
52. For the general discussion regarding how geographic location influences a tribe's political development, see Vine Deloria, *God is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1994) for his discussion about sacred geography; similarly, Sakej Youngblood Henderson, "Ayukpachi: Empowering Aboriginal Thought," in Marie Battiste (ed.), *Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), echoes Deloria although his discussion utilizes the language of ecological context to explore how societal structures such as economy and local bureaucracies developed according to the contours of one's territories and how this forces tribal member bands to alter political constructs that may differ from a band connected by familial ties. Finally, see Leroy Little Bear, "Relationship of Aboriginal People to the Land and the Aboriginal Perspective on Aboriginal Title," in *For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples*, cited in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *Treaty Making in the Spirit of Co-Existence: An Alternative to Extinction* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994).
53. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
54. Deloria, *God is Red*, 122; Youngblood Henderson, "Ayukpachi," 248–78.
55. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 26, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant E).
56. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
57. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 25, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant D).
58. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 14, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant D).
62. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 25, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant C).
63. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant F).
64. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 21, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant C).
65. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 21, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant E).

66. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 25, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant D).
67. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 14, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant G).
68. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 21, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant E).
69. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation.
70. Ibid.
71. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "'A Hell of a Warrior': Sergeant Thomas George Prince," in Bernd Horn (ed.), *Profiles of Canadian Military Leadership* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006. For further background on Prince, see Janice Summerby, "Prince of the Brigade," in *Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields*.
72. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant H).
73. Lackenbauer, "A Hell of a Warrior."
74. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant F).
75. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant I).
76. Ibid.
77. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 21, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant F).
78. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 23, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant J).
79. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant H).
80. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 6, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant K).
81. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 16, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant J).
82. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 19, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant K).
83. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
84. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant C).
85. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant H).
86. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
87. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant H).

88. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant C).
89. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, February 23, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant J).
90. Ibid.
91. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 15, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant B).
92. Anonymous interview by Billy Wadsworth, March 19, 2006, Kainai First Nation (Informant K).