

The Indian Rights Association, Native Protest Activity and the "Land Question" in British Columbia, 1903-1916

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In the boom years preceding World War I British Columbia experienced substantial immigration and rapid expansion of resource industries. Native peoples responded to the loss of access to land and resources with a variety of protest activities. This paper examines the growth, organization, achievements and limitations of the Indian Rights Association, the Interior Tribes and the Nisga'a Petition.

Introduction

Between the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, beginning in 1880, and the first World War British Columbia experienced a major transformation.¹ Social, economic and environmental changes were propelled by the growth of an industrial economy based on resource extraction and the rapid influx of population. The period has been viewed as an era of settling the frontier and province-building, to the accompaniment of almost unbridled optimism. But these developments were not greeted with universal enthusiasm. The expansion of settlement and resource extraction carried other meanings for Native peoples: the loss of access to resources, economic marginalization and institutionalized racism. This paper examines the growth of organized Native responses to these developments. More precisely, the paper focuses on the Indian Rights Association (IRA), together with brief discussions of the Interior Tribes and the Nisga'a Land Committee.² The existing literature, including Tennant's important study, provides an incomplete and sometimes inaccurate picture of these organizations and their activities. As a result, their importance in the development of Native protest in British Columbia has been underestimated.³

Economic Context

In 1881 Native peoples were still in the majority in British Columbia; forty years later they represented less than five percent of the provincial population. During this period non-Native population increased from 23,798 to 524,582 (Table 1). Rapid economic growth, generated by industrial production and export of staple resources (lumber, minerals and fish), accompanied this demographic transformation. The value of mineral production, for example, increased from \$3.5 million in 1891 to \$30.3 million in 1913; fishery production expanded from \$3 million to \$13.9 million over the same period. Most of this growth was concentrated in the years after 1900.⁴

Staples production in a mountainous landscape was predicated on the availability of an effective transportation system, primarily railways. Thus, by 1914, three transcontinental railways crossed British Columbia and a network of branch lines had penetrated the principal valleys of the southern interior of the province. Equally significant for this economic transformation was the establishment of a legal and administrative apparatus to regulate access to the lands and resources of the province. The system implemented by the provincial government proved adequate to the task; nearly 31 million acres of Crown land had been alienated by the time of World War I.⁵ In short, the non-Native economy in British Columbia had expanded dramatically.

Table 1 Population of British Columbia, Native and Non-Native, Selected Years 1881-1921.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Native</u>		<u>Non-Native</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	
1881	25,661	51.9	23,798	48.1	49,459
1891*	25,555	26.0	72,618	74.0	98,173
1901	25,448	14.3	153,169	85.7	178,657
1911	20,134	5.1	372,346	94.9	392,480
1921	22,377	4.3	502,205	95.7	524,582

* 1891 figures are estimates

Source: Census of Canada, 1881-1921

Political Context

In 1871 British Columbia abandoned its status as a British colony in favour of membership in the Canadian confederation. The structure of the new political arrangements was spelled out in the "Terms of Union."

Whatever its other merits, this agreement paid scant regard to the Native people of British Columbia. In a single clause the roles of the respective governments towards the Aboriginal peoples of the new province were outlined. The federal government was charged with the "trusteeship" of the Native peoples of British Columbia; the province was to provide "tracts of land" for the "use and benefit" of the "Indians." Needless to say, Native people were neither parties to the "Terms of Union," nor consulted about its contents.⁶

Located a continent away, and lacking adequate information, it took some time for the federal government to appreciate the "peculiar" situation of Native peoples in British Columbia. The formula of the Terms of Union served, initially, to mask two crucial issues: first, the parsimony of previous British Columbia governments in providing tracts of land for reserves; second, and far more important, the absence of treaties extinguishing Native claims to their territories. As federal officials soon realized, there was reason to believe that "aboriginal title" to the lands of British Columbia had not been extinguished.⁷

Over the following decades these two issues were at the core of a three-sided dispute involving the two governments and the Native peoples of British Columbia. After some early uncertainty the federal and provincial governments sought to limit the dispute to matters concerning the number and size of reserves. But even here problems arose. While constitutional arrangements dictated that the federal government was responsible for administering policy pertaining to Native peoples, the provincial government retained control over lands necessary for implementation of the policy.

Native claims, by emphasizing the question of title, stood in opposition to the positions of both levels of government. Duncan Campbell Scott, as head of the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) bureaucracy, commented on the evolution of this pattern:

From the year 1875 until the present time [1927] there has been a definite claim, growing in clearness as years went by, gradually developing into an organized plan, to compel the Provincial and Dominion Governments, either or both, to acknowledge an Aboriginal title and to give compensation for it.⁸

Government Actions

Building on colonial precedents, the federal government developed a structure to administer its responsibilities to Native peoples. In 1880 this assumed the form of the DIA. Incorporating British Columbia into the

operations of this emerging bureaucracy involved recognizing the peculiar circumstances in the province; not the least of these peculiarities was the "land question." The administrative solution to this problem was the formation of an Indian Reserve Commission (IRC) charged with allotting and surveying reserves.⁹

To function effectively the IRC Commissioner required the co-operation of both federal and provincial governments. With the economic boom and the expansion of settlement in the first decade of the 20th century this basic requirement gradually evaporated. An important stage in this process was reached early in 1907 when the provincial government, through a Minute-in-Council, gave official notice to the federal government of two areas of disagreement on the reserve issue. The province argued, first, that some Indian reserves were of excessive size and should be reduced; second, it claimed the reversionary interest in Indian reserves.¹⁰

The following year the province took two further steps to strengthen its position. First, it initiated a case in provincial courts to determine its rights, vis-à-vis the federal government, concerning existing reserves; any reference to the rights of Native people was excluded. Although abandoned prior to judgement, in favour of direct negotiations, the objective of the province was clear enough: to "get the reserves cut down."¹¹ Secondly, the province halted the process of establishing further reserves. Given the current "unsatisfactory state of affairs," the Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works said it was "inadvisable . . . to make further allotments." Henceforth only applications "for purchase" of land by the DIA or offers of "suitable exchanges" would be considered. According to IRC Commissioner A.W. Vowell, this meant that, apart from surveying, the work of the Reserve Commission would "remain in abeyance until these questions are settled."¹²

Whatever their merits as part of a negotiating stance, these measures did nothing to address the underlying issues. This much was clear to Vowell, Reserve Commissioner from 1898 to 1910. The final sentence of his final annual report stated:

Meanwhile the country is being settled very rapidly, and lands all over the province are being occupied as homesteads, &c., by incoming settlers, interfering more or less with the hunting and fishing grounds of the Indians.¹³

As the consequences of this impasse became apparent, Native peoples brought pressure on the federal government. In response, the federal government opted for an alternative approach designed to produce a judicial decision on the question of Aboriginal title and other outstanding

issues.¹⁴ Negotiations with the provincial government were initiated and, by the summer of 1910, senior officials had reached a provisional agreement. It consisted of a series of ten questions to be used as the basis for reference of a test case to the Supreme Court of Canada.¹⁵ On learning of these developments, however, B.C. Premier Richard McBride refused to proceed. He insisted on the removal of the first three questions: those dealing with the issue of Aboriginal title. In Laurier's opinion these questions were "absolutely material" to the points at issue and he was perplexed by McBride's objections.¹⁶

Over the next two years the federal government took a series of measures designed to overcome provincial obstruction and place a case before the courts. An amendment to the *Indian Act* in 1910 proved inadequate to the task, necessitating a further amendment in 1911. This was followed by the passage of Order-in-Council PC 1081, stating that the federal government proposed to "institute proceedings in the Exchequer Court of Canada on behalf of the Indians a provincial grantee, or licensee, in the hope of obtaining a decision upon the questions involved as soon as a case arises in which the main points in difference can be properly or conveniently tried."¹⁷ At this stage the order-in-council seems to have disappeared within the bureaucracy of the Department of Justice. That, at any rate, was the explanation subsequently offered by Duncan Campbell Scott. Despite drafting the "Memorandum to Council," Scott recalled, the DIA "was not advised of its passage, and was, therefore, ignorant of it until the above date, namely 18th of April 1912."

Owing to the election of a Conservative federal government in the fall of 1911 the delay had significant repercussions.¹⁸ Robert Borden, the newly elected prime minister, opted for a different approach to the problems of Native peoples in British Columbia. He decided to open negotiations on all outstanding issues with the government of his fellow Conservative, Richard McBride. After initial discussions at the ministerial level the federal government appointed J.A.J. McKenna, a DIA official, to "investigate claims put forth by and on behalf of the Indians of British Columbia as to lands and rights, and all questions at issue between the Dominion and Provincial Governments and the Indians in respect thereto, and to represent the Government of Canada in negotiating with the Government of British Columbia a settlement to such questions."¹⁹

At this stage the possibility of a test case remained under active consideration.²⁰ It disappeared from the agenda following McKenna's visit to British Columbia in the summer of 1912. McKenna travelled around the province, meeting a number of Native leaders, and negotiated with the provincial government. The process reached a conclusion with

the McKenna-McBride Agreement of 24 September, establishing the conditions for a joint federal-provincial Royal Commission on Indian Affairs. A crucial feature of the agreement was that the Commission, through its terms of reference, be limited to consideration of matters concerning reserves: numbers, location, size and the reversionary interest. The question of Aboriginal title, as claimed by Native peoples, was excluded.²¹

After three years of labour and ninety-eight interim reports the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission completed its final report in 1916. In sum, it recommended that 482 new reserves, encompassing 87,291 acres, be established and a total of 47,058 acres be "cut-off" from existing reserves. Any proceeds from the sale of these "cut-off" lands were to be divided equally "between the Province and the Dominion, the latter being bound to use the proceeds for the benefit of the Indians of British Columbia."²² Following agreement on the number and extent of reserves the

. . . lands were all to be conveyed by the province to the Dominion. The federal government was to have full power to deal with the lands in any manner, even to selling them. The only interest to be retained by the province was in the case of a reserve unoccupied because the tribe had become extinct. The land in such a case was to revert to the province.²³

Thus, the issues of the extent of the reserves and the reversionary interest would be resolved to the satisfaction of the two levels of government. As events transpired the path from the publication of the findings of the Royal Commission to their final enactment was long and torturous, largely as a result of Native opposition.²⁴

Native Protests

The Native peoples of British Columbia were important participants in the political process leading to the establishment of the Royal Commission. They did far more than simply respond to governmental initiatives. Their efforts brought a substantial elaboration of the forms of protest and clarification of the issues in dispute.

Shortly after the turn of the century a number of southern tribes, both coastal and interior, began to organize in response to "increased pressure of settlement of whites and restrictions being imposed on them in hunting and fishing." This discontent may have contributed to the decision by two interior chiefs, accompanied by an Oblate priest, to visit England and Italy in 1904. They reportedly failed to see Edward VII, "so they went over to

Rome to Pope Leo XIII, and they succeeded in an interview with his Holiness."²⁵

Little more is known about this effort, but two years later several Coast Salish and interior tribes combined to send a delegation to England. The prime mover in this undertaking on the coast was Chief Capilano of the Squamish tribe. Early in 1906 he began to drum up support for the project by travelling around the lower mainland and Vancouver Island and corresponding with interior chiefs. At this stage participation seems to have been limited to "Catholic" tribes.²⁶ A petition was prepared, outlining various grievances and demonstrating a clear awareness of the anomalous situation in British Columbia:

In other parts of Canada the Indian title has been extinguished reserving sufficient land for the use of the Indians, but in British Columbia the Indian title has never been extinguished, nor has significant land been allotted to our people for their maintenance.²⁷

Addressed to King Edward VII, the petition was carried to England by a delegation of three chiefs: Joe Capilano, Charley Isipaymilt of the Cowichan tribe and Basil David of the Bonaparte tribe.²⁸

Although they obtained an audience with the King, the chiefs did not formally present the petition. Instead it was forwarded through the "Canadian office in the usual way." In due course, after following correct procedures, the delegation was informed that their complaints should be laid "before Ottawa."²⁹

Despite this rejection, the trip to London was far from a failure. Its real significance lay in the realm of public relations where it played, with considerable success, to both Native and White audiences. There can be little doubt, for example, that the delegation provided a focus for the expression of Native grievances; it also helped legitimize such expressions. Most significant, though, was the stimulus it provided for further organization.³⁰

The chosen vehicle for these efforts took the form of two petitions submitted to Edward VII. More important than their content were the signatories: twenty-three Fraser River chiefs, twelve Squamish chiefs, seven Vancouver Island chiefs, seven "Upper Country" chiefs and fourteen northern chiefs. The petitions represented the first major attempt at coordinating Native protests from a significant portion of the province.³¹

This pattern of co-operation continued. After receiving written confirmation that their grievances should be directed towards the Canadian government, a conference to discuss future plans was held at North Vancouver in mid-December 1907. The delegates were united on the

principal issue confronting them: their opposition to the consequences of the "increasing development of the country." And, despite disagreements between "northern" and "southern" groups about the details, there was also agreement on the most appropriate response — a delegation to Ottawa.³²

In the summer of 1908, with construction of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway underway along the Skeena river and discontent rising among the "northern Indians," a delegation of twenty-five "chiefs" made their way to Ottawa.³³ Full membership of the delegation is not known but it included representatives from both north and south coastal peoples. A meeting with Prime Minister Laurier was secured on 11 June, during which at least two petitions were presented. Laurier promised to forward them, through appropriate channels, to the King.³⁴ On returning to Vancouver the delegation was optimistic that "all matters pertaining to their rights in British Columbia" would be "amicably settled." Laurier had assured them that the land question "would be settled as soon as possible, and their rights protected."³⁵

The Cowichan Petition and the Indian Rights Association

Although the hopes raised by the trip to Ottawa were not fulfilled, the urgency that had created the delegation was carried forward. The most significant new initiative was the Cowichan Petition of March 1909. Much remains uncertain about the precise origins of the petition, but two White supporters, Rev. C.M. Tate and Rev. A.E. O'Meara, were important in helping give Native discontent this form. Tate, a Methodist missionary, had been stationed at Duncan, in the heart of Cowichan territory, since 1899. O'Meara was an Ontario-trained lawyer who had become a missionary in 1906, serving in the mining communities of the Yukon. What brought these two men together is not known but they met on two occasions at the beginning of February 1909. Their discussions concerned "the conditions of the Indians and [the] planning [of] a course to ask for treaty."³⁶ By this time O'Meara was already aware of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and its potential implications. He suggested obtaining the advice of J.M. Clark, a Toronto lawyer with "an expert knowledge of the matter of Indian Title."³⁷ The result was the Cowichan Petition.

In March O'Meara headed east and, after meeting with Clark, carried the petition to London. He presented a copy at the office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, where it was promptly referred back to Canada for consideration.³⁸ Despite this rebuff the petition of 1909 was important for at least four reasons: it appears to have stimulated the federal government's pursuit of "discussions" with the provincial government concerning a test case; it invoked the Royal Proclamation of 1763 as the

legal basis for recognition of Aboriginal title and sought a decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; it represented a closer interaction between Native people and White sympathizers and advisers; and it gave further impetus to Native organization.³⁹

The precise relationship between the formation of the Indian Rights Association (IRA) and the preparation and submission of the Cowichan Petition remains unclear. An informal organization, established to pursue the objectives expressed in the Cowichan Petition, seems to have evolved into the IRA. As early as May 1909, some form of organization had been established, and funds raised.⁴⁰ A meeting held in Vancouver at the end of September, attended by representatives of twenty coastal tribes, continued the process (Table 2 and Map 1). Following the meeting a statement was issued indicating a desire that the question of Aboriginal title be taken "directly to the judicial committee of the Privy Council." Shortly thereafter a memorandum expressing these sentiments was forwarded to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs by "their lawyer in Toronto," J.M. Clark.⁴¹

Further organizational steps were probably taken at the September meeting as, by the end of the year, the fledgling organization was using the title "Indian Rights Committee." With Tate as Secretary, the Committee actively sought funds for legal expenses. Although there was some opposition to these efforts, a thousand dollars was raised among coastal peoples and approaches were made to interior peoples for a similar sum.⁴² As these fund-raising activities proceeded, counsel for the IRA presented a "Statement of Facts and Claims on behalf of the Indians of British Columbia" to the Superintendent General early in 1910. The objective was to have the "question of Indian title ... submitted for Judicial adjudication."⁴³

The Interior Tribes

Interior peoples had participated in organized protest activities as early as the trip of Chiefs Chilihiza and Louis to England and Italy in 1904. About 1909, however, as the pace and complexity of the Native protests increased, James A. Teit was approached to help formalize further initiatives. An ethnographer married to a Thompson woman, Teit was recruited to attend the meetings and help "with their writing." This led to his assumption of the position of secretary-treasurer.⁴⁴

Early in 1910, as information about the IRA spread, meetings were held by several interior peoples to discuss the implications. One notable result of this process was the publication in July of a declaration by a number of Thompson, Shushwap and Okanagan chiefs. They expressed agreement with the IRA program and pledged financial support for the

Table 2 Participation in the Indian Rights Association:
by Tribal Group, 1909-1916.

Group	Sept. 1909 meeting	1911 meeting, McBride	Monetary support or local meeting 1909-16
Coast Salish			
Songish	+	+	
Esquimalt		+	
Saanich	+	+	
Nanaimo	+	+	+
Chemainus		+	
Cowichan	+	+	+
Squamish	+	+	+
Chilliwack			+
Maria Island (possibly Seabird Island)			+
Aggasiz			+
Sechelt	+	+	+
Slammon		+	
Klahoose		+	
Kwakwaka'wakw			
Kwakiutl (possibly Ft. Rupert)	+	+	
Lekwiltok ¹	+	+	+
Mamalilikulla		+	
Matilpe		+	
Nimpkish	+	+	+
Tenaktak		+	
Tlawitsis		+	
Tsawatainuk [?]		+	
Nuu-chah-nulth			
Clayoquot	-		+
Kelsemart	-		
Ohiat		+	
Northern Wakashan			
Bella Bella	-		+
Kitamaat	-	+	+
Owekeeno			+

Table 2, continued

Group	Sept. 1909 meeting	1911 meeting, McBride	Monetary support or local meeting 1909-16
Nuxalk			
Bella Coola	+	+	+
Kimsquit	+		+
Haida			
Skidegate	+	-	+
Masset	+	-	+
Tsimshian			
Naas River ²	+	+	+
Port Simpson	-	+	+
Hartley Bay		+	+
Kitkahtla	-	+	+
China Hat (possibly Kitasoo)			+
Skeena (possibly Gitksan)*			+
Hazelton			+
Kispiox			+
Lower Fraser*			+
Interior Tribes			+
Lytton			+
Lillooet			+


+ Full participation

- Represented but no signatory, or represented by proxy

* Identity or location uncertain; not shown on Map 1

¹ Includes the Wiwekay (Cape Mudge) and the Wiwekum (Campbell River) and the Walitsum (Salmon River) in 1909 and 1911.² Includes all the Nisga'a villages.

Sources: PAC, RG 2, vol. 1104; annexes E and L to PC 1081; PAC, RG 10, vol. 11047, file 33/General, pt. 6; IRA circular, September 27, 1915. See note 56 for details on local meetings.



cost of hiring legal counsel. Later that year the "Tahltan Tribe," of the Stikine valley in northern B.C., issued a comparable declaration. They claimed

... the sovereign right to all the country of our tribe — this country of ours which we have held intact from the encroachments of other tribes from time immemorial, at the cost of our own blood. We have done this because our lives depended on our country. To lose it meant we would lose our means of living, and therefore our lives. ... We deny the B.C. Government has any title or right of ownership in our country. We have never treated with them nor given them any such title.

Their solution to the current situation was that

... all questions regarding our lands, hunting, fishing etc. and every matter concerning our welfare, be settled by treaty between us and the Dominion and B.C. governments.

These declarations seem to have provided the impetus for the emergence of the Interior Tribes as a rather loose coalition.⁴⁵

Subsequently, according to Teit, the Interior Tribes worked in "unison" with the IRA and the Nisga'a "whenever they . . . thought it right to do so." Some bands went so far as to join the IRA and participate in some of their meetings; Teit himself, for a brief period, served on the executive of the IRA. Nonetheless, Teit claimed, the two organizations remained separate and the Interior Tribes "were not under the control of the Association in any way."⁴⁶

The Nisga'a Land Committee

The Nisga'a had participated in a round of protest activity on the "land question" in the 1880s. Some form of organization may have been formed at that time but, if so, little is known of its activities.⁴⁷ By 1907, however, the land question had assumed a new urgency in the Nass valley. Two would-be settlers were turned back by the Nisga'a and, using an organizational model from Ontario Natives, the "Land Committee" was established. It is also probable that the Nisga'a were aware of developments among southern tribes and may have participated in the meetings held at North Vancouver in December 1907.⁴⁸

By March 1908 the Land Committee had issued a petition, copies of which found their way to a Vancouver newspaper and the DIA. The petition included extensive quotations "from the Scriptures" and a claim to "land in the Nass Valley, about one hundred and forty miles in extent, [which] is all needed by themselves as hunting grounds, timber and fishing

grounds." These claims were repeated to Vowell, who visited the Nass in his capacity as IRC Commissioner during May.⁴⁹

Early in 1909, with discontent over the entry of White settlers into the Nass valley increasing, the Nisga'a learned of the Cowichan Petition from Rev. A.E. Green. He seems to have persuaded the Nisga'a to contribute to this initiative, at least to the extent of having "Mr. Clark present their complaints."⁵⁰ By summer the Nisga'a are reported to have raised \$500 to obtain "the advice of counsel in the East" and sought the co-operation of the Tsimshian. Whether this action was taken on their own account or through the organization emerging from the Cowichan Petition is unclear. The latter seems more likely as Nisga'a representatives attended the September meetings in Vancouver that contributed to the evolution of the IRA.⁵¹

Nonetheless, the Nisga'a Land Committee continued to act independently. In the summer of 1910 the Committee combined an awareness of the legal basis of the claim for Aboriginal title with the traditional tactic of denying access to unwelcome visitors. Copies of a notice, claiming title to territory on the basis of the Royal Proclamation, were served to a number of White "landseekers" who were "turned back" from the Nass valley. The notice stated that

... up to the present time our lands have not been ceded by us to the crown, nor in any way alienated from us by any agreement or settlement between the representatives of the crown and ourselves;

After noting that their case, presumably the Cowichan Petition, was before the Privy Council, it continued:

We do therefore, standing well within our constitutional rights, forbid you to stake off land in this valley and do hereby protest against your proceeding further into our country with that end in view, until such time as a satisfactory settlement be made between the representatives of the crown and ourselves.⁵²

Structure and Organization

By 1910, then, there were three Native organizations in British Columbia directly concerned with the "land question." Information on the internal workings of these Native organizations is limited and often difficult to interpret. Although there was some overlap in membership, they differed in scale and structure. The Nisga'a Land Committee, based in a single cultural group, was both small and cohesive; the Interior Tribes appear to have had the least formal structure; the IRA fell somewhere between.

These organizations did reflect significant differences among Native peoples in British Columbia. The principal line of cleavage lay between north and central coast peoples on the one hand, and interior peoples on the other. This division expressed different cultural patterns, but it was also a product of the geography of missionary activity: Protestant among the former, Catholic among the latter. Notwithstanding these differences, and the independence of the three organizations, there was a clear sense of common purpose and, for a time, a pattern of common action. The principal objective was to obtain a judicial decision on their claims to Aboriginal title.

The Nisga'a Land Committee represented a compromise between traditional structures and the demands of new political circumstances. According to Tennant the creation of a formal committee "was clearly intended as something White politicians and the White public could readily understand and would take more seriously than they had been taking traditional chiefs in traditional roles." Traditional models, however, were reflected in committee membership, with representation on the basis of local clans and communities. But, as all traditional Nisga'a leaders were not fluent in English, delegations were accompanied by their own interpreter when meeting White politicians. Moreover, in 1911, they hired O'Meara as legal counsel.⁵³

The structure of the IRA was more complex but it also owed a good deal to "White" models. At the centre was a small executive whose functions included fund-raising, organizing conferences, circulating information to local representatives and maintaining links with legal counsel. Containing both White and Native members, with perhaps some form of regional responsibilities, the executive met in Vancouver at irregular intervals. Participation at this level required literacy and a familiarity with White culture.⁵⁴

Much less is known about the activities and membership of the IRA below the executive level. Some of the representatives who attended the various IRA meetings were hereditary chiefs; the status of others is not known. Not all representatives were fluent in English and, given the linguistic diversity in British Columbia, communication must have been a problem within the organization. One account of an IRA conference indicates that Chinook served as the *lingua franca*.⁵⁵

Local operations are even less clear. Attempts were made to organize branches, at the community level, with their own officers. How successful this was and how it intersected with traditional authority structures is not known. C.M. Tate, the secretary, did visit local branches, primarily in 1915; presumably other executive members did likewise. Nonetheless, the

suspicion exists that, at this level, much depended on the initiative and enthusiasm of individual delegates.⁵⁶

Continuity of involvement was another problem. As Tables 2 and 3 show, there were fluctuations in participation; given the economic and linguistic barriers to communication, this is not surprising. Nonetheless the IRA raised and spent nearly \$5000 between 1909 and 1914. Of this, nearly one half came from the Nisga'a and various Tsimshian (and possibly Gitksan) tribes.⁵⁷

The Interior Tribes appear to have had the least formal structure, remaining closest to Indigenous models. When problems arose, meetings of chiefs seem to have sought consensus on appropriate actions. According to one account,

All these chiefs used to get together. They'll sit and talk pretty near all night to see what's the best way to do it, which way to say it . . . They'll talk . . . and they'll travel to Ottawa or somewhere else.⁵⁸

Many of the larger meetings were held at Spences Bridge, the home of James Teit, who, in his role as interpreter and secretary, played a crucial role in facilitating interaction with White political structures. Some of these larger meetings were also attended by Tate, presumably in an attempt to co-ordinate activities.⁵⁹

The Route to the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission

In the summer of 1910, with negotiations between the federal and provincial governments on "Indian issues" stalled, Prime Minister Laurier visited British Columbia. His itinerary included stops at Prince Rupert, Vancouver and Kamloops; at each location he received representations from Native delegations. Laurier's responses included reference to his government's policy of seeking to facilitate a judicial decision, at the highest level, on Native claims.⁶⁰ However, with the provincial government still firmly opposed, such a procedure remained impossible. In an attempt to eliminate this impasse Native peoples decided on a direct approach to Premier McBride.⁶¹

The result was a meeting in Victoria on 3 March 1911, between Native representatives and McBride and four of his cabinet colleagues. "We have come here," the delegates informed McBride, "to tell you that our people are far from being satisfied, and are becoming more dissatisfied every day." Their objective was to have the question of Aboriginal title "submitted to the Courts." In reply, the Premier informed the Native representatives that there was "no proper case for submission" to the courts. This rejection was compounded by McBride's surrealistic comment that, in his opinion, Native people "were well satisfied with their position." The

Table 3 Participation in the Interior Tribes: by Tribal Group, 1911-1916

Group	1911 meeting McBride	1913 meeting	1916 meeting
Halkomelem			
Songish	+	+	
Chehalis			+
Chilliwack			+
Maria Island (possibly Seabird Island)		-	
Seabird Island			+
Lillooet			
Anderson Lake	+		
Bridge River		+	
Cayoosh	+	+	+
Chalal (possibly Shalalth or Seaton Lake)			+
Fountain	+	+	+
Lillooet	+	+	+
Mission Band*			+
Nkait (possibly Necait or Anderson Lake)		+	
Nkimpt*		+	
Pemberton	+	+	
Port Douglas		+	
Seaton Lake	+		
Skookumchuck		+	
Slahoos (possibly Slosch or Seaton Lake)		+	
Tenas Lake (Lillooet Lake)		+	
Unidentified	+		
Nla'ka Pamux			
Ashcroft		+	+
Cisco (Siska)		+	+
Cornwalls (Stalz)			+
Coldwater	+	+	
Coutlee			+
Kanaka			+
Keefers		+	
Lytton			+
Nicola Lake		+	+
Pekaist		+	+
Petit Creek		+	+
Spences Bridge	+		+
Spuzzum	+	+	+
Stlpaam*		-	
Suloos (Tsuloos)*		+	
Unidentified	+	+	+

Table 3, continued

Group	1911 meeting McBride	1913 meeting	1916 meeting
Okanagan			
Ashnola	+	+	+
Chopaca	+		
Douglas Lake	+	+	+
Hedley	+	+	+
Nkamip (Osoyoos)	+	-	+
Penticton	+		+
Similkameen (Upper)			+
Vernon	+	+	
Unidentified	+	-	+
Shushwap			
Bonaparte	+	+	+
Canim Lake			+
Canoe Creek			+
Chase	+		
Clinton		+	+
Deadmans Creek		+	+
Halowt	+		
High Bar		+	+
Kamloops	+	+	+
Leon Creek		+	+
Little Shushwap	+		+
Pavilion	+	+	+
Shushwap Lake*		+	
Soda Creek	+		
Tappen		+	
Williams Lake	+		+
Unidentified	+		+
Carrier			
Stoney Creek			+
Tahltan		-	+
Chilcotin			
Anaheim		-	
Kootenay			
Tobacco Plains		-	+

+ Full participation

- Represented but no signatory, or represented by proxy

* Identity or location uncertain; not shown on Map 1

Sources: PAC, RG 2, vol. 1014; annex L to PC 1081: UBC (microfilm); Borden Papers, pp. and 16378-80 and 145248-9.

former point was repeated in a written reply to R.P. Kelly, who had made the Native presentation.⁶²

Although unsuccessful in influencing the provincial government, the meeting represented a considerable organizational accomplishment. Measured in terms of participation it marked the high point of Native political activity in the pre-war period. Delegates from nearly sixty tribes, drawn from most parts of the province, made the trip to Victoria. Members of the IRA, the Interior Tribes and the Nisga'a were well represented (see Tables 2 and 3).

The first important response to McBride's rejection of Native claims came from the Interior Tribes. In May 1911, after a meeting at Spences Bridge, they issued a "Memorial and Declaration." It reiterated the declaration of July 1910, protested the impact of railway construction and sought access to a judicial decision on claims to title.⁶³ About the same time a three-man delegation of Coast Salish tribes journeyed to Ottawa and London, apparently with a version of the 1908 petition, but achieved little.⁶⁴

No further significant Native initiatives took place prior to the federal election of September 1911, which produced the Conservative government of Robert Borden. Early in 1912, though, a deputation of nine interior chiefs travelled to Ottawa. Accompanied by Teit and Clark, they met Borden and expressed their desire for "a legal settlement." In return the chiefs received assurances that their request would receive "careful consideration."⁶⁵ However, the real answer, to this and previous Native initiatives, came later in the year with the signing of the McKenna-McBride Agreement. The consequent Royal Commission posed new and complex problems for the Native peoples of British Columbia.

Responding to the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission

Native responses proceeded on two related fronts: first, a renewed quest for a judicial decision on the "title" issue, and second, opposition to the Royal Commission and its narrow terms of reference, which excluded consideration of the title issue. In developing these responses, however, differences emerged among the three Native organizations. Such differences, it should be emphasized, concerned the appropriateness of particular tactics rather than the basic objective of securing a just settlement.

On the judicial front the principal reaction was the Nisga'a Petition. With O'Meara as an advisor the Nisga'a had embarked on this course as early as August 1912, prior to the signing of the McKenna-McBride Agreement. A formal document was adopted in January 1913, and forwarded, through legal representatives in London, to the Privy Council on 21 May.⁶⁶ Like previous appeals to Imperial authorities, the Nisga'a

Petition was quickly referred to the Canadian government for a response. According to O'Meara, however, a different explanation for not considering the petition was given to the London representatives of the Nisga'a. By this account the "reason for not immediately referring it to the Judicial Committee [was] the alleged fact that 'the whole matter raised by the Petition is at present under the consideration of a Royal Commission'."⁶⁷

The actions of the Nisga'a had three significant consequences. First, they helped provoke a further response from the federal government concerning the conditions for a judicial decision on the title question; these were spelled out by Order-in-Council PC 751. Second, O'Meara's version of events enabled him to sustain the belief that a direct appeal to the Privy Council was constitutionally possible. Third, the actions contributed to dissension between the different Native organizations.

Indications of dissension surfaced at an IRA meeting, held in Vancouver 10 and 11 December 1912. With about a hundred chiefs in attendance, two important resolutions were passed. The first opposed the terms of reference of the McKenna-McBride Agreement and asserted the need for a judicial decision on claims of Aboriginal title. The second urged the importance of unified action on this and related matters through the IRA. By this time, as noted earlier, O'Meara and the Nisga'a were busy preparing their own petition.⁶⁸

Six months later the executive of the IRA grappled with the pragmatic question of how to deal with the hearings of the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission, which had just begun. A resolution was passed, and circulated, recommending that

... two or three members shall be selected by each tribe or band, — at least one of whom shall speak English, — whose duty it shall be to wait upon said Commission when it visits their particular locality, and request that the fundamental question of title first be settled before the question of re-arrangement of reserves be touched.⁶⁹

About the same time the chiefs of the Interior Tribes published a statement that revealed the growing tactical disagreement among different organizations. The chiefs rejected the McKenna-McBride Agreement but expressed their support for the position of the Nisga'a.⁷⁰

The next significant step took place at an IRA convention held in Vancouver in December 1913. A resolution instructing counsel, J.M. Clark, to take their troubles to the "Privy Council as soon as possible" was passed unanimously. To this end Clark travelled to England in the summer of 1914 to see the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The mission was no

more successful than O'Meara's of the previous summer but the experience likely changed Clark's mind about future procedures.⁷¹

Even before his departure for England Clark had expressed disagreement with O'Meara over use of the Nisga'a Petition. He informed O'Meara that the IRA considered it "very prejudicial to the interests of the Indians that separate Petitions of various tribes not authorized by the said Association, should be presented to the authorities." This disagreement might have been of little significance but for two further actions taken by Clark. First, he informed the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs of the division within Indian ranks. Second, presumably accepting the constitutional difficulties of a direct petition to the Privy Council, he indicated that the IRA were prepared to support the terms of Order-in-Council PC 751.⁷²

Passed on 14 July 1914, PC 751 was a federal response to the Nisga'a Petition. It stated the conditions under which the government would accept referral of the question of Aboriginal title to the Exchequer Court, "with the right to appeal to the Privy Council."⁷³ But PC 751 was rather less than it appeared. Native people were required to accept, in advance, the findings of the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission and to agree, if their case was successful, to surrender their title in return for benefits "in accordance with the past usage of the Crown in satisfying the Indian claim to unsurrendered territories." P.D. McTavish and Canon Tucker, on behalf of two White support groups, summed up the implications of the order: "what the Government proposes to the Indians is — If you will first surrender all your rights we will submit to the Courts the question of whether you ever had any rights."⁷⁴

The Nisga'a, with O'Meara as legal counsel, were at the centre of Native opposition to this development. Support was quickly secured from a number of "northern tribes" and, early in 1915, a Nisga'a delegation travelled to Ottawa for a round of discussions with ministers and officials.⁷⁵ During a break in these discussions, two of the Nisga'a delegates returned to British Columbia to attend a meeting of the Interior Tribes at Spences Bridge.⁷⁶ This produced a formal statement expressing opposition to the conditions of PC 751 and support for a series of counter-proposals the Nisga'a had presented to the federal government. These proposals, embracing procedures for reaching a settlement after a judicial verdict, were rejected by the federal government through a new Order-in-Council, PC 1422, on 19 June 1915.⁷⁷

This setback to Native protest activity proved to be temporary. As the Royal Commission approached its conclusion in the spring of 1916,

delegations representing the Interior Tribes and the Nisga'a spent about six weeks in Ottawa lobbying the federal government.⁷⁸ Their main objective, as expressed by a Nisga'a delegate, was to seek a delay in the implementation of the report of the Royal Commission until such time as the Nisga'a Petition had been "decided by the Judicial Committee."⁷⁹ This represented a clear rejection of the various orders-in-council pertaining to the Royal Commission and the conditions for any judicial decision.⁸⁰

One of the responses to these arguments by the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs was to remind the delegates that not all Native organizations supported such a stance. More specifically, the IRA, as represented by J.M. Clark, "were prepared to accept the Order-in-Council [of June 1915]."⁸¹ A prompt objection, that Clark's views were not in accord with those of his clients, was entered but the issue was too important to be brushed aside.⁸² Hence, shortly after the delegations returned from Ottawa, a conference was organized to confront this difference of opinion. Held in Vancouver between 20 and 22 June 1916, these meetings brought together a wide spectrum of Indian representatives and marked the beginnings of a new organization: the Allied Tribes of British Columbia.⁸³

Two significant results emerged from the Vancouver conference. The more important was to remove any uncertainty about Native perceptions of the orders-in-council (PC 751 and PC 1422). After some discussion, the conference passed a formal resolution rejecting the position taken by the IRA counsel. A secondary aspect of this decision, but one that grew in significance over the years, was that it opened the way for A.E. O'Meara to become legal counsel for the Allied Tribes as well as the Nisga'a. Thus O'Meara became the single most important advisor to the Native protest movement in British Columbia, a position he occupied until his death in 1928.⁸⁴ The Vancouver meetings also established an executive committee charged with responsibility for formulating plans for further action. One of the first decisions of the committee, perhaps reflecting O'Meara's influence, was to "recognize the Nisga'a petition as a test case for the land claims of all the tribes."⁸⁵

The delegates to the conference also spent one day in discussions with Duncan Campbell Scott, who urged them to await the report of the Royal Commission before making any decisions on a course of action. The report would soon be completed, Scott observed, and he suggested that it might "meet their demands." In response some of the delegates signified their willingness to wait for a time, but not for "two or three years." Such a time period, they were assured, would not be required as Scott was "anxious

that their claims should be fully and quickly considered, and that they should receive justice." In the light of subsequent events Scott's comments can be described, at best, as wishful thinking.⁸⁶

Conclusion

Native peoples of British Columbia faced daunting challenges in the first two decades of this century. The rapid expansion of settler society during these years was predicated on ready access to land and resources. As a result Native peoples were increasingly, if unevenly, marginalized. That they were unable to stem the forces arrayed against them is not surprising. What is significant is that Native people were not swept away by the tide of changes.

In difficult circumstances, the range and diversity of organized Native protest activity is impressive: eloquent testimony to their persistence in seeking redress for grievances. Equally impressive was the geographical reach of the movement. It was pan-regional and even, at its height, provincial in scope; only the Athapaskan speakers north and east of Prince George, apart from the Tahltan, remained aloof (Map 1). This was no small accomplishment.

Viewed from today's perspective at the end of the 20th century, the IRA was clearly a transitional organization in the history of Native protests. However, it embodied a transition of great importance: from the expression of particular grievances towards a generalized, legally rooted protest movement. The Interior Tribes and the Nisga'a Land Committee, although operating somewhat differently, contributed to this process.

In forging this transition Native people took their protest activities beyond the narrow, bureaucratic channels of the DIA. Native people sought access to the centres of political power in White society: imperial, federal and provincial governments. These endeavours involved the use of forms of protest that were readily intelligible to White politicians (letters, petitions, delegations). They also required extensive and expensive journeys. In the process two basic strategic alternatives for resolving the "land question" were defined: a negotiated settlement or a court decision. These alternatives remain fundamental to the present day.

Sympathetic Whites were important in helping to articulate Native discontent, but they did not create it. The escalating contest over access to land and resources produced grievances aplenty. Nonetheless, guidance in obtaining access to White political institutions was invaluable. Out of this interaction came knowledge about the legal basis of Native claims to title in British Columbia. The widespread dissemination of this information helped to sustain protest activity.

Reliance on White expertise, although unavoidable, had its costs. It facilitated the dismissal of Native protests as the work of "outside agitators." Although not new, such racist denials had a considerable currency in British Columbia. At the same time, antipathies among Whites — perhaps personal, perhaps denominational — were imported into Native struggles. There is even evidence that the DIA sought to promote such differences. Given the other difficulties confronting the creation and maintenance of Native unity, these were not insignificant issues.⁸⁷

Native societies were by no means static, but political interaction with the White world required skills many traditional leaders lacked. All Native organizations grappled with this problem and one of their major legacies was the training provided for a new generation of leaders. These were men who could operate in both White and Native worlds: men such as Peter Kelly, Andrew Paull and Arthur Calder. They were also central figures in handing on the tradition of protest to another generation. Their efforts deserve to be remembered, by non-Natives as well as Natives.

Notes

- 1 Initial research for this paper was undertaken in conjunction with *Delgamuukw et al. v. Attorney General of British Columbia*. Further work was made possible by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. My thanks to Richard Mackie, Frank Tough and Barbara Lane for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Cartography by Eric Leinberger.
- 2 Nisga'a is the currently preferred orthography, replacing the more familiar Nishga or Niska.
- 3 See P. Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990), ch. 7. Other accounts include: G. Shankel, "The Development of Indian Policy in British Columbia," (Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington, 1945); D. Raunet, *Without Surrender, Without Consent: A History of the Nishga Land Claims* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1984); E. May, "The Nishga Land Claim, 1873-1973," (M.A. thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1979); D. Mitchell, "The Allied Tribes of British Columbia: A Study in Pressure Group Behaviour," (M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1977); F.E. LaViolette, *The Struggle for Survival: Indian Cultures and the Protestant Ethic in British Columbia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973). The Nisga'a petition, through the Calder case, represents a direct link to the current round of Native protests.
- 4 British Columbia, Ministry of Mines, *Annual Reports*, 1886-1913; and Canada, Department of Fisheries, *Annual Reports*, 1886-1913. By 1913 forest products had become the leading staple, but data on the value of forest production are unavailable for earlier years. Provincial government revenues, another reflection of the scale of these developments, increased by more than fifteen times during the period: from \$964,944 in 1891, to \$15,219,264 in 1921 (British Columbia, Public Accounts, 1891 and 1921).

- 5 See R.E. Cail, *Land, Man and the Law: the Disposal of Crown Land in British Columbia, 1871-1913* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1974), p. 244. For information on the development of transportation, see R.C. Harris, "Moving Amid the Mountains, 1870-1930," *BC Studies*, no. 58, pp. 3-39. For a cartographic representation of the geography of resource expansion, see D. Kerr and D. Holdsworth, *Historical Atlas of Canada*, vol. 3, *Addressing the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), plate 21. At the same time, a growing system of regulations governed access to fish and game. The "Game Amendment Act" of 1905, for example, led to the appointment of a Provincial Game Warden.
- 6 The full text of clause 13 is contained in Cail, *Land, Man and the Law*, pp. 185-86.
- 7 Between 1850 and 1854 a total of fourteen treaties had been signed, covering portions of the former colony of Vancouver Island. Subsequently, Treaty 8 covered the north-east portion of the province; see W. Duff, "The Fort Victoria Treaties," *BC Studies*, no. 3 (1969), pp. 3-57; and D. Madill, "British Columbia Indian Treaties in Historical Perspective" (Ottawa: Research Branch, Corporate Policy, Indian and Northern Affairs, 1981). On the parsimony of previous colonial governments and the reactions of federal officials, see R. Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1880* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977), pp. 160-74; Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, pp. 39-47. The absence of treaties and the question of the persistence of Aboriginal title remain contentious issues. In *Delgamuukw et al. v. Attorney General of British Columbia*, former Chief Justice McEachern found that title had been extinguished before Confederation and the absence of treaties was without significance. The judgement has been appealed.
- 8 These remarks were made in testimony before a joint committee of the House and Senate (Canada, Houses of Parliament, Senate, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Inquire into the Claims of the Allied Tribes of British Columbia, as set forth in their Petition Submitted to Parliament in 1926, *Report and Evidence*, Appendix to the Journals of the Senate of Canada, First Session of the Sixteenth Parliament, 1926-1927, p. 6; hereafter SJC, *Report and Evidence*). Scott was Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs from 1913 to 1932. His impact on federal policy was both substantial and narrowly conceived; see E.B. Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986).
- 9 For a brief survey of the evolution of the structure of Indian administration in Canada, see Titley, *A Narrow Vision*, chapter 1; Canada, Geographic Board, *Handbook of Canadian Indians*, Sessional Paper no. 21a (Toronto: Coles Publishing Co., facsimile edition, 1971), pp. 222-23. On the IRC, see Fisher, *Contact and Conflict*, pp. 188-206.
- 10 McBride and Fulton to Lieutenant Governor, 26 Feb. 1907, British Columbia Dept. of Lands, file 37905/12. The Minute was approved on 28 February (Fulton to McLean, 3 Sept. 1909, *ibid.*). According to Fulton the province asserted it was a party "to any transaction in connection with the transfer of reserve land." As urban development, especially in Vancouver and Victoria,

engulfed reserves, this became a significant issue. Its complexity was compounded by the fact that no reserve land had been legally transferred to the federal government (*Victoria Daily Times*, 2 Jan. 1908; Cail, *Land, Man and the Law*, p. 187; *British Columbia Gazette*, 27 Dec. 1907, p. 8695).

- 11 The phrase is from the report of a speech by Attorney General Bowser: Venn to Pedley, 4 Sept. 1908, and Bowser to Vowell, 28 Oct. 1908, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), RG 10, vol. 27150-3-1. See also O'Meara, Lecture, 22 Apr. 1910, Public Archives of British Columbia (PABC), Add. MSS 425; and Cail, *Land, Man and Law*, pp. 227-28.
- 12 Cited in Canada, Department of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report* (hereafter DIA *Annual Report*), 1908, p. 273. The same point was made in the 1909 and 1910 reports. In each report, Vowell included lists of: (a) bands with no reserves, (b) bands with insufficient reserves and (c) bands with reserves to be surveyed.
- 13 DIA *Annual Report*, 1910, p. 252. Following Vowell's retirement, the office of Indian Reserve Commissioner for British Columbia was abolished.
- 14 The Laurier government, as Miller shows, had prior experience in using the judicial option for dealing with disputes over land: J.R. Miller, "Great White Father Knows Best: Oka and the Land Claims Protest," *Native Studies Review* 7, no. 1 (1991): 33-35. See also University of British Columbia, *Borden Papers* (microfilm), pp. 16421-23).
- 15 The officials were the Deputy Attorney General for British Columbia and the Deputy Minister of Justice for Canada. See Newcombe to Laurier, 16 June 1910, University of British Columbia (UBC), *Laurier Papers* (microfilm), pp. 17268-76; this source includes the full text of the ten questions.
- 16 See McBride to Laurier, 7 Jan. 1910, and Laurier to Newcombe, 21 June 1910, UBC, *Laurier Papers*, pp. 164831 and 172177; McBride to Rogers, 30 Nov. 1911, Dept. of Justice, Docket A599, pp. 418-420.
- 17 The Order, passed on 17 May 1911, is found in PAC, RG 2, vol. 1104. See also SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 11.
- 18 SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 11. Scott had worked for the DIA since 1880, occupying the position of Superintendent of Education in 1912. The following year he was promoted to DSGIA (Titley, *A Narrow Vision*, pp. 22-24).
- 19 The provincial Minister of Lands visited Ottawa in May 1912; see Friends of the Indians of British Columbia (FIBC), *The Nishga Petition to His Majesty's Privy Council: A Record of Interviews with the Government of Canada together with Related Documents* (n.p.: Conference of the Friends of the Indians of British Columbia, 1915; hereafter FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*), p. 80. See also SJC, *Report and Evidence*, pp. 8-9. McKenna had served as Assistant Commissioner in Winnipeg until 1909, and then as Inspector of Roman Catholic Schools (Titley, *A Narrow Vision*, p. 140 and notes).
- 20 Rev. A.E. O'Meara, representing a White support group, the Friends of the Indians of British Columbia (FIBC), sought specific clarification on this point. In a subsequent meeting with the minister he was informed that the "general question of Indian title would unquestionably have a place in the case to be agreed upon for an adjudication between Canada and British Columbia" (FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, p. 80). O'Meara became an important figure in Native protests: see below.

- 21 McTavish Memorial, 14 Nov. 1912, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1A; McKenna to McBride, 29 July 1912, PAC, RG 10, vol. 3822, file 59335-3. See also Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, pp. 88-89; Cail, *Land, Man and the Law*, pp. 233-34; D. Thompson, "A History of the Okanagan: Indians and Whites in the Settlement Era, 1860-1920" (Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1985), p. 153.
- 22 See, Cail, *Land, Man and the Law*, Table 10; Thompson, *A History of the Okanagan*, p. 154.
- 23 Cail, *Land, Man and the Law*, p. 235.
- 24 See Titley, *A Narrow Vision*, pp. 145-61; Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, ch. 8.
- 25 The trip lasted four months. The chiefs were Chilihiza and Louis, from Douglas Lake and Kamloops; the Oblate priest was Fr. LeJeune. See Attorney General of British Columbia, documents produced in *Delgamuukw et al. v. Attorney General of British Columbia*, Document #1443; Teit statement July 1920, *Victoria Daily Colonist* 15 Nov. 1904; *Vancouver News Advertiser*, 19 June 1908; UBC, *Borden Papers*, p. 16390. The report in the *Colonist* says they met Edward VII.
- 26 Meetings were held in Nanaimo, Quamichan and Vancouver. One account mentions that Joseph Bradley, from Port Simpson, was involved in some way, but no details are available. Bradley, however, was part of the 1908 delegation to Ottawa. Interior tribes included Douglas Lake, Bonaparte and Kamloops (*Victoria Daily Colonist*, 16 and 27 Mar. 1906; *Vancouver Province*, 2 June 1906; Bradley to Scott, 24 Mar. 1914, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1A).
- 27 The full text is contained in *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 6 July 1906.
- 28 Chilihiza and Louis, of the 1904 delegation, were both ill and unable to travel. See *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 6 and 13 July 1906; *London Times*, 14 Aug. 1906, pp. 7 and 8.
- 29 See *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 30 Aug. 1906. The delegation had been provided with a letter of introduction to Lord Strathcona, the Canadian High Commissioner in London. According to one of the delegates, he looked at the petition and advised them to return to Canada and take the "paper to Ottawa and the Ottawa Government would deal with it" (*London Times*, 18 July 1906; statement by Basil David, 27 Apr. 1916, UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 16391-92). The chiefs acted on this advice, visiting Ottawa on their way back to British Columbia, but were unable to "get access" to Prime Minister Laurier. Later they received written confirmation of the advice from the "Imperial Government" (*Victoria Daily Colonist*, 15 Dec. 1907). At the meeting with the King the chiefs presented an "address" and some gifts (*ibid.*, 31 Aug. 1906).
- 30 The text of the petition was published and the whole undertaking was covered, with varying degrees of thoroughness, by the press in Vancouver and Victoria. See, for example, *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 16, 20 and 27 Mar.; 2, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 17 July; 1 and 14 Aug.; 1 Sept. Or see *Vancouver Province*, 16 and 20 Mar.; 2, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 17 July; 1, 8, 14, 24, 30 and 31 Aug.; 1 and 14 Sept. Or see *Vancouver News Advertiser*, 31 Aug. There was at least one report in the *Kamloops Inland Sentinel*, 3 July 1906.

- 31 Some of the organizational activity involved in these petitions is described in *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 8 May 1907. The first petition was signed by Capilano, Isipaymilt and Basil; signatories of the latter are not identified in full. Both petitions were dated New Westminster, 27 May 1907 (PAC, RG 2, vol. 934; PC 1562 M).
- 32 Although not specified, the "northern Indians" likely included the Tsimshian and Nisga'a. They were Protestants and had their own history of protest activity. Such cultural differences may have contributed to the disagreements evident at the meetings (*Vancouver Province*, 13 Dec. 1907). On earlier Tsimshian and Nisga'a protests, see below, note 47.
- 33 See *Toronto Globe*, 6 June 1908; *Ottawa Journal*, 4 June 1908; and *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 24 May 1908. Vowell, Superintendent for Indian Affairs in British Columbia, visited the northern coast on a tour of inspection at this time. In accordance with a well-established tradition, he blamed the unrest, "which recently culminated in several sensational incidents," on an outside agitator: in this case, Joe Capilano (*Vancouver Province*, 2 June 1908; *Vancouver News Advertiser*, 5 June 1908).
- 34 One petition was on behalf of Coast Salish tribes from the Lower Mainland and Vancouver Island (Capilano et al. to Laurier, 11 June 1908, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1). A second petition came from the Coast Tsimshian. Laurier's response is indicated in Exhibit no. 2, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11019, file 506D. The Gitksan are reported to have raised the sum of \$700 to send three delegates (Isaac Tens, Museum of Civilization, Barbeau Files, BF 658.8, p. 3).
- 35 A crowd of "several hundred Indians" greeted the delegation at the CPR station; a procession and "impromptu celebration" were held on the reserve at North Vancouver (*Vancouver News Advertiser*, 17 June 1908).
- 36 Tate Diary, 1 Feb., PABC, Add. Mss. 303; the two men met again on 5 Feb. In 1901 Tate had drafted a petition for the Cowichan Indians, which was sent to Edward VII. On the early careers of these two men, see: Vancouver Public Archives (VPA), Add. MSS 225; C.M. Tate, *Autobiography*; E.P. Patterson, "Arthur O'Meara, Friend of the Indians," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 58 (1967): 90-99. After 1909 both men played important roles in Native protest movements.
- 37 It was through his work for the "Yukon Indians" that O'Meara derived this knowledge. See O'Meara to Stringer, 1 Dec. 1908, and O'Meara to Perrin, 15 Mar. 1909, PABC, K.R. Genn papers, vol. 141.
- 38 See Green to McLean, 29 Mar. 1910, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1. The Cowichan Petition was signed by Clark on 15 March and presented at the Colonial Office by O'Meara on or before 31 March. It was referred to the Governor-General. A second copy was addressed to Edward VII (PAC, RG 2, file 1014; PC 1081, and annexes A, B and C). Expenses for this undertaking were borne by the "Indians themselves"; for O'Meara's account of the trip, see O'Meara to Stringer, 1 May 1909, PABC, K.R. Genn, Papers, vol. 141.
- 39 The fundamental point of reference was to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but it also reflected the St. Catherine's Milling case. The prayer of the petition sought "that steps be taken to protect the usufructuary rights of your petitioners in all of the said land [of the Cowichan valley], or, that in the alternative the

whole question of the rights of the said Tribe be submitted to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for decision and determination" (PAC, RG 2, vol. 1014; PC 1081, annex B).

It was the Cowichan Petition that, according to Duncan Scott, prompted the federal government to "prepare a stated case for the Courts, and a case was actually framed containing ten questions, the first three of which related to the general matter of Indian title" (see above, and SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 11).

- 40 Kelly et al., memorandum, 15 Apr. 1925, AGBC, #1579. A.E. Green, former Methodist missionary on the Nass river and friend of Tate, wrote to the DIA in his capacity as Inspector of Schools. He reported a very widespread movement among the Indians of B.C. about the land issue and noted that funds were being raised (Green to Pedley, 14 May 1909, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1). Moreover, a balance sheet for the IRA, prepared by Tate, covers the period 11 May 1909 to 30 Sept. 1914 (circular, 27 Sept. 1915, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11047, file 33/General, pt. 6). Tate and O'Meara probably met on 29 May at Duncan. Tate's diaries contain no reference to this meeting, but his wife's diary contains the entry: "Mr OHara came today to confer with the Indians as to their claim for rights in their lands. Had dinner with us, I went down with them to Kokahsilah where the meeting was held" (PABC, Add. MSS 303, vol. 3).

There was an Indian Rights Association in the U.S.A., including a branch in California. O'Meara noted that the conditions in that state were "strikingly similar to those of B.C." (The British Columbia Land Situation, 10 Jan. 1910, VPA, Add. MSS 44, vol. 18, file 9).

- 41 The SGIA was the political head of the DIA. See Tate diary, 2 Oct. 1909, PABC, Add. MSS 303. The memorandum was written after consultations between Clark and O'Meara, who had travelled to Toronto. It was forwarded to the SGIA on 20 Oct. 1909 (O'Meara to ?, 6 Oct. 1909, PABC, K.R. Genn papers, vol. 141; PAC, RG 2, vol. 1104; PC 1081, annexes D and E). A copy of the memorandum was published in the *Victoria Times*, 2 Oct. 1909; see also *Vancouver Province*, 30 Sept. 1909, and O'Meara, memorandum, 10 Apr. 1913, UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 145215-20. The signatories to the memorandum are listed in Tables 2 and 3.
- 42 Tate, who was later listed as Secretary, and A.E. Green seem to have acted as an informal executive prior to the conference of Jan. 1910. See Tate diary, 7 and 8 Dec. 1909, PABC, Add. MSS 303; C.M. Tate, circular, 12 Jan. 1910, enclosure in Neill to Vowell, 29 Jan. 1910; Rev. Rohr to Pedley, 13 Mar. 1910; and Wedildahld to McLean, 19 Feb. 1910; PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1.
- 43 Enclosure in Clark to SGIA, 27 Jan. 1910, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file, 27150-3-2.
- 44 J. Drake-Terry, *The Same as Yesterday: The Lillooet Chronicle the Theft of Their Lands and Resources* (Lillooet Tribal Council: Lillooet, BC, 1989), p. 231. Also see Teit to McKenna-McBride Royal Commission, 27 Jan. 1916, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662; Teit to Scott, 2 Mar. 1916, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7781, file, 27150-3-3; Teit to Brewster, 31 May 1917, PAC, RG 10, vol. 3821, file 59,335, pt. 4.

- 45 The Declarations and accompanying correspondence are found in PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1. See also Drake-Terry, *The Same as Yesterday*, pp. 247-48, and Rohr to Pedley, 13 Mar. 1910, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1. Teit, who had undertaken field-work among the Tahltan since 1903, had a role in the preparation of their Declaration; Sylvia Albright, *Tahltan Ethnoarcheology*, Department of Archaeology, Publication no. 15 (Vancouver, BC: Simon Fraser University, 1984), pp. 9 and 19).
- 46 Tate circular, 12 Jan. 1910, enclosure in Neill to Vowell, 29 Jan. 1910, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1. Teit served the Interior Tribes and later the Allied Tribes in various capacities until his death (J.A. Teit, statement, July 1920, AGBC, #1443; Teit to McKenna-McBride Royal Commission, 27 Jan. 1916, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662; Teit to Brewster, 31 May 1917, PAC, RG 10, vol. 3821, file 59,335, pt. 4).

The December 1912 meeting of the IRA included representatives from both coast and interior bands. For a list, see below, note 68.

- 47 Raunet (*Without Surrender, Without Consent*, p. 132) states that the Land Committee was formed about 1890. However, E.P. Patterson ("A Decade of Change: Origins of the Nisga'a and Tsimshian Land Protests in the 1880's," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 18, no. 3, pp. 40-54), makes no mention of such a committee and Tennant (*Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, p. 86) dates the establishment of the Land Committee to 1907.
- 48 Tennant (*Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, p. 86) states that Charles Barton, after a trip to Ontario, and Arthur Calder were responsible for the formation of the Land Committee in 1907. On the opposition to settlers, see *Vancouver Province*, 28 Mar. 1908; PABC, GR 441, box 31, file 1, #44/08; and GR 429, box 15, file 5, #3949/08. The accounts of the North Vancouver meetings make reference to "northern Indians" (*Vancouver Province*, 13 Dec. 1907; *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 15 Dec. 1907). Vowell and Collison shared the opinion that the Nisga'a were aware of Chief Capilano's initiatives (*Victoria Daily Colonist*, 24 May 1908; *Vancouver Province*, 2 June 1908).
- 49 The full text of the petition was not included. See *Vancouver Province*, 28 Mar. 1908. See also PAC, RG 10, vol. 1283, p. 140.
- 50 Green to McLean, 29 Mar. 1910, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file, 27150-3-1.
- 51 See *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 25 June and 2 Oct. 1909. Some knowledge of the Royal Proclamation had reached the Gitksan, neighbours of the Nisga'a, by July 1909 (*Victoria Times* and *Vancouver Province*, 15 July 1909).
- 52 The notice was issued by the Land Committee of the upper Nass at Aiyansh on 17 May 1910. A copy reached the Attorney General's office and the text was published in the *Victoria Daily Colonist* and the *Vancouver Province* (both of 3 June 1910). A copy was also handed to the McKenna-McBride Royal Commission in 1915 (PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 518). The Land Committee also wrote to a Prince Rupert newspaper to explain their position and their letter was reprinted in the *Victoria Daily Colonist* of 19 June 1910. The same article also included extracts from an issue of *Hagaga*, the Mission-produced newspaper of the Nisga'a, examining the land question.
- 53 Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, p. 86; FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, p. 21. O'Meara also became legal counsel to the Allied Tribes in 1916 ("Notes

- of Interview with Honorable Doctor Roche," 17 Feb. 1915, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7781, file 27150-3-4; Patterson, "Arthur O'Meara").
- 54 Tate was a central figure operating as secretary throughout the life of the IRA and, for a time, as treasurer. His diaries, from 1909 to 1916, contain references to the executive meetings. Native members of the executive included Andrew Paull (Squamish), Peter Kelly (Haida), Lewis Gosnell (Tsimshian) and Joseph Stewart (Ruby Creek). They were part of what Tennant has called the "first generation of neo-traditional leaders." See circulars dated 16 Dec. 1912 and 20 May 1913, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662; circular dated 27 Sept. 1915, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11047, file 33/general, pt. 6; Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, p. 87. On the identity of Gosnell and Stewart, see Tate [?] to McKenna-McBride Royal Commission, 21 May 1913, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662.
 - 55 Translators were a feature of delegations meeting White politicians; both Tate and Teit acted in that capacity at the meeting with McBride in 1911 ("Interview of Indian Chiefs with Executive," PABC, Add. MSS 115, British Columbia, Executive Council). On the IRA conference, see *Vancouver Province*, 10 Dec. 1912.
 - 56 This is not very different from the structure of the Allied Tribes as described by P. Drucker, *The Native Brotherhoods: Modern Inter-Tribal Organizations of the Northwest Coast* (Washington, DC: Bureau of American Ethnology, 1958), p. 96. Tate went to meetings at the following locations: Alert Bay, 14 Nov. 1912; Koksilah, 30 Nov. 1914 and 14 Apr. 1916; Chilliwack, 20 Jan. 1915; Quathiaski Cove, 1 Feb. 1915; Lytton, 22 Mar. 1915; Lillooet, 22 Mar. 1915; Pt. Simpson, 17 and 19 Apr. 1915; Kispiox, 22 Apr. 1915; Hazelton, 24 Apr. 1915; Pt. Essington, 26 June 1915; Aggasiz 18 Nov. 1915; Maria Island, 19 Nov. 1915; Duncan, 29 Nov. 1915; and Nanaimo, 10 Apr. 1916. Although not identified as such in his diary, it seems probable that there were branches at most of these locations.
 - 57 Tate reported in 1914 that branches had been established at Shushwap, Chase and Alexandria (circular, 27 Sept. 1915, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11047, file 33/general, pt. 6). A year later the Nisga'a stated that they had spent "upwards of \$5000" on their own petition ("Notes of Interview with Honorable Doctor Roche," 17 Feb. 1915, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7781, file 27150-3-4). It is clear, however, that money was short for all Native political organizations. The same source indicates that O'Meara had spent \$2500 of his own money and the FIBC "upwards of \$17500."
 - 58 Statement by Sam Mitchell, a Lillooet elder, quoted in Drake-Terry, *The Same as Yesterday*, p. 261.
 - 59 For comments on Teit and his relationship with Interior peoples, see McKenna to Scott, 5 Feb. 1916, PAC, RG 10, vol. 59335-2. For Tate, see diary entries for 13-15 Feb. 1911, 15-16 Mar. 1912, 13-16 May 1914, 25-27 Feb. 1915 and 16-17 Mar. 1916, PABC, Add. MSS 303.
 - 60 At Prince Rupert Laurier met representatives from Port Simpson, Kitkatla, Metlakatla, Greenville and an unspecified Nisga'a village (*Vancouver News Advertiser*, 21 Aug. 1910, and *Vancouver Daily World*, 22 Aug. 1910). For a description of federal government policy during this period, see SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 11.

- 61 By this stage Native people had the support and advice of a White lobby group, the Friends of the Indians of British Columbia (FIBC). In the period following Laurier's visit to British Columbia in August 1910 the FIBC, together with the Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada, conducted meetings and corresponded with Laurier and McBride (see annexes J, P, T, V and W to PC 1081, PAC, RG 2, vol. 1104).
- 62 Peter Kelly, a Haida, was a Methodist missionary at Hartley Bay at this time. He went on to play a leading role in the Allied Tribes; see annexes L, M and N to PC 1081, PAC, RG 2, vol. 1104; and A. Morley, *Roar of the Breakers: A Biography of Peter Kelly* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1967).
- 63 See, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1. A copy was sent to the SGIA. See Drake-Terry, *The Same as Yesterday*, pp. 257-60 and 268-70.
- 64 The delegation included the son of Joe Capilano and Chief Tsilpaymilt, who had been on the trip to London in 1906. See undated letters (received 28 May 1911) from Matthias Capilano, Charley Tsilpaymilt and Simon Pierre, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1; and O'Meara, "An Historical Sketch," PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-2.
- 65 Although described as an IRA deputation the chiefs were all from the Interior, representing Shushwap, Okanagan, Lillooet and Thompson tribes. John Chilhitza and Basil David were in the deputation (*Ottawa Citizen*, 8 and 9 Jan. 1912).
- 66 The Nisga'a delegation to the meeting with McBride, in March 1911, apparently initiated O'Meara's involvement with their concerns. See Annex O to PC 1081, PAC, RG 2, vol. 1014; FIBC, *The British Columbia Indian Land Question from a Canadian Point of View* (n.p.: Conference of the Friends of the Indians of British Columbia, 1914), p. 11; and FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, pp. 1-10. Copies of an explanatory "Statement," also adopted in January 1913, were forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the IRA and the FIBC. See also, Patterson, "Arthur O'Meara," pp. 93-94.
- 67 See SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 12; and Memorandum for Government of Canada, 5 May 1914, AC, RG 10, vol. 7781, file 27150-3-4.
- 68 The meeting included representatives from Pemberton, Lillooet, Pavilion, Williams Lake, Soda Creek, Alkali Lake, Hope, Yale, Creston, Fort Steele, Bonaparte, Fountain, Kuper Island, Campbell River, Phillips Arm, Green Point Rapids, Cheam, Ruby Creek, Squamish, Kitamaat, Mission and China Hat (*Vancouver Sun*, 10 and 11 Dec. 1912; *Vancouver Province*, 11 Dec. 1912). See Tate, circular, 16 Dec. 1912, PAC, RG 10 vol. 11023, file 662.
- 69 Paull and Tate, circular, 20 May 1913, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662. On the passage of the resolution see Tate [?] to McKenna-McBride Royal Commission, 21 May 1913, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662.
- 70 UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 145248-49.
- 71 See *Vancouver News Advertiser* and *Vancouver Sun*, 13 Dec. 1913; Gibbons to Scott, 24 July 1914, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662; Gibbons to Scott.
- 72 Clark to O'Meara, 29 Oct. 1914, and Clark to Roche, 8 and 9 Feb. 1915, PAC, RG 10, vol. 3822, file 59,335-2; and statement by Roche, 9 May 1916, UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 16423-24. O'Meara's version of events is contained in a

statement to Roche during a meeting on 17 Feb. 1915. "The Nishgas and myself," O'Meara claimed,

desired that the consultation with Mr. Clark thus begun should be continued. For this Mr. Clark was willing, and in the fall of 1912, as shown by letters in my possession, was prepared to co-operate in drawing the Nishga Petition. Suddenly and to the surprise of both of us, came a letter from Mr. C.M. Tate instructing Mr. Clark not to continue such co-operation. In the campaign against the Nishgas and myself then commenced and continued to the present time, Mr. Tate has professed to act on behalf of the Indians of the Province, but, I believe, without their authority. In my next letter I briefly replied to this protest. [FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, p. 62]

This dispute came to a head in 1916 during the formation of the Allied Tribes. As a result, O'Meara emerged as legal counsel to both the Allied Tribes and the Nisga'a (see below).

- 73 See SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 55. The Nisga'a Petition had been referred back to Canada on 19 June 1913, where it was reviewed by Duncan Scott. He drafted a memorandum that became the basis for PC 751 (Titley, *A Narrow Vision*, pp. 142-43).
- 74 SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 55. The comments by McTavish and Tucker are contained in an "Explanatory Statement" issued by the FIBC and the Social Services Committee of Canada in October 1915. They were quoted by O'Meara in a "Petition to the Lord President of the Privy Council," 30 June 1927 (AGBC #1714).
- 75 The Nisga'a obtained the support of "nine other Tribes," including the Kitkatla, a Coast Tsimshian tribe, the Haida and the Gitksan (FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, pp. 32 and 73; O'Meara to Minister of Justice, 18 Apr. 1913, UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 145237-39. The Nisga'a delegation consisted of W.J. Lincoln, T.L. Derrick and A.N. Calder together with R.S. Woods (interpreter) and A.E. O'Meara (counsel). They met with Minister of Justice C.J. Doherty and Minister of the Interior (SGIA) W.J. Roche on 3 and 4 Feb.; DSGIA D.C. Scott on 4 Feb.; Roche and Scott on 17 Feb., 25 Mar. and 27 Apr.; Scott on 5, 9, 10 and 11 Feb., and 6 Apr. The meetings of 17 Feb. and 27 Apr. were also attended by representatives of the Indian Affairs Committee of the Social Service Council of Canada, an Anglican support group.
- 76 The Interior Tribes had issued formal statements in support of the Nisga'a initiatives in May 1913 and June 1914. Following the latter the Interior tribes had issued an invitation to O'Meara to attend a meeting in the fall in order "to explain more fully the Nishga Petition and the steps which had been taken in connection with it." This meeting was postponed until 25-27 Feb. 1915, partly to facilitate the attendance of Nisga'a delegates (FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, pp. 60 and 79).
- 77 The Nisga'a proposals, the statement of the Interior Tribes and the Order-in-Council are all reprinted in FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, pp. 23, 62-67 and 105-7. See also Teit to Brewster, 31 May 1917, PAC, RG 10, vol. 3821, file 59,335, pt. 4.

- 78 The Nisga'a delegates were anxious to reiterate that they had the support of other Indian groups. "It is well known," they informed Borden, "that the mind of the Nishgas regarding the land question is also the mind of the other Northern Coast Tribes" (Nisga'a delegates to Borden, 8 May 1916, UBC, *Borden Papers*, p. 16403).
- 79 See statement by Charles Barton in an interview with W.J. Roche on 9 May 1916, UBC, *Borden Papers*, p. 16414. The delegations also met with Prime Minister Borden on May 19; *ibid.*, pp. 16427-34.
- 80 The clearest expression of this position is contained in the written statement of the Nisga'a and Interior delegates of 26 May 1916 (UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 16437-39).
- 81 Roche was aware of this split in February 1915 and raised the issue during his meeting with the Nisga'a delegates on the 17th of that month (FIBC, *The Nishga Petition*, p. 62). Clark, in addition to corresponding with Roche on the issue, imparted further information during a private meeting with the Minister (UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 16423-24).
- 82 See statement of Thomas Adolph, 26 May 1916, UBC, *Borden Papers*, pp. 16435-36. For the similarity between the position of the Nisga'a and the Interior Tribes, see Teit to Borden, 9 May 1916, PAC, RG 10, vol. 3822, file 59335-2.
- 83 See the statement of Andrew Paull, long-time secretary of the organization (SJC, *Report and Evidence*, p. 175). According to a statement issued after the Vancouver meetings, the delegates of the Nisga'a and the Interior Tribes, on returning from Ottawa, sent an invitation to the executive committee of the IRA to attend the conference; Allied Tribes, "Statement Issued by the Committee appointed by the Conference 28th June, 1916" (n.p.: 1916).
A number of documents provide information on these meetings. The most authoritative is a statement, prepared by P.R. Kelly and J.A. Teit (Chairman and Secretary, respectively, of the Executive Committee), and published by the Allied Tribes (Allied Tribes, "Statement"). The local newspapers also included several accounts (*Vancouver Sun*, 21, 22 and 23 June 1916; *Vancouver Daily World*, 21 and 22 June 1916).
- 84 O'Meara's rise to prominence was facilitated by the resignation during the Vancouver meetings of two White advisers to the IRA: J.E. Bird, a lawyer, and C.M. Tate, the General Secretary of the organization. It can be assumed that Clark ended his connection with the Indians of British Columbia at the same time. O'Meara died of "heart disease" at his home in Chilliwack on 2 Apr. 1928 (*Victoria Times*, 3 Apr. 1928).
- 85 Allied Tribes, "Statement."
- 86 See *Vancouver Sun*, 23 June 1916. For an account of subsequent events, see Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics*, and Titley, *A Narrow Vision*.
- 87 See Neill to Vowell, 29 Jan. 1910, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1; Keen to McKenna, 10 June 1913, PAC, RG 10, vol. 11023, file 662; Scott to Endicott, 7 Oct. 1914, PAC, RG 10, vol. 7780, file 27150-3-1A; Scott to McKenna, 14 Mar. 1916, PAC, RG 10, vol. 3822, file 59335-2.