

The Battle of Batoche

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ABSTRACT. In this article, Hildebrandt examines the course of events immediately preceding the Battle of Batoche, and considers the details of the first two days of the battle in greater depth than is the case in many previous histories. Of particular interest is his examination of the military strategy of the Métis, and the significance of the *Northcote* incident and the presence of the Gatling gun on the outcome of the battle.

RESUME. Dans cet article Hildebrandt étudie les événements qui ont précédé immédiatement la bataille de Batoche. Il examine avec beaucoup plus de précision que la plupart des autres publications sur ce sujet le détail des deux premiers jours de la bataille. L'intérêt de cet article réside en particulier dans une étude approfondie de la stratégie militaire des Métis, ainsi que de la signification profonde de l'incident *Northcote* et de l'utilisation du gatling sur l'issue de la bataille.

The Battle of Batoche has been the subject of numerous scholarly and popular studies.¹ This interest, however, has been focussed on the significance of the battle, its consequences, its importance as a watershed in Canadian history, and as a symbolic victory of Anglo-Canadian forces over those resisting the new economic order. The earliest publications, Major Boulton's *Reminiscences of the North-West Rebellion*, and C. P. Mulvaney's *The History of the North-West Rebellion of 1885* were based on first-hand accounts of North West Field Force participants anxious to explain their victory. Immediately after the appearance of the official account of the rebellion, published in the *Canada Sessional Papers* in 1886, little analytical work was attempted.² Early accounts made almost no reference to sources that might have provided perspective to the Métis actions.³ This to some extent has been corrected by George Stanley and, more recently, Desmond Morton, but the overall result of past histories of the Battle of Batoche has left the military actions of the Métis and the Indians vague. The impression that the outcome of the battle was inevitable still remains.⁴

Traditionally, the last day of the battle, when the North West Field Force suddenly and surprisingly broke through weakened Métis lines at the south-eastern end of the battlefield, has been emphasized. Yet a detailed narrative shows that the first day had by far the most military action, which included the *Northcote* incident and at least two nearly successful attempts by the Métis and the Indians to outflank the North West Field Force. On this first day the Métis and the Indians put such pressure on Middleton's men that some accounts suggest that only the highly mobile and rapid fire Gatling gun prevented a serious setback. In fact, according to Reverend G. Cloutier's diary, the Métis considered the first day a victory.⁵ They believed that their actions caused Middleton to withdraw into the zareba on the evening of May 9.

One other noticeable imbalance exists in the historic record. The tactics adopted by Middleton bore the brunt of considerable criticism,

especially by the Canadian officers, many of whom felt slighted because Middleton preferred British officers. Similar criticism from military historians has been made without reference to contemporary military handbooks such as Garnet Wolseley's *A Soldier's Pocket-book*.⁶ Furthermore, none of the well-known accounts of the military actions cite the military manuals of the day, such as Captain Callwell's *Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice*.⁷ This last book makes frequent reference to Middleton's actions during the 1885 campaign. Indeed, they are held to be exemplary, given the conditions he encountered. The ten maps which illustrate my article are based on the documents and maps of the period and on many trips to the site to examine the terrain over which this battle was fought.⁸ (In this endeavour I am indebted to Jack Summers who tramped the site with me on numerous occasions over the past two years. Without his insights much of what is detailed here could not have been accomplished.)

In 1885 there were approximately forty-eight thousand native Westerners in the Assiniboia, Saskatchewan and Alberta territories.⁹ Politically, many grievances of these people had been ignored, and fears of an Indian uprising were widespread. The dangers of an uprising by native Westerners were denied by P. G. Laurie of Battleford, editor of the *Saskatchewan Herald*, whose columns frequently contained diatribes against reports from eastern newspapers whose editors claimed the Western frontier was a lawless and dangerous territory.¹¹ Laurie thought that such reports might slow the settlement he so desperately wanted. Also known to many was the recent catastrophe at the Little Bighorn. Such factors lent credence to the preconceived but basically irrational notion of a hostile, wild frontier.¹² It was largely for this reason that the North West Field Force organized a careful well-ordered strategy to move into this unknown territory.

Major General Charles F. D. Middleton, C.B., Commander of the Canadian Militia and leader of the North West Field Force, was uncertain about the exact number of "savages" his men would be fighting. The experience of British contingents in small wars throughout the Empire showed that caution would have to be exercised. When fighting native forces, there was always the fear that a small group could easily gain momentum with a few early successes against a regular European-type army.¹³

Not all Canadian leaders were confident of a clear early victory. The obstacles of geography, transportation and supply were enormous. Middleton, though armed with a brash confidence, initially showed disregard for the fighting prowess of the Métis and forged ahead to confront them as soon as he could. Only after Fish Creek, the first encounter and a setback for the North West Field Force, did Middleton grudgingly acknowledge that he had underestimated the Métis.¹⁴

To move against Prince Albert and, later, Batoché, identified as the Métis stronghold, Middleton and his officers agreed to a three-pronged movement into the Northwest. Columns were to march towards what were considered to be potential trouble spots. Middleton would proceed north from Qu'Appelle (Troy) along the South Saskatchewan; Otter from Swift Current towards Battleford; and Strange from Calgary towards Edmonton. Of these columns only two were to be engaged in any serious fighting, and only Middleton's column was involved in more than one battle with the Métis in which any lives were lost.

Essentially there were five significant battles or confrontations during the suppression of the insurrection in the West. The North West Field Force was involved in four of them: Fish Creek, Cut Knife Hill, Batoché and Frenchman's Butte. At Duck Lake the skirmish was between the Métis and the North West Mounted Police, under Superintendent Crozier. One other major event occurred during the campaign—the Frog Lake Massacre, where whites and Métis in the community were killed and the remainder taken hostage by Big Bear's Cree insurgents. Only the Battle of Batoché gave the government forces a decisive victory. The sole clear victory for the Métis came at Duck Lake. The other three conflicts, Fish Creek, Cut Knife Hill and Frenchman's Butte were all stand-offs in one form or another. At Fish Creek, the Métis retreated after an indecisive battle; at Cut Knife Hill, Otter withdrew pursuant to the resistance of Poundmaker's Cree; and at Frenchman's Butte, Big Bear's Cree retreated from the barrage of fire into their defensive alignment, although the militia were unable to pursue them through the muskeg.

Perhaps more significant than the battles which were fought, were those which were not. Although the newspapers of the time indicate that many whites feared reprisals from Indians during the rebellion, very few took place. At Battleford, some five hundred men, women and children were allegedly besieged in the North West Mounted Police fort by Poundmaker's Cree, but the fort was not directly attacked, although the stores of the town, momentarily abandoned by a frightened population, were looted.¹⁵ In Prince Albert, residents protected by the North West Mounted Police were not threatened by Indians or mixed bloods. Trouble was anticipated from the large number of Indians comprising the Blackfoot Confederacy. Crowfoot, their war chief, had received an invitation from Riel to join the resistance, but did not respond. The presence of the North West Mounted Police and the trust the Indians had was certainly partially responsible for their reluctance to participate alongside Riel.¹⁶ A general attack was feared by many whites in the West, however.

The Governor-General and Adolphe Caron, the Minister of the Militia, differed with Middleton over the course of action that would

most quickly end the campaign. The target for the first attack remained uncertain. Governor-General Lansdowne clearly believed that after Fish Creek, Prince Albert would be the objective for the North West Field Force. He had written to Lord Derby in London stating that he hoped Middleton would join forces with Otter at Prince Albert and would then advance on Batoche. "Middleton will probably have to fight again on his way to Prince Albert. He would, I gather, prefer not to fight if he could avoid doing so, until after he had reached Prince Albert and perhaps effected a junction with Otter."¹⁷ Lansdowne, who was in touch with Caron on an almost daily basis, appeared to be under the impression that a greater number of troops would finally advance on Batoche.¹⁸

The correspondence between Lansdowne, Derby and Melgund (later Earl of Minto and Governor-General of Canada) leaves the impression that there were reservations over Middleton's ability to conduct the campaign from the field. Lansdowne intimated these concerns to Melgund. On one occasion he wrote, "The Fish Creek affair has troubled me very much—Even without your private telegrams I could read something very like the word disaster between every line of the General's other accounts. I have thought all along that he and the experts quite underrated the difficulty of the task before him."¹⁹ Other observers saw Middleton as a general too old and reluctant to engage in combat and to advance on Batoche:

During this tedious delay General Middleton gave all sorts of excuses for his reaction. One day it was want of supplies then he had not sufficient medical staff to take with him after having a suitable force to look after the wounded. Then the excuse was that the wounded could neither be left where they were nor removed up the river to Saskatoon. The truth was that he was afraid to advance on the rebels' position at Batoche until he was materially reinforced.²⁰

Whether Middleton actually had a clear plan of attack in mind for Batoche after Fish Creek is not known. According to Boulton, Middleton seldom communicated his intentions even to those in his immediate staff. What is known is that up to 29 April, Middleton was heading towards Prince Albert and that he was reluctant to engage his men too hastily after Fish Creek; "Find it would be better to push on to Prince Albert by Hudson's Bay Crossing. Troops behaved well but are raw, officers same. Would not be safe to risk defeat so shall relieve Prince Albert and join with Otter in attacking rebels. Shall send courier to Humboldt or Clark's Crossing . . . am engaged in bringing column to this side. Will march tomorrow."¹² It was a rather optimistic prediction the day after Fish Creek and it was in fact to be over two weeks before he would march again. Three days later, on 28 April, Middleton again reasserted his conviction to move to Prince Albert first. Middleton had mixed reactions to the battle; in his communications to Caron there was only a cautious optimism. "I think we have taught the rebels a lesson and am pretty sure that I would march to Batoche, but their men

would harass me all the way, and I lose a great many men and I am very averse to that and do not think it would be politic.”²²

The arrival of the *Northcote* on 5 May, with its supplies and two companies of the Midland Battalion on board, coincided with Middleton’s change of plans. Middleton’s confidence seemed renewed with the appearance of the *Northcote*, and Batoché now became his objective. Reasons for changing targets from Prince Albert to Batoché are unclear and no evidence exists to suggest that he discussed his change in plans with any of those around him or with Caron in Ottawa. Even those at the front believed he would first move on to Prince Albert. Major Boulton, Commander of Boulton’s Scouts, wrote:

On the 5th of May General Middleton completed his arrangement for a further advance on Batoché. At the time he was, I believe, urged to advance directly on Prince Albert, in order to effect a junction with Colonel Irvine and his corps of Mounted Police, leaving Batoché for future attack; but no doubt feeling that this would be a sign of weakness, the General determined to march on to Batoché, and to attack Riel in his stronghold without further delay, sending a message to Colonel Irvine to cooperate with him from the North.²³

A new determination now pervaded Middleton’s communications and he no longer expressed concern over his shortage of manpower—he certainly dropped the idea of joining forces with Otter for an attack on Batoché. This might have been due, at least partially, to Otter’s fall from favour after his battle with Poundmaker’s Cree at Cut Knife Hill on 2 May. Otter had embarked on his mission to Cut Knife Hill against Middleton’s orders but with the approval of Lieutenant-Governor Dewdney. These two events—the arrival of the *Northcote* and Otter’s encounter at Cut Knife Hill—coincided with Middleton’s determination to move against Batoché. A two-pronged attack was still planned but Otter would no longer be part of it.

The arrival of the *Northcote* significantly strengthened Middleton’s marching capacity. On board the boat were eighty men of the Midland Battalion, together with Colonel Van Straubenzie and Captain Howard of the United States Army. Howard, a representative of the American gun manufacturer, had with him the Gatling gun which was to provide the important fire power on the first day of fighting at Batoché. The cargo also contained the desperately needed food supplies and some ammunition. The steamer itself was also to be used in the attack.

Alterations to the *Northcote* were made by Major Smith of “C” School of Infantry who was placed in command of the steamer. Middleton ordered the upper deck to be made “bullet proof” and placed the following somewhat motley crew on board:

Thirty-one rank and rifle, two officers C Company School Corps, Captain Bedson, my aide-en-camp, Captain Wise, who, though better, was to my great loss, incapacitated from walking or riding, three sick officers, Mr. Magre and Mr. Pringle, medical staff, several men of supply and transport services, Mr.

Gottam, a newspaper correspondent, and some settlers returning to their homes, amounting with some of the crew to about fifty combatants...²⁵

Then Major Smith was ordered "to anchor the first night abreast of our camp, remain there the next day, and on the morning of the ninth drop down and meet the column at about 8, just above Batoche."²⁶

These tactics were not without critics:

... the commander had conceived the rather ludicrous idea of converting the *Northcote* into a gunboat. She was furnished with clumsy barricades, which were to serve as bulwarks, and as she had no cannon to counter against, the task of rendering these barricades bullet proof was a difficult one. The utter folly of equipping and arming her in the manner described was seen when she passed down the river and began the fight on May 9.²⁷

Obviously, loading down a steamer that had already experienced serious navigational difficulties with sandbars downstream was considered impractical. However, no other sources were critical of this phase of Middleton's strategy for Batoche.

Finally, on 7 May, Middleton was prepared to move on from the site of his first battle with the Métis and the Indians. The General had estimated the strength of his force to be seven hundred but, according to Melgund, eight hundred and eighty-six men made up his ranks.²⁸

Middleton chose to advance with an infantry force which included Boulton's Scouts and French's Scouts (the Dominion Land Surveyors were to arrive on 11 May). There was no trained cavalry at the front even though it was available. Middleton's decision not to include Denison's cavalry was one part of his plan for which he later received much criticism.²⁹

Four guns or cannon were in the Field Forces' arsenal, two with the Winnipeg Field Battery and two with "A" Battery. All four were RML nine-pounders and were put to extensive use by Middleton, especially at Batoche. Their effectiveness against the elusive Métis and their well-hidden rifle pits has been questioned by some. But it has also been argued that they were effective in psychologically demoralizing the enemy over the four days of fighting.³⁰

The more publicized piece of artillery during the campaign was the Gatling gun carried to the front by the *Northcote*. Operated by Captain Howard throughout the campaign, the Gatling gun's effectiveness at Batoche has been the source of some controversy, judging from the reports following the fighting. For many, it was the first time they had ever seen a rapid fire gun in action and, as a novelty, it attracted considerable attention and commentary both during and after the campaign. Major Boulton, in his reminiscences, was cautious in assessing the contribution the Gatling made to the success of the North West Field Force. While admitting that it was a significant weapon, particularly on the first day of the fighting, he was less effusive than most. Boulton felt that the success attributed to the Gatling

detracted from what he considered the brave and solid role played by the infantry and artillery companies.³¹


The Gatling gun's primary advantage was its rapid fire capacity—it was advertised as being able to fire one thousand shots per minute. It was also relatively light to transport and easily adjustable for both elevation and direction. Of the gun's ten barrels, five were fired in succession while the other five were being loaded. When the crank which fired the gun was turned firing, loading and extraction all took place synchronically without interruption.³²

The entire combat contingent which was to move against Batoché was thus assembled. On the afternoon of 7 May, the troops marched from Fish Creek to Gabriel's Crossing which they reached by 6:00 P.M. Here they met the *Northcote* which had landed that afternoon. A scouting mission was undertaken to decide on the safest approach to Batoché. Middleton wrote: "As I had learned there were some nasty places to pass on the river trail, I rode out with some scouts to the east, accompanied by Mr. Reid, the Paymaster of the Midlanders, etc., in this very neighbourhood. With his assistance I marked out a route for next day's march which would bring us on the Humboldt trail to about five or six miles from Batoché."³³

On the morning of Saturday, 9 May, reveille was sounded at 4:00, breakfast was taken at 4:15 and the men were ready to march at 5:00, each with one hundred rounds of ammunition.³⁴ As the column advanced on Batoché, it encountered sporadic rifle fire from two houses along the road. The two houses, not far from the church and rectory and belonging to Ludger Gareau and Jean Caron Sr. were barricaded. One report has the building about four hundred yards from the church and rectory.³⁵ The first house was fired on by the Gatling gun which caused the men in and around the two buildings to scatter. Boulton's Scouts then fell back and a gun from "A" Battery shelled the second house: "Some rebels immediately ran out of a ravine behind the house into the bush. The two houses took fire and were soon in ashes."³⁶

The coordinated attack on Batoché was to take place at 8:00 A.M. with the *Northcote* moving down river from the south and Middleton coming across land from the east. It is clear that 8:00 A.M. had been agreed upon as the time for the two-pronged advance to begin. (See map I).

The steamer was to remain just downstream from Batoché until bombardment from Middleton's guns was heard. But the *Northcote* was engaged by the Métis before Middleton's troops reached the village defense. As Middleton wrote: "As we got near the river, much to my annoyance we heard a rattling fire and the steamer's whistle, showing the latter was already engaged."³⁷





According to Major Smith, the *Northcote* was progressing as planned until shortly before 8:00 that morning. At 6:00 A.M., the *Northcote* had moved to a point just south of Batoche where she anchored because she was slightly ahead of schedule. The sources describing the progress of the *Northcote* agree that she was fired on immediately after her advance up river resumed. There is disagreement, however, over when this advance commenced. One source had it at 8:10, while Major Smith reports it as being 7:40—a difference of some 30 minutes, and enough to spoil the plan.

As the *Northcote* struck out towards midstream she immediately came under heavy fire from both banks. In his reports, Smith indicated that the men on board did not return the fire at first, but as the hail of bullets became heavier his men began “independent and volley firing.”³⁸ The Métis appeared to be lying in wait . . .

. . . as we rounded the bend a moment or so later we were raked fore and aft by a fierce storm of bullets coming from both banks. From almost every bush rose puffs of smoke, and from every house and trees on the top of the banks came bullets buzzing. The fire was steadily returned by the troops on board, consisting of C Company School of Infantry; and notwithstanding that the rebels were protected by the brush and timber which covers the banks, apparently some injury was inflicted upon them. Volley after volley was fired and several of the lurking enemy were seen to drop headlong down the sloping bank.³⁹

Father Fourmond, who was housed in the rectory throughout the fighting, also remembered the activities surrounding the arrival of the *Northcote*:

Vers 8 hs. a.m. nous étions sortis . . . Tout à coup, un . . . sifflement affreux se fit entendre à nos oreilles, venant du côté haut de la rivière . . . C'est le bateau à vapeur . . . C'est le bateau arrivant et sifflant la guerre . . . L'attaque commença par un parti de Sioux campés proche de la mission; . . . Aussitôt prennent fusils et se précipitent vers le bateau à travers les buissons . . . La bataille était engagé.⁴⁰

Philippe Garnot recalled Dumont telling him that almost all of the Métis had left their rifle pits along the Jolie Prairie to fire on the *Northcote* as it moved by the village. Garnot himself remembered sending about twenty men to join the assault.⁴¹


One of the more spectacular events was the decapitation of the steamer's smoke stacks when the ferry cable crossing the river was lowered—sending them crashing to the deck. Major Smith's report suggested that he was unaware of the loss of the stacks and whistle until after the *Northcote* had anchored again downstream, even though he wrote: “As we passed Batoche the fire was especially heavy, and I heard a crash as if a portion of the upper deck had been carried away.”⁴² This decapitation was engineered by the ferryman, Alex P. Fisher, who was assisted by Pascal Montour. The consequence of this tactic might have been greater had the Métis been able to corral the steamer at this crossing.

On board the *Northcote* only three minor injuries were reported,

including the shot to the heel suffered by Macdonald, the carpenter. Major Smith concluded his report to Middleton by praising the zeal and coolness of his soldiers, while placing the blame for the disastrous fate of the *Northcote* on the near-mutinous crew. "Our weakness lay in the fact that the master, pilot and engineer were aliens, and that the crew were civil employees and not enlisted men."⁴³ The final assessment published in Mulvaney's history of the Northwest Rebellion was less circumspect "... General Middleton's navy project did little more than imperil many valuable lives and withdrew from his forces a considerable number of men who were badly needed on Saturday, Sunday and Monday."⁴⁴ This last condemnation perhaps does not take into account the effect the *Northcote* had in distracting the Métis and the Indians away from the eastern front where Middleton's advance took place. The Métis expended much energy and ammunition on the *Northcote*, even after it had been incapacitated. It is remarkable that on 9 May Middleton reached the church and rectory, which he was unable to do the following day—in fact he would not reach this point again until the final day.

The organization of the Métis facing the troops who were advancing towards Batoché is less well known than that of the North West Field Force, though some evidence was collected by W. B. Cameron from Patrice Fleury and Charles Laviolette later.⁴⁵ Two scout detachments were formed, one under Fleury and the other under Ambroise Champagne. Fleury was on the west side of the river while Champagne patrolled the east side. Both had chosen a few good riders to accompany them. Dumont, who was Commanding General, had nine or ten captains who were responsible to him, each of them, in turn, responsible for a troop of men. A Board of Strategy, headed by Louis Riel and Charles Nolin (who had left before the fighting had started), also was formed to advise Dumont. The first secretary of the board was William Jackson who was later replaced by Philippe Garnot. Remaining members were Albert Monkman, Napoléon Nault (brother of André Nault), John Boucher, Philippe Gariépy, Pierre Gariépy, Old Man Parenteau (father-in-law of Xavier Batoché), Moïse Ouellette, Maxime Lépine and Joseph Arcand.

As the *Northcote* floated downstream beyond Batoché the infantry neared the church and rectory. Within one hundred yards of the church two rounds were fired from the Gatling gun. Immediately following this burst of fire a white flag, or handkerchief, was noticed and the firing was halted by Middleton. (See map 2). He had apparently given "strict injunctions to the force to spare non-combatants as far as possible."⁴⁶ From Middleton's recollections the flag was seen being waved by a priest from the opened door of the church. He then approached the church: "I stopped the fire and rode up to the house which I found to be full of people; three or four Roman Catholic



DETAILED BATTLE ZONE MAP.

BATOCHÉ. DAY 1, MAY 9, 1885

9:00 AM

MAP 2 OF 10.

SITE FEATURES.



TREED AREAS



FLOODPLAIN



SLOPES



TRAILS

LEGEND.

1, 2, 3 etc. SEQUENTIAL MILITARY MANOEUVRES



METIS and INDIANS



NORTHWEST FIELD FORCE



RIFLE PIT - UNOCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - OCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - HASTILY CONSTRUCTED



RIFLE FIRE



CANNON (9 POUNDERS) / FIRE




GATLING GUN / FIRE

NWFF.

- A BOULTON'S MOUNTED INFANTRY
- B 10th GRENADIERS
- C 90th BATTALION
- D MIDLANDERS
- E 'A' BATTERY
- F WINNIPEG FIELD BATTERY
- G FRENCH'S SCOUTS
- H SURVEYORS

PLAIN

AREA WHERE ZAREBA WILL BE BUILT IN AFTERNOON



priests, some Sisters of Mercy, and a number of women and children, the latter being all half-breeds. They were naturally alarmed, and having reassured them we continued our advance."⁴⁷ According to Boulton, only the corner of the rectory had been struck by the bullets. Some of the bullet marks can still be seen in its woodwork.

Fourmond recorded this encounter in some detail:

En même temps, nous voyons les habits rouges se développer en ligne de bataille tout autour de la mission; profitant des divers accidents du terrain, pour cacher leur marche en avant . . . Sortons, dit P. Fourmond, ils vont nous reconnaître, et ne pas tirer sur nous . . . PP. Fourmond et Végréville sortent et s'adossent au pignon de la maison, faire face aux soldats pour être reconnus . . . A peine là, qu'une détonation retentit et une balle frappe au-dessus de nos têtes . . . Rentrons, il y a danger. A peine entrés, . . . on entend la mitrailleuse cribler le toit de la maison.⁴⁸

There a decision was made to try to raise a white flag:

P. Moulin saisit un morceau de coton donné par les Mères et entrouve la porte ouverte et l'agite en face des soldats avançant en ordre de bataille. Au même instant on entendit ce cri retentir de leur côté. "Don't fear! Don't fear!"⁴⁹

After the encounter at the church, Boulton's Scouts advanced. Only a short distance past the church Boulton's infantry were fired upon from "a sort of low brush about 200 yards or 300 yards ahead."⁵⁰ Two companies of the 10th Grenadiers were then ordered to advance in skirmishing order, and these men reached the edge of the ravine on the left; another two companies moved forward on the right near the church. "A" Battery was now ordered forward to the crest of the hill overlooking Batoche with both its nine-pounders and the Gatling gun. The former began to shell the houses at Batoche while the latter was directed at the west bank "from where a galling fire was being kept up by a totally invisible enemy."⁵¹ This was the farthest the Field Force was able to advance, and it was not until the 12 May that they would reach the crest of the hill overlooking Batoche again. Having reached this ridge by the mission the Grenadiers and "A" Battery came under a shower of bullets. Recalling this moment Boulton wrote, "We had now received a decided check. Immediately in our front lay thick bush, beyond which we could not penetrate. We had been driven by a heavy fire of the enemy from the position which the guns occupied overlooking the village, which was within easy range of the rifle pits that were covered by the bush."⁵² At this point Middleton ordered the Gatling gun ahead.

This initial clash has been estimated by some to have been just before 9:45 A.M. As the Grenadiers moved forward the heaviest fire was felt from the left, "and desperate efforts were made to turn our left flank by their men in the bush under the high river bank and on the slope, who fired with great vigour."⁵³

Having reached the crest of the hill overlooking Batoche, Middleton noted that "the gun detachments and horses were suffering,"⁵⁴

and ordered them to pull back. At this point the heaviest of fire was felt from, as Middleton wrote, "a bluff just below."⁵⁵ By all accounts it was here that the Gatling gun made its most memorable contribution by holding off the enemy fire until the Grenadiers could make an orderly retreat. It looked as though the Métis were trying to pinch off the Grenadiers, leaving them cut off from an easterly retreat.

The Grenadiers had previously been ordered to fire from a lying position, but now as they stood up to retreat, drawing the Métis fire,

The Gatling, which was being worked for a second time and was just getting into action, with Captain Howard at the crank, turned its fire on the concealed foe, and for a moment silenced them.⁵⁶


Although the fire from the Métis was intense, no one was killed during these clashes. At this time the Field Force occupied a position just back from the top of the ravine. The Métis held two positions: one lay immediately to the front and centre in rifle pits and to the left on the heavily wooded crest of the river bank. The right as yet was not defended, and it would not be until 11 May that it became necessary for the Métis to deploy greater numbers to the north.

The Gatling gun was now moved from the left flank towards the lines extending to the church. (See map 3). This could be considered the second of three attempts to break through the enemy lines. As Middleton reported, "I brought the gatling round the church and Captain Howard made a dashing attempt to flank the bluff, but could not succeed, as the enemy was ensconced in well made rifle pits."⁵⁷ The time was now estimated by one source to have been approximately 9:45 A.M. The Winnipeg Rifles occupied the left flank along the river and graveyard; the 10th Grenadiers were next (going left to right) to the front and centre, while "A" Battery, along with Boulton's and French's mounted infantry, lined the right flank. "The Midlanders were in reserve near the church, near which the General and staff took a position, while the remaining companies of the 90th, aided by the Winnipeg Field Battery and dismounted detachments, were deployed on our right centre, right and right flank."⁵⁸

The Métis made two attempts at encirclement during this early action. The first was made on the left flank. The second attempt came after the Gatling had to save the troops following the initial advance:

... The Grenadiers advanced to the edge of the wood in rear of the school house, and a little to the right of the spot where we first felt the rebel fire... The rebels detected the movement, and desperate efforts were made to turn our left flank by their men in the bush under the high river bank and on the slope, who fired with great vigour; but they had nothing but shot guns, and their fire fell short. Some rebels with rifles on the other side of the river also took a hand in, but the Gatling silenced them.⁵⁹

A planned manoeuvre to capture the Gatling gun on the first day failed. It was described by Elie Dumont as they moved from right to



DETAILED BATTLE ZONE MAP.

BATOCHÉ. DAY 1, MAY 9, 1885

11:00 AM

MAP 3 OF 10.

SITE FEATURES.



TREED AREAS



SLOPES



FLOODPLAIN



TRAILS

LEGEND.

1, 2, 3 etc. SEQUENTIAL MILITARY MANOEUVRES



MÉTIS and INDIANS



NORTHWEST FIELD FORCE



RIFLE PIT - UNOCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - OCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - HASTILY CONSTRUCTED



RIFLE FIRE



CANNON (9 POUNDERS) / FIRE



GATLING GUN / FIRE

NWFF.


- A BOULTON'S MOUNTED INFANTRY
- B 10th GRENADIERS
- C 90th BATTALION
- D MIDLANDERS
- E 'A' BATTERY
- F WINNIPEG FIELD BATTERY
- G FRENCH'S SCOUTS
- H SURVEYORS

PLAIN

AREA WHERE ZAREBA WILL BE BUILT IN AFTERNOON



SCALE



left for their aborted attack:

... Tout droit ou mettaient le gatling [sic], on se trouvait dans les petits trembles ... Alors, Philippe tire et Bap. Boucher tire aussi. Gens du gatling ont commencé à tourner la machine. Le gatling tire sur nous. Quand fini la décharge, je me sauve en descendant les côtes ... Une partie de nos gens étaient là et voulaient aller au bord de la rivière ... on était comme une 30ne. On a suivi la Rivière à l'abri des écarts pour remonter le courant vis-à-vis le gatling ... Voulait ramasser du monde assez pour aller prendre le gatling sur la côte en face de nous, ... restait encore 100 vgs pour aller au gatling: on n'était pas assez de monde. ... On a resté ½ hs. là, et retourne par même chemin en courant vite au bord de la rivière pour éviter à nos gens de tirer sur nous, ... On a été auprès du cimetière. Soldats déjà reculés. On ne pouvait pas tirer les soldats étaient trop loin déjà.⁶⁰

After the first line of skirmishers ran into resistance and retreated a short distance, Middleton ordered the two nine-pounders of "A" Battery forward. No. 1 gun, under Captain Drury, fired a few shells a distance of fifteen hundred yards across the river, and No. 2 gun, under Lt. Ogilvie, also fired at buildings across the river. The fire from the Métis was not particularly intense at this time and an almost unencumbered shelling by the nine-pound guns was continuing. Dumont was on record as stating later that the initial resistance was less than it might have been since, "Those in the pits near the river could not resist the excitement of following the 'Northcote' down stream, otherwise the General and the guns would not have advanced to the position from which they shelled Batoche on the 9th, before clearing out the rifle pits along the river bank, in the cemetery coulee, and on either side of the trail from where it descended the hill."⁶¹ In the intervening time after the *Northcote* had floated downstream, the Métis were again manning the rifle pits along the entire front. During this lull Middleton ordered one of the guns further forward. Unfortunately for Middleton, the gun misfired and Middleton ordered a retreat, "... when with a startling suddenness of a thunderbolt from a cloudless sky, a crashing fusillade, it could almost be called a volley, swept through the wooden slope at the right front ... the bushy slope, which hitherto appeared to be perfectly deserted, appeared suddenly to be infested by coyotting savages. The guttural 'ki-yi-ki-yi,' the sweeping fusillade, and above everything, the startling suddenness of the eruption, combined to make the new situation a trying one for the nerves of the bravest."⁶²

At approximately 12:00 noon, after Captain Howard's attempt to outflank the Métis on the right had failed, Middleton moved back to the left flank where he had left Melgund in command. When he arrived he found Captain Peters had attacked the Métis lines to the west attempting to reach the rifle pits: "... I found Captain Peters had made a gallant and vigorous attempt, with a few of the garrison artillery, to drive the enemy out of the bluff below, but had failed and had retired, leaving a wounded man behind [Gunner Philips]."⁶³

Shortly after Philips was shot (one source had it at 2:00 P.M.), an attempt to rescue him was organized under the direction of Captain

Peters. (See map 4). It was believed at first that Philips had only been wounded and perhaps that was the case. One participant recalled Philips crying out after he was hit, "Captain French, my leg is broken. For God's sake, don't leave me here."⁶⁴

Shortly after Philips was rescued, a second encirclement of the Field Force was attempted, this time from the right flank of their line of defense. (See map 5). Middleton makes almost no mention of these threats of being cut off from supplies, but they are detailed at some length in numerous other accounts. Earlier, the Gatling had been effective in repelling an attack on the left flank, but the Métis now employed distracting tactics by taking advantage of the north-westerly wind blowing towards the church. A prairie fire was lit up-wind and it was expected that the Métis would try to attack under the cover of the smoke. The tactic managed to unsettle some of the senior officers; Melgund described the effects of this unanticipated tactic:


Enemy...lighted bush fire on our right front, behind smoke of which we expected them to advance, things looked awkward we got wounded out of church into waggons, and had ordered them to fall back to camp. I found that the ammunition waggons were also retiring, and I stopped them, much to Disbrowe's relief, who was in charge of them and had done well all day.⁶⁵

The smoke and fire appears to have alarmed the men sufficiently that the wounded were moved out of the temporary hospital which had been set up in the church. According to another source, however, the troops were never in danger of panicking:

For a time we were surrounded by fires from the sloughs, the smoke of which rolled along the ground like fog. It was a tight place, but the troops never for a moment flinched. They simply looked to their officers who in turn patiently waited for orders from the chief.⁶⁶

The fire, then, was the cause of some anxiety for the right flank but it appears that it was not followed by any sustained advance from the Métis.

After Philips's rescue and the perceived encirclement had been withstood, the heavy firing on both sides subsided. It was now mid-afternoon. "Towards three o'clock the fire slackened somewhat, though a head shown by either party was a target for a score of bullets."⁶⁷ At 3:00 P.M., Middleton decided to send Lord Melgund, his chief of staff, to Humboldt, ostensibly to send a private message to Caron. The documentary sources remain ambiguous so that the real purpose of the mission remains clouded with controversy. Later, some innuendo appeared in the eastern press to the effect that Middleton was panicking and was anticipating a desultory battle which he feared might be lost by the Field Force. The telegram was never found and, therefore, the issue cannot be definitely settled. In his own account, Middleton states that he sent Melgund simply as a precautionary measure. The order to send Melgund in fact was tied to Middleton's larger problems. The first of these was that he was retreating and he



DETAILED BATTLE ZONE MAP.

BATOCHÉ. DAY 1, MAY 9, 1885

2:00 PM

MAP 4 OF 10.

SITE FEATURES.

-  TREED AREAS
-  SLOPES
-  FLOODPLAIN
-  TRAILS

LEGEND.

1, 2, 3 etc. SEQUENTIAL MILITARY MANOEUVRES

-  METIS and INDIANS
-  NORTHWEST FIELD FORCE
-  RIFLE PIT - UNOCCUPIED
-  RIFLE PIT - OCCUPIED
-  RIFLE PIT - HASTILY CONSTRUCTED
-  RIFLE FIRE
-  CANNON (9 POUNDERS) / FIRE
-  GATLING GUN / FIRE


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
- A BOULTON'S MOUNTED INFANTRY
- B 10th GRENADIERS
- C 90th BATTALION
- D MIDLANDERS
- E 'A' BATTERY
- F WINNIPEG FIELD BATTERY
- G FRENCH'S SCOUTS
- H SURVEYORS

PLAIN

AREA WHERE ZAREBA WILL BE BUILT IN AFTERNOON



SCALE 



DETAILED BATTLE ZONE MAP.

BATOCHÉ. DAY 1, MAY 9, 1885

3:00 PM

MAP 5 OF 10.

SITE FEATURES.



TREED AREAS



FLOODPLAIN



SLOPES



TRAILS

LEGEND.

1, 2, 3 etc. SEQUENTIAL MILITARY MANOEUVRES



MÉTIS and INDIANS



NORTHWEST FIELD FORCE



RIFLE PIT - UNOCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - OCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - HASTILY CONSTRUCTED



RIFLE FIRE



CANNON (9 POUNDERS) / FIRE




GATLING GUN / FIRE

NWFF.

- A BOULTON'S MOUNTED INFANTRY
- B 10th GRENADIERS
- C 90th BATTALION
- D MIDLANDERS
- E 'A' BATTERY
- F WINNIPEG FIELD BATTERY
- G FRENCH'S SCOUTS
- H SURVEYORS

PLAIN

AREA WHERE
ZAREBA WILL BE
CONSTRUCTED 4-6 PM



was concerned over the effect this would have on the enemy; second, he did not know how far to retire. His concern over whether the Métis would interpret the withdrawal as a retreat from weakness (to which the Métis could respond by an attack) was paramount with Middleton.

Melgund's account of this event does not relate any of the atmosphere surrounding the order or any of the underlying reasons for it. He simply stated:

About 3 P.M. General told me he wished me to go to Humboldt and send some telegrams for him. He also wished me for several reasons to go to Ottawa. I accordingly started, and found our camp on prairie breaking up in order to move up to General.⁶⁸

By approximately 3:00 P.M. the fighting had subsided. Middleton had sent Boulton and Secretan to strike camp and move it to within a mile of Batoche (about one-quarter mile from the church). Three and one-half hours later the transport carrying the camp forward was arriving and a zareba was formed. The zareba consisted of a transport pulled into a "zareba" shape with earth and poplar branches filling the space underneath the wagons, a small trench was also dug around the outside of the enclosure.

Zareba warfare is recommended when a long column of transport needs to be guarded and when fighting guerillas. Major Callwell also advocated the use of these tactics, especially when approaching an enemy of unknown strength. It was seen as a defensive tactic within an overall offensive campaign:

The principle [zareba warfare] is an excellent illustration of defensive tactics superimposed upon offensive strategy. The regular troops invade hostile territory, or territory in temporary occupation of the enemy, and they maintain strategically the initiatives; but when they find themselves in presence of the irregular forces prepared for battle, they form the laager or zareba as the case may be, and either await attack or else leave their impediments in it and go out to fight without encumbrances. In any case they have a secure bivouac and adequate protection during the hours of darkness.⁶⁹

In fact, Callwell recommended such tactics in the terrain of South Africa and North America. The precedent for the use of such tactics originated with pioneers, who came to the frontier in wagons, and used circling formations in face of hostile natives. In regular military strategy this tactic stems from the square. A similar tactic was actually used by the Métis against the Sioux at the battle of Grand Coteau. In North America, pioneers "...when operating against Red Indians often formed laagers, or corrals as they were called."⁷⁰ Callwell specifically cited the use of zarebas, "During the suppression of Riel's rebellion in 1885, laagers were generally established after each march by the government troops."⁷¹ He furthermore cited Middleton's tactics as an example of a proper use of these tactics, "...in the campaign against Riel, ... the regular army has adopted it to varying circumstances with great success."⁷² And as such Callwell concluded:

Some think it to be derogatory, some fear its evil moral effect upon the troops. But if kept within limits, and employed only when clear necessity arises, if not permitted to cramp their energies or to check judiciously applied offensive action on the part of the troops there is much to be said for a military system which safeguards the supplies of an army and which grants it temporary repose.⁷³

Coinciding with the withdrawal of the troops to the zareba, at approximately 6:30 P.M., was a renewed advance from the Métis. Middleton wrote, "Towards evening the troops were gradually withdrawn, some of the enemy following them up until checked by a heavy fire from the zareba."⁷⁴ The Gatling gun was again heavily relied upon to cover the retreat to the zareba. (See map 6). From all accounts the retreat was an unpleasant one. "The rebels, well aware of our retirement, took advantage of their safe route under the brow of the cliff, and rising over the brow fired into the zareba."⁷⁵ Both the 90th and the 10th Grenadiers were deployed to meet the Métis's pursuit and, as one source noted, "... the wonder is that our loss was not heavy. The only reasonable explanations are poor ammunition, poor and hurried marksmanship, greater caution on the part of our forces, and a kind Providence."⁷⁶ One man was killed during this final skirmish of the day, however; Private Moor, 3rd Company of the Grenadiers, was shot through the head while defending the zareba.


At dusk, around 7:00 P.M., the fire lessened. "A few of them kept up a desultory long-range fire for a short time, killing two horses and wounding a man."⁷⁷ As the fighting waned fires were lit and men ate supper and prepared for the night. Only the wounded were allowed to sleep in tents, the remainder made do under the open sky. The night was ominous for many and one man recorded his feelings:

Night came at length, but tired as we were it was scarcely welcome. We were cooped up, and had the extreme satisfaction of furnishing a good mark for pot shooters. In the corral were more than six hundred mules and horses, and eight cattle. Men were busy throwing up hasty entrenchments; teamsters, nervous and frightened, were yelling at equally nervous animals; around the hospital tents the doctors were busy dressing wounds, probing for bullets, etc. The bullets were whizzing and pinging overhead, and occasionally when one remembered that a favorite trick among the reds is to stampede the cattle and horses of the enemy. Hoofs would be apt to deal worse wounds than balls, and against affrighted animals, cooped up within a small space, we had absolutely no defense. The anticipations of a mean night were largely realized, though thus far we have escaped a stampede. Few, if any, slept five hours consecutively, and the firing kept up almost all night.⁷⁸

To prevent a surrounding manoeuvre by the Métis during the night, trenches had been dug around the zareba and the Midland Battalion and one company of the 90th took up positions on a height of land overlooking the river. This did not prevent the dropping fire which the Métis and Indians kept up throughout the night, however.

According to Elie Dumont, the Indians did much of the firing during the first evening:

Grosse gagne se sont assis. On tire des plans pour la soirée. Sauvages disaient on



DETAILED BATTLE ZONE MAP.

BATOCHÉ. DAY 1, MAY 9, 1885

6:00 PM

MAP 6 OF 10.

SITE FEATURES.



TREED AREAS



FLOODPLAIN



SLOPES



TRAILS

LEGEND.

1, 2, 3 etc. SEQUENTIAL MILITARY MANOEUVRES



METIS and INDIANS



NORTHWEST FIELD FORCE



RIFLE PIT - UNOCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - OCCUPIED



RIFLE PIT - HASTILY CONSTRUCTED



RIFLE FIRE



CANNON (9 POUNDERS) / FIRE




GATLING GUN / FIRE

NWFF.

- A BOULTON'S MOUNTED INFANTRY
- B 10th GRENADIERS
- C 90th BATTALION
- D MIDLANDERS
- E 'A' BATTERY
- F WINNIPEG FIELD BATTERY
- G FRENCH'S SCOUTS
- H SURVEYORS

PLAIN



va les tirer ce soir dans leur camp, toute la nuit: vous autres vous travaillerez dans la journée, les métis. Métis disent oui. Au commencement de la veillée, les sauvages ont commencé à tirer, sur le camp, une 10ne de minutes entres les coups, toute la nuit jusqu'au jour.⁷⁹

The resistance of the Métis and the Indians on the first day appears to have momentarily stunned Middleton. His decision to move the camp up to the front showed that he had not entirely lost confidence in the ability of his men to break through the defenses at Batoche—but in spite of this, Middleton's actions during the next few days were cautious and deliberate. Even though his intelligence reports were showing that the Métis were fewer in number than he had estimated and that they were low on ammunition, Middleton was taciturn, unwilling to embark on a bold offensive.⁸⁰ He chose this tactic even though he had lost only two men and a few wounded. In effect, he was imposing a partial siege on Batoche. His caution was shown when, according to Boulton, he ordered reinforcements to the front, although Middleton himself did not admit this in his official account published in the *Sessional Papers*.

By the end of the first day of fighting at Batoche, Middleton and the North West Field Force were in a defensive encampment; the men and animals huddled in the zareba spent a fretful night. While the Métis and the Indians by contrast were in an almost victorious mood, having witnessed the uniformed army in retreat, they showed an audacious confidence by keeping up a constant fire into the corral throughout the night. Fourmond recalled that the Métis were in a jubilant mood that evening. As he wrote: "On eut dit l'armée mise en fuite. Et la victoire gagnée par les métis qui alors poursuivit l'ennemi d'aussi près que pouvait le permettre le gatling gun."⁸¹

The priests who occupied the church through most of the fighting made a number of perceptive observations. The first was that the Canadians appeared to be somewhat disorganized on this first day (a weakness that Middleton himself acknowledged). "Parmi les diverses impressions de la journée, il en est une qui regarde la tenue de l'armée canadienne. Fûmes surpris de son triste accoutrement aussi bien que de son peu de discipline. Nous disions: où sont nos troupes françaises. Quel contraste! Il nous semblait voir des enfants jouant au soldat."⁸² Fourmond also noted the shortage of ammunition among the Métis even after the first day, "... on voyait Sioux, rôder sur le champ laissé par les soldats, les cartouches abandonnées ou perdues, s'approvisionnant ainsi pour le lendemain."⁸³ After a cannon ball was fired on the house holding the prisoners it, too, was used for ammunition: "Le fils de Michel Trottier ramasse le boulet, va au bas de la côte porter la poudre de dedans et ramasse les balles des soldats et va les faire fondre pour faire des balles pour Métis."⁸⁴ One other observation made by the priests was that the Métis may have gained a false sense of security from the method of firing used by the Field Force. "Les Métis souvent

induits en erreur sur les morts des soldats par la manoeuvre qui fait coucher le premier rang avant le second tire.”⁸⁵ The recognition by the Métis that they were killing fewer men than they believed could have demoralized them after the apparent victory of 9 May.

The next day, 10 May, was a Sunday; the North West Field Force was unable to reach the position left the day before, “as the enemy was in greater force, and now held the high ground about the cemetery and the ground in front of the church. Some of them, apparently Indians from their war cries, had taken post at the end of the point of land below the cemetery . . .”⁸⁶ (See map 7).


Middleton had apparently decided to attempt to demoralize the enemy with heavy artillery fire during the day. Shortly after 5:00 A.M., he began to fire on positions which he had held the previous day. “Two guns were directed against the houses in the basin-shaped depression along the river. A few rebels lay behind three log shanties just below the river bank, and the artillery soon drove them out.”⁸⁷


On 11 May, Middleton appeared more anxious for a direct engagement with the Métis and the Indians. (See map 8). But he approached this strategy with caution. Most of the day was spent in reconnaissance, exploring all the possibilities available for a major attack. On this penultimate day of the battle of Batoché, the fighting escalated, as a consequence of the reconnaissance carried out by Middleton.


It had been reported to Middleton that a space of open prairie, overlooking the village of Batoché, lay just to the north of the zareba. Boulton, whose men accompanied Middleton, described the purpose as follows:


We marched out about ten o'clock under the command of the General himself, leaving (Alone) Montizambert, Colonel Grasset, Colonel Williams, Major Jarvis, Colonel Mackeand and Colonel Van Straubenzie all discussing the position, and studying a plan of the ground which had been drawn by Captain Haig, R. E. with a view of preparing an attack.⁸⁸


Middleton, accompanied by the Gatling gun, proceeded north through a small swamp, under the cover of bushes lying to the north of the zareba. (See map 9): They emerged on an irregularly-shaped clearing “about two miles long and 1,000 yards in the broadest part, with a sort of slight ridge running down the centre and some undulations.”⁸⁹ As they moved northward they attracted a sporadic fire from the rifle pits which ran along this ridge. In response to the sniper fire, Middleton ordered the Gatling gun to direct two or three rounds into the rifle pits. Middleton then rode further to the north where he pursued two men he spotted riding across the prairie on ponies and captured another, later discovered to be one of Riel's men, who came out of the bush. According to Middleton, “We also captured some cattle and ponies which we took back to camp with us.”⁹⁰ Boulton wrote, “Before leaving this point we burned down some log houses that might offer














shelter to the enemy, in case further operations were needed here.”⁹¹

Middleton had been receiving intelligence reports which indicated that the Métis were almost out of ammunition. Now that he could see the Métis thinly spread out along their line of rifle pits, he discovered what he needed to know in preparation for his final attack on Batoche. “We could see with our glasses that the enemy had a series of rifle pits all along the edge of those woods, and numbers of them were running up between the woods and disappearing into the pits. Evidently they were prepared for an attack in this direction.”⁹² It was clear that the Métis had responded to Middleton’s manoeuvre of pulling men away from their right flank to reinforce the left where the Field Force “drew a smart fire.”⁹³

Further evidence that the Métis had followed the Gatling gun to the north awaited Middleton when he returned to camp. There he found that the infantry were able to regain the ground they had held of the first day of fighting. “A party of Midlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams’ command, finding the fire slacken from the Indians’ post below the cemetery, and led by him, gallantly rushed it, the Indians bolting leaving behind them some blankets and a dummy which they had used for drawing our fire.”⁹⁴ Middleton now knew that the Métis could not be certain how many men he might deploy in a manoeuvre to the north because of the cover offered by the intervening bushes. As a consequence of the advances made by the infantry, the artillery were again able to draw up in the vicinity of the graveyard to open fire on the village and on the houses on the opposite bank, “. . . shelling the opposite bank we [observed] that the shells created great consternation among the rebels, making them scatter and get well beyond range, and silenced the long range rifles which were a constant source of annoyance.”⁹⁵

It was clear to Middleton that the resources of the Métis and Indians were running low and that his men were gaining confidence.⁹⁶ The Métis hardly pursued the Field Force as it retired for the night and there was no fire into the camp that evening; a parapet had been built around the zareba that day to protect against bullets fired into the camp. Late that evening Middleton made his decision. “Our men were beginning to show more dash, and that night I came to the conclusion that it was time to make our decisive attack.”⁹⁷

Convinced that the Métis and the Indians would follow his manoeuvre accompanied by the Gatling gun, Middleton again reconnoitred to the open plain north of the zareba. Middleton then told Van Straubenzie to proceed to the original front and “that as soon as he heard us well engaged he was to move off, and, having taken up yesterday’s position, push on towards the village.”⁹⁸ This manoeuvre engineered by Middleton was commemorated in a major military

study of the nineteenth century which examined warfare against what were referred to as "savages" throughout the British Empire. Major Callwell cites Middleton's feinting action as particularly successful in the situation confronting him:

General Middleton found the half-breeds holding a long line of rifle pits; this stretched across the land enclosed by a wide salient angle formed by the Saskatchewan. The Government forces encamped opposite one end of this line of defence and formed a zareba, and they remained facing the enemy four days engaged in skirmishes. On the third day the mounted troops made a demonstration against the hostile centre, and it was observed that a part of Riel's followers were withdrawn from the end of the line opposite the zareba to strengthen the threatened point. On the following day this demonstration was repeated by the mounted men with two guns, and these then returned quietly to camp. In the afternoon the whole Government force attacked the end of the rebel line in front of the zareba where it had been greatly weakened, and broke through and reached Batoché. The undulating nature of the ground patched with woods and copses enable the feint to be carried out in very effective fashion.⁹⁹

The strategy was straightforward and simple even though it failed initially. The attack from the left flank was to be led that morning by Colonel Van Straubenzie's brigade. The men making up the party intended to participate in the feinting manoeuvre were, "Captain Dennis' corps, my own corps [Boulton], and Captain French's, in all numbering about one hundred and thirty men, one gun of "A" Battery, under Captain Drury and the Gatling under Lieutenant Rivers, accompanied by Captain Howard, marched off under General Middleton . . ." ¹⁰⁰ The nine-pounder which accompanied Middleton's expedition was pulled up into firing position, and the Land Surveyors, under Captain Dennis, dismounted and advanced in skirmishing order. The Gatling gun was then stationed to the north of this point and Middleton rode out to within four hundred yards of the Métis rifle pits to order the advance of the dismounted surveyors. The rest of the infantry was kept hidden behind the advancing skirmishers. According to one surveyor's reminiscences, it appeared that the Métis were anticipating an attack from the basin where Middleton assembled his men. "The Rebels evidently expected us, for we had only advanced a few yards when they must have caught sight of one of us over the rise, and a volley was fired into our ranks, at the report of which we dropped our faces in the brush, one of us never again to rise again, for poor Kippen fell dead with a rifle bullet in his brain."¹⁰¹ The nine-pounder and the Gatling also opened fire and there was a brief, but from most accounts, intense exchange. Perhaps the Métis, in fact, had expected the main attack to come from this front.

During the morning's action, another event occurred which suggests that the Métis position was weakening. It also showed that Riel, by sending his message to this front, believed that it was where the main attack would take place. Just as the Gatling was ready to move to a position further to the north, Middleton saw a man riding towards him

with a white flag. It turned out to be a Mr. Astley, a surveyor captured by Riel just after the battle at Duck Lake. "He told me he had just come from Riel, who was apparently in a great state of agitation, and handed me a letter from him in which he said, apparently referring to our shelling the houses, that if I massacred his women and children they would massacre their prisoners."¹⁰² Middleton replied that he had no intention of deliberately injuring women and children and suggested that they be placed in a building marked by a white flag. Astley, after having explained Riel's condition for surrender, returned with Middleton's reply. Shortly after this, another man emerged on foot carrying a white flag. He turned out to be Thomas Jackson, later found to be sympathetic to Riel. Jackson was carrying the same note as Astley; however, he refused to go back to Riel's camp and Middleton allowed him, for the time being, to go free.

It was now about 11:30 A.M. and Middleton was prepared to move back to camp. His deployment of troops in the morning seemed to confuse the men in the rifle pits, according to Boulton "... keeping us for a while just out of sight of the enemy, occasionally showing a mounted man or two to puzzle the rebels as to our movements, which always drew a volley from them."¹⁰³ Following this, the men returned to camp having lost only one man in what was to be an all-out advance against the Métis and Indians.

That morning Van Straubenzie had ordered the Midlanders and Grenadiers out in quarter column ready for an attack on the left flank. Due to a strong east wind he was however unable to hear any of the artillery or rifle fire from Middleton's contingent. According to a number of accounts, Middleton was furious when he returned to camp at lunch to find that no attack had been made. Middleton himself wrote: "I am afraid on that occasion I lost both my temper and my head."¹⁰⁴ Later, in retrospect, Middleton seemed to believe that it was fortuitous that the charge had been aborted. "On regaining the camp I was much annoyed at finding that, owing to a misconception of my orders, the advance parties had not, as I had directed, been sent forward to hold the regained position and press forward, as I drew the enemy from their right by my feint; but now I am inclined to think it was a fortunate thing that they had not, for I believe the total silence and absence of fire from my left only strengthened the belief of the enemy that I was going to attack from the prairie ground."¹⁰⁵ The men of the Grenadiers and Midlanders were just completing their meal which one man described as: "munching the bulletproof discs of that indescribable compound known as Government biscuit that formed our lunch..."¹⁰⁶ Middleton was sitting down to his when he gave a rather vague order to Van Straubenzie to "take them as far as he pleased."¹⁰⁷ It is believed that the order was simply intended to send the men back to the positions they held that morning although it might

have been taken as a signal to advance further against the Métis positions.


Conflicting accounts over exactly what happened and who was responsible for the charge at this point are numerous. (See map 10). Much of the conflict was motivated by those who sought personal glory and also by those who either hated or admired Middleton. One observer noted:


... one of the Midland men on the slope of the hill near the cemetery was hit by a volley from the west side of the river, and the ambulance men going to his relief were also fired upon. This seemed to infuriate the men, and their officers saw that there was no holding them any longer. Colonel Williams therefore decided upon charging, and with only two companies of the Midland, he led the way counting on the 90th and the Grenadiers for support.¹⁰⁸

Others also gave credit to Williams for leading the final charge though it is not clear whether he proceeded on his own or under orders. Colonel Denison, who was not at the front but stationed at Humboldt, acknowledges Williams as the leader of the final charge. Captain Peters gives credit for the charge to Van Straubenzie, while Boulton tends to credit Middleton and Van Straubenzie with issuing the string of orders which led to the final charge.¹⁰⁹ Middleton's own description, which he wrote closest to the time of the action, indicates that the breakthrough merely happened and was not actually ordered as an advance:

After the men had had their dinners they were moved down to take up old positions and press on. Two companies of the Midland, 60 men in all, under Lt. Col. Williams, were extended on the left and moved up to the cemetery, and the Grenadiers, 200 strong, under Lt. Col. Grassetton prolonged the line to the right beyond the church, the 90th being in support. The Midland and Grenadiers, led by Lt. Cols. Williams and Grassetton, the whole led by Lt. Col. Straubenzie in command of the Brigade, then dashed forward with a cheer and drove the enemy out of the pits in front of the cemetery and the ravine to the right of it, thus clearing the angle at the turn of the river.¹¹⁰

One theory suggests that because of the turn in the river it was necessary for the line of advance to be equidistant from the rifle pits all along the front and that, consequently, the extreme left had to be ordered slightly forward. When so commanded they advanced without resistance, possibly due to weakly manned or vacant rifle pits (men being now located to the north where attack was anticipated). Gaining confidence and momentum and encountering little resistance, they broke into a run. Seeing this movement, the rest of the front, extending to the right from the river past the church, now followed suit. This advancing front, made up from left to right of the Midlanders, Grenadiers and 90th, was now joined by men ordered by Middleton to extend the line to the right. This was done by sending out the gun of "A" Battery and by "B" and "F" of the 90th; Boulton's Mounted were then sent to lengthen the line even further. The Surveyors were ordered out to the right of Boulton's men. The artillery were now firing both at the





village and at the Métis in rifle pits across the river, whose fire was pouring down on the Midlanders closest to the river. The gun from the Winnipeg Field Battery and the Gatling were ordered to fire at the village from the right extreme on the front.

Loud cheers were heard as the men now broke towards the village. One reporter wrote:

... with a rush and a cheer they were down on the rebels with the fierceness of Bashi-Basouks, the Midland on the left, the Grenadiers in the centre, and the 90th on the right. The advance came sweeping round until a few minutes saw the line of direction at right angles to the original line of attack. The cheering was that of satisfied and contented men, and the enthusiasm was intense. Nothing could have withstood the pace, the force, and the dogged determination of the men. The cheering attracted the General, and, taking in the situation at glance, he came on with the Winnipeg artillery, Gatling and three companies of the 90th.¹¹¹

Just as Middleton heard cheers from the men as they broke through the first line of rifle pits, Astley, Riel's messenger, again appeared. He carried with him a note from Riel which read, "General, —Your prompt answer to my note shows that I was right mentioning to you the cause of humanity. We will gather our families in one place and as soon as it is done we will let you know."¹¹² It was signed Louis David Riel. On the outside another missive, reflecting a more agitated state of mind, appeared. "I do not like the war, and if you do not retreat and refuse an interview, the question remains the same concerning the prisoners."¹¹³ The message on the envelope, which contained a veiled threat, was in fact a contradiction of the note inside, an indication of Riel's instability. Middleton ignored both the note and the message:

Of course no answer was sent, and soon, with the officers well in front, a general advance of the whole line was made with rousing cheers, the place was captured, the prisoners released, and the fighting was over, except for some desultory long-range firing, which was soon put down by two or three parties sent in different directions.¹¹⁴

The final offensive did not run as smoothly as Middleton described, and a number of sources indicate that some stiff resistance was met as they moved down the slopes towards the village. One skirmisher recalled the action, "The enemy poured in a hot fire when we started, but I don't think any of our men were hit until we got into the bush. Here many of the men were struck."¹¹⁵ Most were hit by shots fired from the camouflaged rifle pits.

The well-constructed rifle pits discovered after the attack by the Field Force were praised by Middleton:

... I was astonished at the strength of the position and at the ingenuity and care displayed in the construction of the rifle pits, ... In and around the pits were found blankets, trousers, coats, shirts, boots, shoes, food, oil, Indian articles of sleep, one or two damaged shot guns and one good rifle. It was evident that a detachment of Rebels had lived in these pits, day and night, and it was easily understood, by an inspection of them, how perfectly safe the holders of these pits were from the fire of our rifles and especially from the Gatling and artillery.

These pits were also judiciously placed as regards repelling a front attack, but by attacking their right (which was their weakest point) and driving it in, we turned and took in reverse all their entrenchments, along the edge of the prairie ground, and thus caused a rout which ended in a "sauve qui peut."¹¹⁶

The Métis, as is now well known, were short of ammunition and fighting men on this last day. Of the original 320 to 350 combatants, Lépine recalled that only fifty to sixty men were fighting during the final battle.¹¹⁷ "40 environ métis, avaient des carabines, le reste avaient des fusils à canard (2 coups)."¹¹⁸ Nails were being fired by some in the rifle pits when the metal bullets manufactured from the last of the melted down cannon balls had been exhausted. In addition to the fact that they were poorly armed and lacked ammunition, the Métis, it appears, were also misled by appearances on this last day. Vandale remembered thinking that the peace had been won when Middleton withdrew his men from their left flank in the morning. The Métis, it seems, believed that Riel's messages had succeeded in winning a cease fire. Vandale wrote: "Le canon arrête et Champagne se sauve et dit c'est la paix . . . Les Métis se lèvent, s'assient sur le bord des trous . . . puis se relèvent et se retirent au camp des familles, une douzaine environ, pensant que c'était la paix."¹¹⁹ As was evident, however, it was a terrible misunderstanding: "On était à se laver, quand Gabriel vient nous renvoyer aux trous du vieux chemin—s'y sont rendus, et grand bruit dans le camp et coups de fusil—10 minutes plus tard, bataille générale. Quand la bataille recommence, il y en avait 18 qui tenaient bon, et plusieurs se sauvaient un à un quand ils avaient une chance."¹²⁰ It is clear that the state of disarray the Métis found themselves in on the last day was greater than has previously been believed. Indeed, the orders under which the Métis were acting were confused and contradictory. The final attack by the Field Force was decisive, therefore, even from the perspective of the Métis.

On voit l'armée déboucher de tous côtés en ordre de bataille. Infanterie, artillerie, cavalerie, tout à la fois. Avec un ordre et détermination, une rapidité de mouvement que nous n'avions pas vue les autres jours. Du ler coup d'oeil, on comprit que l'heure décisive était venue; que c'en était fait de Batoche.¹²¹

At dusk, Middleton ordered that the camp be formed into a zareba. Trenches were dug but they were not as extensive as before. These precautions turned out to be unnecessary as no other shots were fired at Batoche. The zareba was located just to the north and east of Batoche's house.

During the period after the fighting and throughout the following days, the men with the Field Force, and the reporters accompanying them, made a number of observations about the Métis and recorded statements made by them. While these statements were accurately recorded, whether they were factual remains questionable. One recurring observation was that the Métis and their families were forced to take up arms against their will.¹²²

Almost ten years later, when he was reflecting over the events of 1885, Middleton was generous in his praise of the fighting ability of the Métis and Indians. Of the combat on 12 May, in particular, he wrote:

Needless to say, I was well satisfied with the result of the day's fighting, which proved the correctness of my opinion that these great hunters, like the Boers of South Africa, are only formidable when you play their games, 'bush fighting', to which they are accustomed, but they cannot stand a determined charge.¹²³

This seems to be an accurate assessment, but begs the question in that the Métis and Indians were prevented by their own leader from fully engaging in guerilla warfare. A bold frontal attack was possible not through anything Middleton or the Field Force did, but through Riel's determination to decide their fate at Batoche.

For the Westerners who rose or were tempted to rise in arms, there was a subtle irony in the presence of these Eastern soldiers. Many who had come obediently and with preconceived notions of the savagery of the Wild West came to sympathize with the problems of their former foes. The problems of the administration of the Northwest was apparent to those who marched into the territory—they too suffered from privations on the frontier. Only after receiving reports from the distant Northwest did many of the officials in the East become aware of Western discontent and discover that there was substance to the complaints.

Melgund, on whose observations both Lansdowne and Derby relied, believed that there was general discontent in the Northwest among all groups as a result of inadequate administration and neglect. As he wrote after the fighting had ended:

Riel and Gabriel Dumont were not counting only on their half-breed and Redskin rifles, but on the support of white men who they had been lulled into believing would stand by them. Riel put his fighting men in his first line, but in his second we may perhaps find the disappointed white contractor, the disappointed white land shark, the disappointed white farmer.¹²⁴

The tragedy of Batoche was that those mentioned by Melgund, and especially the Métis and Indians who fought in the last battle, relied too heavily on Riel to win redress for their grievances.

NOTES

See among others, Captain Ernest Chambers, *The Royal Grenadiers, A Regimental History of the 10th Infantry Regiment of the Active Militia in Canada* (Toronto: E. L. Ruddy, 1904); Charles Boulton, *Reminiscences of the North-West Rebellion* (Toronto: Grip Printing, 1886); W. B. Cameron, *The War Trial of Big Bear (or Blood Red The Sun)* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1926); Joseph Kinsey Howard, *Strange Empire: Louis Riel and the Métis People* (New York: William Morrow, 1952); Desmond Morton, *The Last War Drum: The North-West Campaign of 1885* (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972); Desmond Morton and R. H. Roy (eds.), *Telegrams of the North-West Campaign of 1885* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1972); C. P. Mulvaney, *The History of the North-West Rebellion of 1885* (Toronto: A. H. Havey, 1885); G. H. Needler, *Suppression of Rebellion in the North-West Territories* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948); C. P. Stacey, "The North-West Campaign, 1885," *Canadian Army Journal*, 8 (1954): 10-20; G. F. G. Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellion* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1936); G. F. G. Stanley, *Louis Riel* (Toronto: McGraw

- Hill, 1963); P. B. Waite, *Arduous Destiny 1874-1896* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971). Although not all of these sources are quoted directly, they were consulted in both the writing of the text and in the preparation of the maps.
- 2 Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1886, no. 5, "Report upon the Suppression of the Rebellion in the North-West Territories, and in Matters in Connection Therewith in 1885."
 - 3 One of the earliest analytical pieces was an article by Colonel C. F. Hamilton, "The Canadian Militia: The Northwest Rebellion, 1885," in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, January 1930, 220.
 - 4 Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada*; Morton, *Last War Drum*; and Morton, *Telegrams*.
 - 5 Journal de l'abbé G. Cloutier, Archives Archépiscopales de Saint-Boniface, 1886.
 - 6 Major General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocketbook for Field Services* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869).
 - 7 Captain C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principle and Practise*, 1896.
 - 8 The manoeuvres and positions on these maps are based on both documentary sources and on period maps. The period vegetation as it appears on these maps was based on R. Coult's study "Batoche National Historic Site Period Landscape," *MRS 404* (Parks Canada, 1980).
 - 9 Waite, *Arduous Destiny*, 149.
 - 10 For an interesting argument on this topic, see Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire Building* (Toronto: New American Library, 1980).
 - 11 P. G. Laurie was editor of the *Saskatchewan Herald* from its founding in 1878 until 1902.
 - 12 The etiology of these fears that many whites had of the Indians is explored in the introduction of Drinnon's book and also in Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and American Mind* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1953) and, most recently, Frederick Turner, *Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against the Wilderness* (New York: Viking Press, 1980).
 - 13 Callwell, *Small Wars*, chapter 2.
 - 14 Morton, *Telegrams*.
 - 15 See, for example, Robert Jefferson, *Canadian North-West Historical Society Publications*, "Fifty years on the Saskatchewan" Vol. 1, no. 5, 1929, especially Part III. In Part III Jefferson indicates that the dangers anticipated by those besieged were exaggerated by them.
 - 16 John Jennings, "The North-West Mounted Police and Indian Policy, 1874-96." Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1980.
 - 17 Derby Papers, 28 April 1885, Public Archives of Canada, microfilm A-32.
 - 18 Public Archives of Canada, Minto Papers, Lansdowne to Melgund, 30 April 1885, microfilm A-129.
 - 19 Minto Papers, Lansdowne to Melgund, 30 April 1885.
 - 20 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 193-194.
 - 21 Morton, *Telegrams*, 26 April, 210.
 - 22 Morton, *Telegrams*, 216.
 - 23 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 252-253.
 - 24 Melgund Diary in *Saskatchewan History* 23, no. 3, (Autumn 1969), 97.
 - 25 Needler, *Suppression*, 44.
 - 26 Needler, *Suppression*, 44.
 - 27 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 194.
 - 28 See Melgund Diary, 91, and Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 198.
 - 29 In discussing this matter with Jack Summers, he suggested that Middleton may have had more than his personal dislike of Denison in mind when he decided to leave the cavalry at Humboldt. Summers thought that the willful tendency of the cavalry to confront every situation by head on attack might have made them difficult to handle for what Middleton anticipated facing at Batoche.
 - 30 The tactic to use the artillery to demoralize the enemy can be directly traced to Wolseley's recommendation in *The Soldier's Pocketbook* that: "Its [the artillery's] moral effect is powerful; it frightens far more than it kills," 225.
 - 31 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 262.
 - 32 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 252.
 - 33 Needler, *Suppression*, 44.
 - 34 Minto Papers, 9 May, 1885.
 - 35 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 260.
 - 36 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 199.
 - 37 Needler, *Suppression*, 45.
 - 38 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 491.
 - 39 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 225.
 - 40 Cloutier, 5084-5085.
 - 41 Cloutier, 5111.
 - 42 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 491.
 - 43 *Sessional Papers*, 1886, no. 5, 41.
 - 44 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 231.
 - 45 Saskatchewan Archives Board, A. S. Morton Manuscript Collection—W. B. Cameron Papers, C550/1/281.

- 46 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 200.
 47 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 199.
 48 Cloutier, 5085-5086.
 49 Cloutier, 5085-5086.
 50 Needler, *Suppression*, 46.
 51 Needler, *Suppression*, 46.
 52 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 262-263.
 53 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 200.
 54 Needler, *Suppression*, 46.
 55 Needler, *Suppression*, 46.
 56 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 262-263.
 57 Needler, *Suppression*, 46.
 58 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 205.
 59 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 200.
 60 Cloutier, 5123-5124.
 61 Chambers, *The Royal Grenadiers*, 62.
 62 Chambers, *The Royal Grenadiers*, 64, and also Melgund, 104-105.
 63 Needler, *Suppression*, 46.
 64 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 206.
 65 Melgund, 105.
 66 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 206-207.
 67 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 206-207.
 68 Melgund, 103.
 69 Callwell, *Small Wars*, 240.
 70 Callwell, *Small Wars*, 244.
 71 Callwell, *Small Wars*, 264.
 72 Callwell, *Small Wars*, 264.
 73 Callwell, *Small Wars*, 246.
 74 Needler, *Suppression*, 48.
 75 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 207.
 76 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 207.
 77 Needler, *Suppression*, 48.
 78 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 208.
 79 Cloutier, 5125.
 80 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 202-204.
 81 Cloutier, 5089.
 82 Cloutier, 5088.
 83 Cloutier, 5095.
 84 Cloutier, 5113.
 85 Cloutier, 5111.
 86 Needler, *Suppression*, 48 and also Cloutier, 5092.
 87 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 210.
 88 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 270-271.
 89 *Sessional Papers*, 1886, no. 5, 30.
 90 Needler, *Suppression*, 80.
 91 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 272.
 92 Needler, *Suppression*, 50.
 93 Needler, *Suppression*, 50.
 94 Needler, *Suppression*, 50.
 95 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 273.
 96 *Sessional Papers*, 1886, no. 5, 31.
 97 Needler, *Suppression*, 50.
 98 Needler, *Suppression*, 50-51.
 99 Callwell, *Small Wars*, 204-205.
 100 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 275.
 101 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 257.
 102 *Sessional Papers*, 1886, no. 5, 31.
 103 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 277-278.
 104 Needler, *Suppression*, 51.
 105 *Sessional Papers*, 1886, no. 5, 31.
 106 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 257.
 107 Morton, *Telegrams*.
 108 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 257.
 109 Boulton, *Reminiscences*, 259.
 110 *Sessional Papers*, 1886, no. 5, 33.
 111 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 221.
 112 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 216.
 113 Needler, *Suppression*, 52.
 114 Needler, *Suppression*, 52-53.

- 115 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 292.
116 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 292-293.
117 Cloutier, 5120.
118 Cloutier, 5111.
119 Cloutier, 5114.
120 Cloutier, 5106-5109.
121 Cloutier, 5097.
122 Mulvaney, *North-West Rebellion*, 275.
123 Needler, *Suppression*, 53.
124 Melgund, 314.