Indian Reorganization Act (1934). It documents in a variety of ways how this seemingly beneficial, at other times benign, Act has produced a Native economic dependency that will probably never be reversed. The implications of such a conclusion are both enlightening and serious. The second theme touched upon is that more recent federal policy and legislation have continued to enforce a Native dependency. While policy statements publicly decry this dependency, the implementation procedures preclude any meaningful change. The special issue makes a substantive contribution to the field of Native Studies as well as policy analysis. If other issues are as penetrating and insightful, it should be one journal that all libraries will continue to support.

James S. Frideres


Professor Brian Titley has done a great service for scholarship on Native history, indeed for Native studies in general, with the publication of his aptly titled book on Duncan Campbell Scott, A Narrow Vision. Scott, who was with the Department of Indian Affairs in Ottawa from 1878 to 1932 and served as its Deputy from 1913-32, is a key figure. He was the lynch-pin and provided the essential continuity of Canadian Indian policy in the 19th and 20th centuries. This policy has been singularly noted for its basic elements, particularly the Indian Act, and the Crown's control of land and natural resources on reserve and within Treaty lands. It was, and remains, a very unimaginative vision that is often seen to be negative and regressive, if not in style, then certainly in content. Its essence was colonial, a legacy of British Imperial history. Yet, as Professor Titley observes in his "Introduction," the administration of Indian Affairs remains a complex and many-faceted enterprise. Thus, at least until much more research has been done, scholarship on the subject must perforce be cautious.
Wisely, Professor Titley has taken a selective approach to a very large subject. He has not attempted to write a complete, much less a definitive, biography; rather he has focused on his own interest and the significance of the subject matter, in which, the author asserts, Duncan Campbell Scott played a pivotal role. The chapters include topics on Indian administration, Scott as "Treaty Maker," schooling and civilization, Indian political organizations, the Six Nations status case, Land Claims in British Columbia, "Senseless Drumming and Dancing," and the comic Scott-Graham trauma of 1932.

Critics of this book will invariably point out other significant aspects of policy and administration with which the book does not deal. For example, this reviewer would have liked to see more on land claims in Ontario, more on Scott's views with regard to the Canadian North and Indian Treaties and administration there, and more on Scott's views on Indian affairs in the Maritime Provinces and Quebec. Except for the chapters on the Six Nations Status Case and the general introductory chapters, the focus is primarily on the Prairie Provinces and part of northern Ontario. This may reflect more Scott's own interests as Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs than Professor Titley's "subjectivity." Let the critics themselves write about the aspects Titley has not covered.

A Narrow Vision opens, somewhat facetiously, with a quotation from the June 1983 issue of National Lampoon which effectively mocks Scott as a public servant. "...As a government official, he ensured that his native charges always got a fair shake, usually by the scruff of the neck; By doing his Christian and civic duty to ensure the rapid decline of native culture in Canada, he conveniently provided himself with sunset-tinged images of the "tragic savage" to enrich his bland versifying, while at the same time enriching his private collection with filched Indian art, now worth a bundle." Without in any way "excusing" Scott from his responsibilities as a senior bureaucrat, it is evident that Professor Titley does not always appreciate what a "tough business" the administration of Indian affairs has been.

Moreover, was there any real alternative? As Professor Titley himself observes, Scott played "a pivotal role in seeking resolutions satisfactory to the department and within prevailing policy guidelines." Nevertheless, it is important to understand what happened, and why, for the historical legacy of Indian policy is immediate.

In Chapter One, on the "Origins and Development" of "Indian Administration," Professor Titley provides an excellent summary of the ad hoc and pragmatic framework of Canada's Indian policy as a product of British imperialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. He is less successful in providing clear evidence for his thesis that, even prior to 1913 when Scott became Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, and as such the "principal architect of Indian policy" (p. 22) until his retirement in 1932, he (Scott) was "for many years the real decision-maker within the department." There are only a few hints and little "hard evidence" that this was the case. Not being the head of the Department until 1913, much less its political head, Scott was, except at a few critical points, not the real "decision-maker" prior to 1892; Lawrence Vankoughnet and the Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, were in charge. Scott's influence gradually increased and became more prominent as he became Chief Accountant and then Superintendent of Education. Nevertheless, in the years (1896-1905) in which Clifford Sifton was Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, there is no doubt who shaped Indian policy, and it was not Scott.

There are a few minor inaccuracies in these initial chapters. Most, not "all of what is now southern Ontario," was surrendered by Indian people to the Crown by the mid-19th century. These early treaties provided for "reserves, cash payments" and often annuities, not "presents." Presents and present-giving did not flow from the treaties but rather were paid to British Indian allies as a means of retaining their loyalty in time of war. These presents continued to be made until they were discontinued by the British Imperial government in 1858. This is a commentary on the view that the end of the War of 1812-14 brought the "military

usefulness of the Indian to an end" (p. 2). But if that were to be the case, why did the presents continue for more than fifty years?

It is also doubtful that the Indian Reserves in Quebec were "confirmed by the British in the Articles of Capitulation, 1760" (p. 3). They attained legal status and protection only by legislation in the early 1850s. In addition, there had already been legislation passed in 1839 that provided for "protection" for Indian Lands. Treaty Three did not, as Professor Titley states, "achieve the surrender of that part of the Canadian shield lying between the Manitoba border and Lake Superior" (p. 19). Treaty Three was signed in 1873, long before the Ontario boundary dispute was settled, and moreover, part of the Treaty Three area is, in fact, in Manitoba.

In the brief discussion of the so-called "numbered" treaties, Professor Titley, in his description of the treaty provisions, makes no reference to the "outside" or "oral promises" of the treaties which have been, and still are, of significance for both Indian people and the Crown. There is a good summary of the attempts, in some cases highly successful, of Sifton and his successor Frank Oliver to take Indian reserve lands by surrenders under the Indian Act. However, Scott remains a shadowy figure in all of this, and to state merely that he was the "real decision-maker" in the Department is quite unconvincing.

Chapter Two, "The Poet and the Indians," a "critical reassessment of Scott's world view," takes an original approach. Professor Titley skillfully outlines Scott's British imperial sentiments and shows what the linkages were between Scott's career as a civil servant and a man of letters. He deftly weaves into his assessment the significant elements of Scott's character and family life. There is no doubt that, whether in poetry, prose or in his work for the Department, Scott's view of Indian people was not original and was shaped by his 19th-century Euro-Canadian cultural "baggage." Scott stated that "The happiest future for the Indian race is absorption into the general population, and this is the object of the policy of our government" (p. 34). With these views, Scott was less an

architect than a "caretaker" of a 19th-century Indian policy that was already outmoded before he became Deputy in 1913. His view was fundamentally conservative.

Chapter Three, "Schooling and Civilization," one of the best chapters in the book, illustrates the preferred means by which Scott attempted to carry out and complete Canada's "imperial mission," the task of assimilating Canada's Native people. Under Scott, and despite his efforts, Professor Titley observes correctly that "success continued to elude the policies" (p. 75). Relying on the major church organizations as a powerful cultural tool, primarily for reasons of economy, church and state worked to establish "day and residential schools" for Indians. Detailing the administration of these schools and the results they achieved, Professor Titley shows the complex problems that arose in this area, particularly in western Canada. He shows that, in 1909, Scott, as the newly appointed Superintendent of Education, embarked on a new policy direction emphasizing efficiency which would "phase out...inefficient boarding and day schools" (p. 83). While the self-serving, and perhaps inaccurate, statistics gratifyingly showed an improved school attendance, they also exhibited an ugly side of the policy. This attempt at civilization drove a "cultural wedge" between some generations of Indian people in the 20th century. Moreover, Indian people continued to resist and did not lose either their cultures or their languages. The "failure" of this policy was not acknowledged until well after Scott's departure as Deputy in 1946-48, when the Joint Parliamentary Committee reviewing the Indian Act "proposed instead the integration of young Indians into public schools" (p. 93).

Professor Titley's chapter Six, on "Indian Political Organization," outlines the familiar ground of the development of these organizations as a form of Native resistance to government since the later 19th-century. This chapter is well done but not original. It covers the theme of Native resistance through tribal and regional organizations on issues of "land claims and treaty rights." It does not intend to document, nor does it document,
the "grass-roots" resistance movements to the imposition of non-Native ways of life on Native people. Professor Titley describes the activities of the Grand General Indian Council of Ontario, one of the first Native political organizations in the Pre-Confederation era. He shows how these early organizations did not always have Band support. More damning, he shows that Scott saw these organizations as rivals to his power as Deputy and used various coercive measures to break them at local, provincial, national and international levels. The best examples were "Chief Thunderwater's movement" and F.O. Loft's "League of Indians."

Professor Titley places the development of Indian political organization in a broader context, especially the return of Indian veterans after the First World War and the government's inordinate fear, as evident in the Winnipeg general strike, of any apparent subversion of the established system or institutions. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in Duncan Campbell Scott's subsequent actions to root out and destroy the hereditary system of government of the Six Nations and Grand River. This is the subject of Chapter Seven.

Scott's measures in "attempting to destroy the traditional system of politics along the banks of the Grand River" were "draconian." Here was a people who were allies of the Crown in war and in peace; people who had had their own system of government for hundreds of years. Scott chose to ignore that and to bring about an elected system of government to fulfill his assimilationist objectives of federal Indian policy. In doing so, he incurred the enmity of the Six Nations and brought aboriginal people onto the centre stage of international politics once again. This was known as the Six Nations status case which had its roots in the 18th-century. The hereditary council formed a committee in 1919 to support the status case of the Six Nations, i.e. to renew the Six Nations' historical view that they were sovereign under the aegis of the Crown. At the same time Scott and the Department were moving forward with their version of the "ultimate solution," Bill 14, compulsory enfranchisement, which became Law on 1 July 1920. The resistance movement by the Six

Nations continued for the next few years and resulted in an election of a hereditary council, by force, at the Six Nations. This was not before the Six Nations took their case for special status all the way to the League of Nations. This gave Canada, largely due to the actions of Scott and in collaboration with the federal Department of External Affairs a national "black eye" in the process. In the context of Indian administration in Canada the Six Nations status case was no doubt the low point of federal Indian policy in the 20th century in Canada since it was premised on the complete eradication of the culture and customs of a people who had shown nothing but loyalty to the Crown since the American Revolution. Nothing could have been more absurd. It showed the utter bankruptcy of Scott's "narrow vision." However, his work on land claims in British Columbia was scarcely more credible.

In Chapter Eight, Professor Titley focusses on an historical but also contemporary problem. This is the lack of understanding by the government of British Columbia, as well as other governments, of the concept or the reality of aboriginal title. It also illustrates the development within Canada of regional Indian policies, notwithstanding that the overall responsibility and policy direction was to come from the federal government in Ottawa on the basis of constitutional responsibilities as laid down in the British North America Act. Instead of dealing with aboriginal title and developing a well established pattern of treaty-making, as developed elsewhere in Canada, the British Columbia Government adopted a policy of being less generous than elsewhere. A small land base was provided in the form of inadequate reserves which were seen at best to be a "nuisance" to the White settlers and their government. The issue was not addressed until the First World War when the McKenna-McBride Commission was appointed and was not dealt with adequately thereafter. It led to a "saw off" between the governments without the involvement of the Indian people and to the denial of claims to aboriginal title and to the establishment of the "cut-off lands." An "ill-considered and ineffective" federal government attempt to create uniformity of

administrative practice in British Columbia, in which Scott led the way, resulted in delaying the resolution of long-standing aboriginal claims in British Columbia.

In Chapter Nine, Scott's activities in relation to Indian culture were just as unsuccessful. "Senseless Drumming and Dancing" evokes the essential paternalism and the assimilationists roots of Canadian Indian policy. Although the Department, through the Indian Act, had attempted to do away with the cultural practices beginning with the revisions to the Indian Act in the 1880s, it was not until the years that Scott became Superintendent General in 1913 that these clauses were invoked through the Indian agents backed by the force of the law. At Alert Bay for example, Indian people who disobeyed the law against potlatching lost their possessions and were imprisoned when they resisted. Their objects, confiscated by the Indian agent, found their way into Scott's office or into Museums without compensation or in lieu of a jail term. For this Scott was completely responsible. He ignored the "leniency" arguments of the "man of the spot" as well as the advice of government expertise in the form of Edward Sapir, of the federal government of Mines, and later of Diamond Jenness. Notwithstanding these attempts, aboriginal cultural practices did not die, nor were they rooted out by the Department. They went "underground" to live again another day and were likely strengthened by the assault on them.

The last Chapter, Ten, is a quintessential account of a bureaucratic power struggle between Commissioner Bill Graham, the Department's man on the prairies, and Scott, the man from Headquarters. This epitomizes the character of Indian Affairs bureaucracy in Canada. Bill Graham was a "success" at least in the context of implementing the Department's schemes, particularly the development by aboriginal people during the Great War of successful commercial agriculture on the Prairies. In doing so he created a real problem for the Department because the program was a success and thus proved to be real competition for the Indian peoples' neighbors. When Scott attempted to "wind down
the program" Graham resisted and created a long standing "turf war" between the two bureaucrats that lasted until Scott retired in 1932.

As a senior man, Graham hoped to get Scott's job. However, his position was undercut by a controversy involving alcohol. To get liquor for the club "on-reserve," club members had to carry intoxicants illegally through the reserve. When they were caught it became a political embarrassment for the teetotalling Conservative Prime Minister, R.B. Bennett, especially when raised in the House of Commons by the equally temperate J.S. Woodsworth. Graham took the political "flak," notwithstanding his close family connections with the Prime Minister. Scott used this as an excuse to avoid passing on the mantle of power in the Department to Graham. Instead, Bennett promoted a Calgary doctor and golf chum to the job, Dr. Harold McGill. Scott lived in relative obscurity in retirement until his death in 1947.

Scott, concludes Professor Brian Titley, was a "capable and efficient administrator, who lacked interest in his career as a civil servant and in Canadian Indian policy." Yet he was clearly influential and was Deputy at a time when the Department and its policy was at a "critical phase" in its policy and history. There is no doubt that his views were "narrow." Was he really different? Could it have been otherwise? Was he racist? If he was not really interested in the subject area, why did he show so much zeal in so many areas? There is much more on Duncan Campbell Scott than appears in Professor Titley's account. Scott is a controversial man who had a depth of views and experience grounded in Victorian imperialism. His long years of experience were not, as suggested here and elsewhere, of someone with a desultory attitude or necessarily a "narrow vision." The answer lies in the changing Weltanschauung of mid-Victorian imperialism, as evidenced by Canada's vision of aboriginal people in the 19th-century and today. Professor Titley has done Canadian scholarship a great service by opening up this area of scholarship to Canadian historians. It is indeed a fine book.

David McNab