

PROBLEMS OF WESTERN CANADIAN INDIAN WAR VETERANS AFTER WORLD WAR ONE

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When Canada's soldiers came home after the Armistice in 1918, they believed they were returning to an enlightened society for which many of them had fought and died. Overseas they had been exposed to new ideas which had broadened their outlook and their expectations.¹ Indian soldiers, too, expressed optimism about such matters as equality, responsibility and opportunity which they hoped would be waiting for them on their return to Canada. Yet within months of their return, many Indian war veterans found that nothing had changed; they were still under the yoke of government bureaucrats and treated like irresponsible children. Some became angry, but most became bitter or disillusioned by the fact that the better world they had fought for, did not seem to exist within the boundaries of their own reserves.

Between 3,500 and 4,000 Indians served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, many of them in front-line combat positions overseas. By the end of the war, thirty-five percent of Canada's Natives had enlisted out of a possible total of 11,500 men who were of eligible age for service. This was at least equal to the enlistment ratio of the non-Indian population in Canada.

The hopes of Indian soldiers for a better life for themselves and their people had, however, already experienced setbacks during the war years. For example, it appeared for a time that the legal status of all Canada's Indians might change when Native soldiers were given the right to vote. Their franchise was officially confirmed in 1916 when, during the parliamentary debates, the Hon. Charles Doherty, Minister of Justice, stated that "Section 1,

of An Act to enable Canadian soldiers on Active Military Service during the present war to exercise their electoral franchise...makes no exception of Indians."²

When the Military Voters Bill was introduced in late 1917, it had a special provision for Indian veterans whereby, if it was not feasible for Indians to vote at the polling station closest to their reserve, a polling station would be set on the reserve. During this election Indians could vote without the fear of losing their treaty status.³

After the war the legal status of Canada's Indian population remained an unresolved question. Although many Indians, officials, and members of the public advocated giving the franchise to all Indians in recognition of their men's valiant performance on the battlefields,⁴ others approached the question with concern and suspicion. While the franchise appeared to many as a boon for the Indians and a solution to the question of government wardship, the franchise also carried the distinct danger in the minds of many Indians that the government might use it to terminate its responsibility towards them and force them to abandon their cultural heritage.⁵ This fear seems to have been well founded as it was in line with the belief of Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, that the legal status of Indians should be terminated without the consent of Indians when he believed they were ready. As he stated:

I think that it would be to the interest of good administration if the provisions with regard to enfranchisement were further extended so as to enable the Department to enfranchise individual Indians or bands of Indians, without the necessity of obtaining their consent thereto, in cases where it is found upon investigation that the continuance of wardship is no longer in the interest of the public or of the Indian. 6

The Indians also had the experience of the Greater Production Effort to know how easily the government could override Native rights by simply amending the Indian Act. In January of 1918, W.M. Graham, Inspector of Indian Agencies for Southern Saskatchewan, outlined a plan to increase food production in order to assist with the war effort. It involved the

use of "idle" Indian lands which he claimed amounted to 220,000 acres in the South Saskatchewan Inspectorate alone. He proposed that the "proper" use of these lands could raise cattle production to three times the existing level. The project became known as the "Greater Production" scheme and was approved in February 1918 with Graham appointed Commissioner for the western provinces.⁷ He was given authority through Order-in-Council "to make proper arrangements with the Indians for the leasing of reserve lands"⁸ and to manage these lands for the Greater Production Effort.

However, at that time, Indian lands could not be expropriated for any purpose without the consent of the band involved. To make the confiscation of reserve lands a simple matter, the Indian Act was amended in the spring of 1918 to make such consent unnecessary.⁹

The Conservative government endorsed Graham's dictatorial plan even when it was criticized by government opponents as not being in the best interests of the Indians. The Hon. Arthur Meighen, Minister of the Interior, defended the Commissioner when he stated in the House of Commons on 23 April 1918 that,

We need not waste any time in sympathy for the Indian, for I am pretty sure his interests will be looked after by the Commissioner.... The Indian is a ward of the Government still. The presumption of the law is that he has not the capacity to decide what is for his ultimate benefit in the same degree as his guardian, the Government of Canada.¹⁰

The use of Indian lands followed two patterns. One involved leasing land to white farmers for up to five years; some 255,000 acres were used in this way. The other saw the establishment of Greater Production farms on Indian land. These federal agricultural experiments were set up on the Blood, Blackfoot, Muscowpetung, Crooked Lakes and Assiniboine reserves and occupied a total area of 20,448 acres.¹¹

The implementation of the scheme greatly upset a number of bands, including the Blood Indians. On 31 May 1920, they presented a memorandum to the Department of Indian Affairs outlining their complaints which included gross mismanagement and

the agent's dictatorial actions. For example, they pointed out that on 30 May 1918, after nearly 4,800 acres of their reserve had been taken for the creation of a Greater Production farm, Indian labour was used at the expense of their own farms. In addition, Blood farm machinery was virtually commandeered by the agent at great inconvenience to the Indians. Scott tried to dismiss most of their complaints as being exaggerated although he did concede that there had been some mismanagement.¹²

During the war, Indians received medals for conspicuous gallantry, died at Vimy Ridge, gained enviable reputations as snipers, and lived as equals with non-Indians in the trenches and behind the lines.

After the war, Indian veterans looked to the Government of Canada for some tangible acknowledgement of their contributions. For example, the veterans of the Peguis band, in Manitoba, wanted to know what reward they could expect through the Department of Indian Affairs for their services in the war.¹³ Similarly, a letter from Mark Steinhauer, from the Saddle Lake Agency in Alberta, made his views even more explicit. He wrote,

I have been wondering...whether we are going to get anything out of our country that we are going to fight for.... What I want to find out is, is there a possible chance of us getting our franchise and our location in the reservation after the war is over? I do not think it would be fair not to get anything out of a country that we are fighting for. 14

Interestingly, Duncan Campbell Scott, in a postwar essay on Native soldiers, believed that changes would be forthcoming, although he envisioned them as simply hastening the elimination of the Indians' traditional lifestyle and customs. Scott wrote,

These men who have been broadened by contact with the outside world and its affairs, who have mingled with the men of other races, and who have witnessed the many wonders and advantages of civilization, will not be content to return to their old Indian mode of life. Each one of them will be a missionary of the spirit of progress.... Thus the war will have hastened that day, ...when all the quaint old customs, the weird and picturesque ceremonies...shall be as obsolete as the buffalo and the tomahawk, and the last tepee of the Northern wilds give place to a model farmhouse.

In other words, the Indian shall become one with his neighbor in his speech, life and habits, thus conforming to that world-wide tendency towards universal standardization which would appear to be the essential underlying purport of all modern social evolution. 15

Where administrative matters were concerned, it soon became apparent that the post-war attitude of the Indian Department was as though the war had never occurred and that nothing had changed. When an Indian agent inquired in 1922 about the legal status of Indian veterans, J.D. McLean, Secretary of the Department, replied: "These returned Indian soldiers are subject to the provisions of the Indian Act and are in the same position as they were before enlisting."¹⁶ This statement summed up well not only the legal, but also the social and economic status of Indians after the war.¹⁷ While conditions for the majority of other Canadians improved, the same could not be said for Natives. Even though they had survived the war, many of the Indian veterans continued to live at the bottom of the economic ladder and as the years passed their situation did not improve. One can imagine the despair they experienced, especially when comparing themselves to their white colleagues.¹⁸

Besides their own Department's lack of tangible recognition for the sacrifice the Indians had made during the war, Native veterans and their families found that they were excluded from many of the war and post-war programs offered by other federal departments, particularly the Department of Veterans Affairs. The Indians were considered to be wards of the government and therefore not the responsibility of Veterans Affairs. This attitude of exclusion existed even during the war, as the Blood agent discovered when he tried to obtain money from the Patriotic Fund for the benefit of families who had men overseas. He was informed by the local chapter of the Patriotic Fund that,

The dependents of these Indian soldiers are wards of the Government, and draw living rations from the Government and have no rents to pay, hence since they are a charge on the Government of Canada, and as the Government of Canada is responsible for their maintenance, and for these reasons we cannot

recommend that they participate in the distribution of Patriotic Funds. 19

The agent relayed the contents of the letter to J.D. McLean, suggesting the matter be taken up with the Head Office of the fund. Scott himself brought the complaint to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of the fund. At the regular meeting of the committee it was finally decided that "families of Indians who have listed be treated in the same manner as those of other nationalities."²⁰

In 1919, the Soldier Settlement Act gave veterans wishing to farm an opportunity to obtain Dominion lands or to purchase farms; the legislation did not exclude Indians.²¹ However, for Indian veterans in western Canada, the Act conflicted with an amendment to the Indian Act of 1906 which stated:

No Indian or non-treaty Indian resident in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, or the Territories shall be held capable of having acquired or of acquiring a homestead or pre-emption right under any Act respecting Dominion lands, to a quarter section...in any surveyed or unsurveyed land in the said provinces or territories. 22

The discrepancy was quickly brought to light when the majority of Indian veterans who wished to take up farming under the Act wanted to do so on their own reserves. For example, the agent for Fisher River stated that the Peguis Band soldiers wanted land on their reserve and with assistance from the government they planned to purchase farm implements.²³ Even some of the agents were unsure if the Soldier Act included Indians. The agent for the Touchwood Agency questioned if John Anderson, a member of Gordon's Reserve, could obtain a loan since he was an Indian.²⁴ However, even when officials decided Indians could apply, they still perceived them to be wards of the Indian Department. So, for administrative convenience, arrangements were made for the Indian Department to enforce the Act as it pertained to Indian veterans.²⁵

The problem may never have arisen if Scott had followed his original plan to locate Native veterans on "a grant of lands outside of a reserve..."²⁶ Instead, he agreed with W.M. Graham's

suggestion to "have the Indians provided with land on reserves and to be under the supervision of the Department and to leave available land outside of reserves for other applicants."²⁷ This procedure simplified matters for Indian agents who could more easily enforce clauses of the Indian Act when veterans were residents of reserves.

Although Indians qualified for loans, the clause in the Indian Act remained an obstacle for Natives to be granted Indian land. Alexander Brass, who made an application to the Soldier Settlement Board, attempted to avoid the problem by requisitioning land outside of his reserve. In a letter to the Department he stated that,

I hereby make application to leave the reserve and relinquish my rights therein. I have been living on the Peepeekesis Reserve for eight years before enlistment. Over three years I was working at the File Hills Indian Agency under Inspector Graham and over four years I was on a farm in the Colony, and I have the last three years served overseas in the Army. And I find that I'm not satisfied to resume work where I had left off before joining up.

I wish to be exactly on the same footing as the settlers outside of Reserves. In this I have every confidence in myself, that I'm capable of handling my own affairs. Judging by my past experiences in different occupations, whether for myself or for someone else, I think I'm safe in saying that I have proved good. I understand that there are privileges for returned soldiers, and as I like farming or ranching, I would follow on these lines.

In the Army, oftentimes, I was entrusted with very responsible work. In the struggle for liberty I tried to do my little bit, and because of having learnt its meaning, I beg of you, to grant me my request and right, by letting [me] be my own master. I may say I held the rank of Corporal and have been awarded the Military Medal. I have some money in the office and have always been self-supporting. All the above is true and it's my hope that it will meet with your approval, and your reply at an early date. 28

Brass was given the chance to start a farm off the reserve and he made a success of it for 15 years. Not until the Depression, when he was unable to repay his loan was he forced to return to his reserve in 1938.²⁹

Another Indian veteran, Samuel White Cap from the Assiniboine Agency in Saskatchewan, applied to the Soldier Settlement Board for land off his reserve. However, the agent believed that White Cap was not capable of handling a proposition of this nature by himself and that better results would be obtained if a grant was given him to start on the reserve, and under the strict supervision of the agent.³⁰ This suggestion ran into opposition, not only from the Indian Act, but also from the band council. The agent called a meeting of the council in order to have it pass a resolution granting White Cap the location upon which he was settled. The council refused to pass the resolution on the grounds that they believed if an Indian veteran defaulted on his loan it could lead to the alienation of reserve lands.³¹ The council pointed out that,

At the time of Treaty the Government had told them, Indians would be exempt from fighting in any of the whitemen's wars, and that on account of the Indians having of their own free will, offered to fight this War for their country, that the Indian returned soldiers should have been given more consideration than the white soldiers, and that any assistance granted to returned Indian soldiers, in the way of equipment etc. to enable them to commence farming should have been given free without the Government asking the Indians of the Band to pass a resolution securing the Government for the amount of this assistance, by granting a mortgage on a certain parcel of land in their Reserve.³²

D.C. Scott intervened and against the wishes of the band granted White Cap the location on the condition that the land set aside had never been claimed by or located to anyone in the past.³³

On the prairies, only one in ten Indians who applied for financial assistance was granted a loan from the Soldier Settlement Board. While some historians claimed the Indian success rate was poor,³⁴ in fact it was quite good especially when compared to the non-Indian veterans. By 1924, due mainly to falling prices, 43.5 percent of all non-Indians granted loans had forsaken the agricultural way of life and the related repayments.³⁵ Among Indian veterans on the prairies, only 17.4 percent were in arrears on their loans. Using the Department's list of payments

by Indian soldier settlers for 1922-23, it is evident that of the 23 men documented from the West, 10 had paid off their loans while 9 made a payment in 1923, leaving only 4 in arrears.³⁶

Yet many Indians did not have the opportunity either to succeed or fail, due to the paternalistic attitude of the agents who had the power to approve or reject an application.³⁷ For example, when George Strangling Wolf applied, the Blood agent's assessment was less than favourable and resulted in Strangling Wolf being turned down. The agent stated:

I might say that on Wolf's return from overseas he was given a chance to farm and was provided with horses and a certain amount of machinery, but was too lazy and unsettled to work. I don't think I would care to recommend that his application be given favorable consideration.³⁸

In Saskatchewan, Angus Artist, a member of the Assiniboine Agency, was interested in Soldier Settlement land off his reserve but the agent did not think he was capable of handling a project of this nature by himself. Therefore, the agent suggested that better results could be obtained if a grant was given to Artist that would keep him on the reserve and under the strict supervision of the agent.³⁹

A group of veterans from the Oak River Reserve provides another example. James Fred Essie asked the agent if he, along with Samuel Dowan, Manis Myrick, and Herbert Hapa, could get the Department to help them locate on farms under the same conditions as white soldiers. Essie believed they were capable of handling farms on their own. According to the agent, they were very anxious to leave the reserve and to move among the white population. They told the agent that they would want houses, horses, implements, stock, seed, and grain. However, the agent believed that it would be better to start a colony with these men and those from other reserves because he thought that they would require a certain amount of supervision.⁴⁰ J.D. McLean told the agent to review carefully the cases of the four men and then submit a full report, including a broader explanation of the suggestion of starting a colony.⁴¹ Unfortunately Essie died in

1924, Dowan was dead by 1928, and no action seems to have been taken to start a veterans' colony.

Even if an Indian veteran was supported by a veteran's organization, as in the case of Thomas Green, acceptance was not necessarily forthcoming. Green was from the Muscowequan Reserve in Saskatchewan. He enlisted in 1917 at the age of 43 and was wounded in France.⁴² After his discharge he applied for a loan and W.D. Sugden-Swang, Secretary Treasurer of the Great War Veterans' Association, wrote to D.C. Scott to support Green's application. He noted that while Green was well educated and of good address, he was practically starving with his wife and child. Sugden-Swang felt that,

the Government will show him at least the same appreciation as is accorded his white brothers who saw the horrors of war service. While serving with the forces he was granted the usual privileges of a soldier on pass which allowed him free access to the haunts of civilization, but..., when he returned to his own people he was once more treated as a man unworthy of his liberty. He was under no obligation to enlist being protected by the Indian Act but thought it was his duty.⁴³

However, the agent wrote Scott and noted that since his return Green had been dismissed from his job at the Kamsack Agency and claimed he had subsequently tried every available source to arouse sympathy on his behalf. Therefore when Green applied for assistance under Soldier Settlement the agent would not recommend him. He further underlined his position by stating:

If his family is in need then it is because he is too lazy to work. He is a man who was improvident and indolent before the War, who is now trying to use the fact of his overseas service to obtain charity and sympathy. He has made similar pleas for assistance from the local Branch of the Great War Veterans Association but as the local executive knew Green no attention has been paid to him.... In conclusion I may say that I have told Tom Green if he ever got down to work and showed me he intended to make an earnest effort to help himself, I would recommend some assistance being given to him.⁴⁴

Thus the agent succeeded in preventing Green from being accepted for a loan.

As the Depression took hold in the 1930s Indian veterans continued to be denied the benefits available to non-Indian veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs continued to pass its responsibility to the Department of Indian Affairs, using the excuse that the Indians were wards of the government. In the spring of 1932 it was decided by the Minister of Pensions and National Health that the War Veterans' Allowance Act did not apply to Indian veterans residing on reserves because they were viewed as being no different from any other Indian on a reserve.⁴⁵ In a letter to the Indian Department, the Veterans Affairs Committee stated,

that assistance by way of relief to returned soldiers who are Indians is denied if they are living on reservations for the reason that such men are wards of your Department. The Committee is also informed that the privileges of the Soldier Settlement Act were denied by the Soldier Settlement Board to returned soldiers who were Indians on the grounds that settlement privileges were available only through your Department.
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Another problem for western Canadian Indians arose when the Soldier Settlement Act made it possible for non-Indian veterans to obtain land at a low rate of interest.⁴⁷ Most of the Crown land had already been taken up by homesteaders so new land had to be found and Indian reserves were eyed with renewed interest. W.A. Buchanan, the Member of Parliament for Medicine Hat, suggested during the debate over the Bill that, "there are lands on...Indian reserves that would suit this particular purpose...."⁴⁸ Since the Indian reserves in the west were underpopulated, they had obvious potential. The Soldier Settlement Act accordingly was revised in 1919 to include the following reference to Indian reserve land:

The Board may acquire from His Majesty by purchase, upon terms not inconsistent with those of the release or surrender, any Indian lands which, under the Indian Act, have been validly released or surrendered.⁴⁹

W.M. Graham heartily endorsed the proposal and succeeded in securing some 85,000 acres of treaty lands from the Indians for

the Soldier Settlement Board. These lands, primarily in Saskatchewan, were surrendered and sold for one million dollars.

Newspapers of the day carried stories extolling Graham's work, but not everyone thought he was acting in the best interests of the Indians. J.A. Newnham, the Anglican Bishop of Saskatchewan, wrote D.C. Scott about Graham's actions concerning the Ochapowace Reserve. He noted that

Mr. Graham...is intending and hoping to transfer them [the Indians] to some Sioux Reserve near Dundurn, and to hand their Reserve over to Soldier Settlement, or some such thing. I beg to enclose their protest most heartily, and to urge that nothing of the sort be done.⁵⁰

However, the protest failed and the land was eventually sold.

By 1921 it was apparent that as a business venture the government farms were not a resounding success as the total expenditure far exceeded the revenue from sales.⁵¹ By that year, \$826,838.93 had been spent but revenue had amounted to only \$576,192.07. Had the project not received an initial advance of \$362,000 from war appropriations, it would have been in serious trouble.⁵²

In 1919, Scott initially had seen the effort as a success when he stated, "many extensive tracts of land that had hitherto lain idle were placed under cultivation; a valuable contribution was thus made to the food supply of the nation, and work of permanent importance accomplished."⁵³ However, by 1922 he had apparently changed his mind in view of its financial performance and terminated the project.

In the area of agriculture, increased food production did not better the economic conditions of the Indians. In fact technological innovations introduced during the war brought about changes that left the Indians further behind in economic development. Adding to the problem, the government failed to extend credit programs to the Indians to allow them to purchase farm equipment and improve their own lands.⁵⁴ A credit plan may have allowed most Indians to at least remain on par with non-

Indians, but without it they had neither the capital nor the knowledge to take advantage of the war-induced innovations.⁵⁵

Some unexpected results of Native participation in the war were to bring Indians from across Canada into contact with one another, to create closer bonds among them, and to promote a new feeling of self-worth. Being presented with decorations and commendations, and generally succeeding in winning the war alongside other Canadians, Indians felt they had proven that they had the ability to speak for themselves. Therefore in 1919, reflecting their new awareness of nationhood, many Indian veterans joined together in the formation of the League of Indians of Canada in hopes of improving conditions on the reserves.⁵⁶ The League was the first such organization in the country.

The principles of the League were drawn up by Frederick Loft, a Mohawk Indian who had been a lieutenant in the Forestry Corps. He had had the opportunity to talk with many Indians from all over Canada while in the service. He saw the need for some medium through which the tribes might be unified, with the goal of securing a representative Indian opinion which would provide unity of action.⁵⁷ Loft became the League's first president.

The principal aim of the League was to attain equality for the Indian as a Canadian citizen--equality, that is, in the two-fold meaning of privilege and responsibility. To achieve this objective, the main emphasis was to improve educational and health programs.⁵⁸ The League defined "equality" as having the privileges and responsibilities of a citizen but did not include the absorption or assimilation of Indians into the mainstream of Canadian society.

The first meeting was held in September of 1919 at Sault St. Marie, Ontario, and the second in June, 1920, at Elphinstone, Manitoba. A meeting for the Saskatchewan Indians was held in the following year.⁵⁹ After 1922, the organization held its annual meetings in the west because the Indians of that region provided the most active membership.⁶⁰ Ultimately, the organization became known as the League of Indians of Western Canada.

In their constitution was a strong recognition of the authority of the Crown and a need for "the perpetuation of the memory of those who died in the War, and proper provision for their dependents."⁶¹ Also prominent was a hope for co-operation with the Federal government. However, this was not to be.

D.C. Scott saw the League as an annoyance and irritation which would be an impediment to efficient administration. In fact, the League's proposals were often in direct opposition to established Departmental policy. Political unity and the fostering of a strong Indian identity was in direct contrast to Scott's policy of assimilating the Indians into the mainstream of Canadian society. Scott initially felt that the League would dissolve if the Department refused to co-operate, and to hasten this the agents were directed to avoid all contact and support for it and pressure their wards to refrain from any correspondence with Loft.⁶² Commissioner W.M. Graham was particularly disturbed at the growth of the League in Western Canada. His concern centered not only on the political implications of the movement, but also on the large rallies which distracted the Indians from their farm work during the summer months.⁶³

Although the League did not receive the co-operation it desired, it continued to pressure the government for changes to better the Indian situation. In the area of education, the League failed in that major achievements did not occur until more than two decades later.⁶⁴ However, in 1922 it did achieve the repeal of Arthur Meighen's Conservative government's 1920 Bill which provided for compulsory enfranchisement.⁶⁵

While the League and its war veteran supporters did not accomplish much, they did lay the foundations for Indian political organization in Canada. Ultimately, both the Indian Association of Alberta and the Union of Saskatchewan Indians grew out of Loft's original league.

When D.C. Scott wrote an essay on the Indians' participation in the Great War, he stated his belief that they were now "beginning a new era."⁶⁶ This may have been true had it not been for the Indian Department's own biases which prevented

Natives from taking a more active role in their own self-determination. The plight of western Canadian Indians remained comparable to what it was prior to the war and in fact during the 1920s their conditions declined in some cases. Yet in Scott's concluding paragraph he observed that:

The Indians themselves...cannot but feel an increased and renewed pride of race and self-respect that should ensure the recovery of that ancient dignity and independence of spirit that were unfortunately lost to them in some measure through the depletion of the game supply,...and the ravages of vices...of the white man. The Indians deserve well of Canada, and the end of the war should mark the beginning of a new era for them wherein they shall play an increasingly honourable and useful part in the history of a country that was once the free and open hunting ground of their forefathers. 67

NOTES

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¹⁴NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6767, File 452-15, pt. 1, Mark Stienhauer to D.C. Scott, 7 August 1916.

¹⁵Duncan Campbell Scott, "The Canadian Indians and The Great World War," Canada In the Great War: Vol. III, Guarding the Channel Ports. (Toronto: United Publishing of Canada Ltd. 1919), pp. 327-28.

¹⁶NAC RG 10, Vol. 3181, File 452, 124-1A, McLean to Thomas Deasy, 8 September 1922.

¹⁷Samek, p. 372.

¹⁸Gaffen, p. 31.

¹⁹NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6762, File 452-2, 2, Philip Morris, Asst. Secretary Canadian Patriotic Fund to Scott, March 1917; and W.J. Dilworth, Blood Agency, to McLean, 20 February 1917.

²⁰Glenbow Archives, Blood Agency Papers, M1788, Box 16, File 122, Scott to W.J. Dilworth.

²¹John L. Taylor, Canadian Indian Policy During the Inter-War Years (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs, Queen's Printer, 1984), p. 34.

²²Consolidated Statutes of Canada, 1906, Clause 81, Sec. 164.

²³NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7527, File 25, 136-1, Carter to McLean, 21 April 1919.

²⁴NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6771, File 452-29, W. Murison, Touchwood Indian Agent, to McLean, 8 April 1919.

²⁵NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7524, File 25, 102-1; Glenbow Archives, Blood Agency Papers, M1788, Box 14, File 120, McLean to James McDonald, Griswold Indian Agent, 28 March 1919. Department of Indian Affairs Form Letter to agents, 6 May 1919. This document includes the conditions whereby an Indian veteran would be granted a loan.

²⁶NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7484, File 25001 Pt. 1, Scott to Arthur Meighen, 15 October 1918.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7524, File 25, 111-2, Pt. 1, Alexander Brass to Department of Indian Affairs, n.d.

²⁹NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7525, File 25, 111-6, Pt. 1, W.M. Graham, Indian Commissioner to McLean, 19 January 1923. NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7524, File 25, 111-2 Pt. 1, G.A. Dodds, File Hills Indian Agent to Secretary, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, 27 July 1938.

³⁰NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7524, File 25, 102-3 Pt. 1, Thomas Donnelly, Assiniboine Indian Agent to McLean, 8 May 1919.

³¹Titley, A Narrow Vision, p. 45. However, the Indian Act was amended in 1922 to eliminate the ambiguity which had upset the Assiniboines.

³²NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7524, File 25, 102-3 Pt. 1, R.D. Wilson, Assiniboine Indian Agent to McLean, 8 May 1919.

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³⁴Gaffen, p. 36.

³⁵Wright, p. 22.

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⁴⁰NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7524, File 25, 102-1, McDonald to McLean, 17 March 1919.

⁴¹NAC, RG 10, Vol. 7524, File 25, 102-1, McLean to McDonald, 28 March 1919.

⁴²NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6771, File 452-29, Murison to McLean, 3 February 1919.

⁴³NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6786, File 452-436, W.D. Sugden-Swang, Secretary Treasurer Great War Veterans' Association to Scott, 8 March 1922.

⁴⁴NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6786, File 452-436, J.B. Harding, Touchwood Indian Agent, to Scott, 22 March 1922.

⁴⁵NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6762, File 452-1, Pt. 5, Murray MacLaren, Minister of Pensions and National Health, to T.G. Murphy, Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, 5 April 1932.

⁴⁶NAC, RG 10, Vol. 6762, File 452-1, Pt. 5, W.S. Woods, Chairman War Veterans Allowance Committee to A.F. MacKenzie, Assistant Deputy and Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, February 1932.

⁴⁷Wright, p. 8.

⁴⁸Taylor, p. 28.

⁴⁹Canada, The Soldier Settlement Act, 1919, Section 10.

⁵⁰Gaffen, pp. 35-36.

⁵¹Titely, "William Morris Graham", p. 31.

⁵²Ibid. p. 30.

⁵³Scott, pp. 326-327.

⁵⁴Michael L. Tate, "From Scout to Doughboy: The National Debate Over Integrating American Indians into the Military, 1891-1918," The Western Historical Quarterly 17, 4 (1986), p. 434.

⁵⁵Samek, p. 372.

⁵⁶Grant, p. 34; Titely, A Narrow Vision, p. 101.

⁵⁷Ahenakew, p. 123.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 123-124; Calgary Albertan, 26 June 1922. In this article Loft sets out the goals of the league.

⁵⁹Ahenakew, p. 124.

⁶⁰Titely, A Narrow Vision, p. 106.

⁶¹Edmonds, pp. 341-42.

⁶²Titely, A Narrow Vision, p. 104.

⁶³Ibid., p. 107.

⁶⁴Ahenakew, pp. 131-35.

⁶⁵Calgary Albertan, 26 June 1922.

⁶⁶Scott, pp. 327-28.

⁶⁷Ibid.