A SUMMARY OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE CANADIAN WEST, 1867-1984

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In 1867 the Dominion of Canada came into being. At the time, it was an eastern-based union made up of only four provinces: Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Although the idea of confederation had won some popular support in Ontario, for the most part, the Dominion had been created by businessmen and politicians in the interest of economic expansion. Above all else, the union was meant to create prosperity by imitating developments in the United States. The central idea was that Canada would acquire a western hinterland, one that would be settled by white immigrant farmers, and ultimately, one that would be exploited and developed for the benefit of the eastern provinces. To that end, in 1869 the federal government acquired through negotiation those Hudson's Bay Company lands lying between the Great Lakes on the east and the Rocky Mountains on the west. These lands, set up as the Northwest Territories, were formally incorporated into the Canadian administration as a colonial domain for the use and benefit of the Dominion.

In securing a western hinterland, the Canadian government was immediately threatened by the spectre of Indian opposition. The southern portion of the Territories--the very area earmarked for agrarian settlement--was dominated by Plains Indian Nations. These tribes, largely untouched by European society, were steeped in the culture of their forefathers and had an alarming potential for armed resistance. Equally important, as independent nations they had very definite land rights, sanctified by British policy and precedent. The Royal Proclamation of 1763, as well as the order-in-council authorizing the transfer of Hudson's Bay Company lands in 1869, required that the Canadian government acknowledge Indian title to the Northwest Territories.1 This effectively meant that, before the designs of the Dominion could be realized, the Indian and his claims would have to be dealt with.

As it turned out, the strength of the Indian position was more apparent than real. The reason for this was the rapid decline of the buffalo, the main source of subsistence for the Plains tribes. Starting in the late eighteenth century, the bison had become the object of intense commercialization, first by the Native community and then by white hunters. Originally, it had been slaughtered for its meat in order to provision the fur trade; this was followed by a growing interest in the buffalo robe, especially by American hunters; finally, and most destructive, the hide of the bison became commercially important as belting material for the wheels of industry in the eastern United States.2 By the late 1870s, the demise of the animal in western Canada was virtually complete. Well before that, however, Indian tribesmen fully appreciated that their shrinking food supply was a portent of impending disaster. Faced with cultural trauma, not to mention outright starvation, they more than anyone else realized that survival
dictated some form of accommodation with the Canadian government. 3

It was against this backdrop that the Canadian government assumed control over the Territories. It did so by concluding a series of treaties with the various tribes. From the Indian point of view—shaped by oral tradition and verbal promises of the government's negotiators—these treaties represented agreements of friendship and alliance between sovereign powers. 4 The Dominion, it was understood, guaranteed the Indian his hunting and fishing rights, and at the same time, promised to aid and instruct him during the difficult transition to an agricultural way of life. What the Indian would have to give up in return was neither emphasized nor always explained by the government commissioners, although the written text of the treaties left no doubt that he was being asked to surrender his title to the West. 5 From the government's point of view, it was the letter rather than the spirit of the treaties that was important. In becoming a party to the treaty, insisted the government, the Indian effectively had signed away all aboriginal title, and in the process, had become a ward of the Canadian state. 6

Wardship was based on Euro-centric understanding. It was assumed that the pre-industrial culture of the Indian was irrelevant to modern society and that, for both practical and humanitarian reasons, the Indian would have to be culturally assimilated—in effect, remade in the image of the whiteman.7 The restructuring, of course, would require considerable training in the ways of white society, and until this was accomplished, the Indian ward would bear a special relationship to the government, that of a protected dependent without citizenship rights. The terms of wardship were contained in federal legislation, known as the Indian Act(s), which sought to regulate and govern virtually every aspect of Indian life.

It was generally conceded that the most appropriate setting for the tutelage of the Indian was a reserve, a tract of land set apart from white society. Through this segregation, the civilizing and Christianizing of tribesmen could be expedited without being hampered by the negative features of Euro-Canadian society, especially the use of alcohol. As a tool of assimilation, the reserve system had been tried in Ontario as early as the 1830s, 8 and since that time, it had become such an accepted feature of Indian policy that, as a matter of course, provision for reserves was included in each of the western treaties.

Such provisions had little meaning as long as the Plains Indians continued to live off the land uninterrupted by actual settlement. But with the final disappearance of the buffalo and the first flush of immigration, reserves took on new meaning. Throughout the early 1880s, the various bands—often destitute and starving—moved onto the lands set aside for them. There, under the watchful eye of the Indian agent and farm instructors, backed by the North West Mounted Police, tribesmen began their long and painful adjustment to an alien way of life.

Fundamental to reserve society was a consolidation of government power. Continuing immigration into the west meant that the Indian population soon would be reduced to a minority. But even more important was
A Summary of Federal Indian Policy in the Canadian West, 1867-1984

the military suppression of Indian opposition in 1885. In that year, some twelve hundred tribemen, principally Cree, bolted from reserves in central Saskatchewan and took up arms to protest their treatment by government. Often Indian agents had been incompetent and occasionally brutal, and in all cases, they had been required by senior officials to administer schemes aimed more at retrenchment than Indian welfare. Indicative was a relief measure which required half-starving Indians to do manual labour as a precondition to receiving food rations, despite the fact that there was seldom enough work to do, and that not infrequently they lacked the winter clothing and footwear necessary to withstand sub-zero temperatures. To the Indian, such a program was a complete violation of what had been promised in the treaties. Justified or not, however, the uprising gave the government the opportunity to deal with Indian resistance once and for all. The Dominion not only dispatched eight thousand troops, provisioned with field pieces and a Gatling gun, but also consolidated its victory by executing eight leaders and sending others to prison. In the end, all semblance of Indian independence was destroyed, and the government was now at liberty to implement a series of assimilationist schemes aimed at "de-tribalizing" Indian society.

From the onset, this involved various attempts by government to displace traditional Indian leadership, especially where chiefs proved obstructive. To detract from their authority, such leaders were not recognized as spokesmen for their bands and every effort was made to replace their power and patronage with those of the Indian agent. The hallmark of these attempts was the introduction of elected band councils as modified versions of municipal government. In theory, such councils were meant to train the Indian in the principles of democracy, but more immediately, they represented an assault on Indian tradition and tribal leadership. To counteract the possibility that uncooperative chiefs might be elected, amendments to the Indian Act legitimized the deposing of such leaders.

As an extension of these measures, reserve society was to be "atomized" or broken down into its component parts. To undermine long-standing communalism, and especially to discourage cooperative farming and ranching, the concept of a "location ticket" was implemented. Essentially, the ticket gave the individual control, although not ownership, of forty acres of reserve land. It was meant as an incentive to individual initiative and enterprise and it was deemed to be a half-way house to private ownership. Also reflecting atomization were attempts to immobilize the Indian in order to prevent collective opposition to government programs. As a matter of administrative policy, no Indian was allowed off the reserve without a pass signed by the Indian agent. Because the ban lacked any legislative basis, it was enforced through an amendment to the Indian Act giving the Indian agent the powers of a Justice of the Peace so that he might enforce the provisions of the criminal code dealing with vagrancy and loitering.

Similarly, regulation and control applied to economic activities. Seen as a child-like figure unable to protect himself against white people, the Indian ward was forbidden to dispose of reserve products, even when produced on individual land allotment under a location ticket. Under-scoring the paternalism of the measure, violations were punishable by fines, not against the Indian but against the purchaser of the goods. In addition, tribesmen for a time were not allowed to buy farm machinery
and other labour-saving devices. In part, this regulation stemmed from the practical difficulty of keeping machines in working order, given the lack of mechanical skills on the reserves. Perhaps even more important, it mirrored concerns that the Indian be properly schooled in a work ethic.

At the same time, de-tribalization demanded a concerted attack on traditional religion and ceremony. In 1895, a law was passed proscribing all ceremonies involving "wounding or mutilation"—an obvious attempt to suppress the Plains Indian Sun Dance. In its various forms, the dance traditionally had been staged in order to win supernatural favour and it entailed different degrees of personal sacrifice ranging from fasting to the cutting or tearing of human flesh. This alone invited the censure of missionaries who condemned the dance as barbaric and pagan. It also offended the Indian agents and others not only because it sometimes lasted for weeks and meant a lengthy distraction from farming, but also because it occasioned a congregation of bands which might prove subversive. In the final analysis, the Sun Dance epitomized Indianness itself, and for that reason, it was outlawed. Indeed, dances of all types were banned eventually, the only exception being with the written permission of the senior official of the Department of Indian Affairs.

Lastly, and underpinning the entire assimilation program, Indian children were to receive a formal education. It was first thought this could best be done by establishing day schools on each of the reserves. But when these schools proved ineffectual, they were closed in favour of boarding industrial schools, strategically located in various parts of the West. The industrial school had been pioneered in the United States and later adopted in Ontario, and as a tool of enculturation, it offered a number of advantages: although it was mainly government funded, it was managed by religious denominations and this meant an emphasis on Christianity, thought to be a prerequisite to the civilizing of the Indian child; in practical terms, it was geared to farm and domestic training, deemed appropriate to the Indian's station in life; based on the half-day plan, the curriculum combined classroom instruction with outdoor training, and as such, it seemed well suited to what was described as the restless character of the Indian child; and above all, as a boarding institution, the industrial school removed the child from the so-called "corrupting" influence of his home environment and Indian culture. In adopting this school system, officials believed that full assimilation would be possible in a generation or two, and to maximize the impact of the system, laws were passed making attendance compulsory.

Not surprisingly, the Indian community saw the government's reserve policy as a complete betrayal. Initially, tribesmen had accepted the reserve not only as a matter of economic necessity, but also as a "homeland," a place where they could enjoy their own society and culture undisturbed by white settlement. The very idea that their reserves should be used to transform them into "brown whitemen" was completely unacceptable and their reaction was immediate. Lacking either political or military power, they responded the only way they could—through passive resistance. To protest restrictions on their economic activities, many cut back on agricultural production, while some abandoned farming altogether. Despite the law, parents refused to send their children to school, both because of the
A Summary of Federal Indian Policy in the Canadian West, 1867-1984

appalling rate of disease there and because it was a system that taught children to be ashamed of their parents and their traditions. And most importantly, tribesmen reacted to government measures by consciously persisting in their traditional institutions, and in some cases, by devising or adopting counter-innovative techniques as an assertion of Indianness.

Annual Sun Dance gatherings, for example, became the core of cultural resistance among the Saulteaux, Cree, Assiniboine, Sioux and others. These gatherings not only represented "ideological rituals," protecting and reinforcing the Indian social system, but also acted as an education system rivalling that of the industrial schools. They were attended by the entire family, and in addition to the observance of sacred rites, they functioned to integrate the young into Indian society in that they included the initiation of braves, marriage ceremonies and the reaffirmation of a whole range of social relationships. Indeed, according to Jacqueline Gresko's study of the Treaty 4 area of Saskatchewan, the summer camp of the Sun Dance was the major reason for the ultimate failure of the industrial school system. She also notes that, ironically, graduates of the industrial school often figured both in Indian dancing and in various efforts to have the ban on dancing lifted.

The same could be said of the Ghost Dance. This was a ritual that had grown up in the western United States as the focus of a militant religious revival aimed at driving the whites off tribal lands and restoring the Indian to his former glory. In the Canadian context, it was adopted principally by a small band of Sioux living near Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. Among the last to do so, the band only recently had moved onto a reserve, and it was specifically in reaction to reserve life that, starting in the 1890s, the dance was incorporated into the band's rituals. Unlike its American counterpart, the Canadian Ghost Dance was non-militant, but it was intensely Indian in content and thus remained a covert religion. Although it embraced a Christian social morality as a means of salvation, the salvation itself promised an afterlife of traditional Indian culture and fellowship. Not unlike the Sun Dance, it was essentially an assertion of Indianness in opposition to forced enculturation.

The net result of Indian resistance was that, contrary to federal policy, the reserves functioned as Indian homelands, cultural islands sheltered from white society. As a policy, "assimilation through segregation" had occasioned considerable change and cultural disruption in tribal society; and yet, the dogged unwillingness of the Indian to be remade into a whiteman was an undeniable fact of reserve life. The bankruptcy of the policy was writ large in the refusal of Indians to enfranchise, despite encouragement from government officials. As a rite of passage, enfranchisement signified that the Indian had been sufficiently trained to assume full citizenship rights and obligations and it required that he legally surrender his Indian status and leave the reserve. For tribesmen, however, the process was of dubious benefit. It meant they would be separated from family and friends who would remain on the reserve; it meant they would cease to have any treaty rights; and most of all, it meant a complete repudiation of their tradition and culture, identified with the reserve itself. For these reasons, throughout the closing decades of the nineteenth century, only a trifling number of western tribesmen voluntarily
In light of this realization, the government embarked upon a different strategy. Starting in the late 1890s, and lasting right to the present, Dominion officials implemented a policy which might be described as "assimilation through integration." The main idea was that segregation on the reserves should be abandoned in order that tribemen now might be integrated into mainstream society. Presumably, the Indian had been sufficiently trained to relinquish his status as an Indian ward in favour of full Canadian citizenship.

One major dynamic of the new policy was the alienation of reserve lands, in either part or whole. In some cases, this was accomplished without the government first obtaining formal land surrenders by those affected. Amendments to the Indian Act between 1910 and 1918 gave officials the power to expropriate reserve lands for transportation rights-of-way, to subject reserve lands to mineral exploration by private companies and to lease out unused reserve lands to white farmers. In other cases, the alienation was effected through land surrenders by bands, often under pressure from the government. In 1898, changes to the Indian Act permitted the government to give advance cash payments to certain bands as an inducement to surrender their lands; and later, both during and after World War I, the government passed enabling legislation which expedited the surrender of entire reserves when they fell within the boundaries of cities.

A second component of the policy was to have the provincial governments take over the delivery of various social services to the Indian community, as they do for other Canadians. In the 1920s, for instance, the Dominion government made reserves subject to provincial laws on general police matters, and later entered into cost-sharing arrangements with the provinces whereby the latter agreed to include Indians in their health and welfare, as well as education, services. Although Canada's constitution stipulates that Indians and their lands are specifically and exclusively the responsibility of the federal government, by passing some of that responsibility on to the provinces, the Dominion was diluting its guardian-trust obligations to the Indians, and at the same time, attempting to blend them into the provincial population. The change in police jurisdiction and other measures also had the effect of dismantling the barriers that had separated tribemen and their reserves from the Canadian community at large.

A third dynamic consisted of co-opting the Indian into citizenship. One method was arbitrary enfranchisement, first introduced in the 1920s as an amendment to the Indian Act. Under the provisions of the amendment, a three-man board would examine the qualifications of a particular tribeman, and if it deemed him capable of living off the reserve, the individual would be enfranchised, even against his will. Needless to say, the measure invited a torrent of opposition in the Indian community, so much so that the government eventually was forced to repeal the amendment, although it was reintroduced in the 1930s and remained in force until 1951. Since that time, the strategy of the government was simply to assign citizenship rights
A Summary of Federal Indian Policy in the Canadian West, 1867-1984

to the Indian, without first requiring enfranchisement. By the early 1960s, Indians had been granted the right to consume intoxicants in public places, as well as vote in federal and provincial elections. 37

A fourth element was government support for Indian emigration from the reserves to the urban areas of the south. In 1951, only 17% of registered Indians in Canada lived off the reserve; by 1961, the figure had increased to well over 30%. 38 The reasons for the migration are many, but among the most important is the fact that, economically, the reserves cannot support the existing population. The Indian birth rate, more than twice that of Canada as a whole, coupled with the weak economic base of most reserves, has forced young Indians into the urban areas in search of employment and the other attractions of city life. 39 Although the migrant normally returns to the reserve several times before taking up permanent residence in the city, the result nevertheless is a burgeoning Native urban population in the West. From the government's point of view, once the Indian has acquired municipal residence, he ceases to be the responsibility of the Canadian government and comes under provincial jurisdiction. For this reason, Indian urban residence has become a cornerstone of the Dominion's integrationist policy. 40

One of the clearest expressions of that policy was the so-called "White Paper," a belated declaration of intent drawn up by the government in 1969. It was based on the premise that special legal status for the Indian was the root cause of what by this time was recognized as the poverty-stricken condition of the Indian; and as a panacea, the White Paper proposed to end all distinction between Indians and non-Indians. 41 It recommended that the Indian Act be repealed; that reserve lands be divided up and parcelled out to Indians on a free-hold basis; that the federal administration of Indian affairs be phased out; and that the provinces assume the same responsibility for Indian citizens as they do for other Canadians. 42 It was, of course, a statement par excellence of a policy that had existed in practice for decades. As an official pronouncement, however, it assumed new importance, especially in the Indian community where it was seen as an engine of cultural genocide, and its main effect was to provoke the antipathy of Indian organizations. In the end, Indian opposition to the White Paper proved so embarrassing that, officially at least, the government was forced to disavow its own policy statement. 43 Notwithstanding this public reversal, nevertheless, the government was not about to abandon a time-honoured solution to the "Indian problem," and in practice the policy remained in effect, only now as a matter of hidden agenda. 44

More recently, the whole idea of Indian integration has been repudiated by a growing demand for Indian self-government. Historically, the various tribes had been self-governing in every sense of the word, and were acknowledged as such both by the Royal Proclamation and by the resulting treaty process in Canada. In the present context, the concept first achieved political prominence as an outgrowth of Indian reaction to the White Paper of 1969. After that, the demand for self-government as a matter of aboriginal and treaty right became increasingly insistent until, by the early 1980s, it had become the banner cause of Indian First Nations across Canada.

That the cause has won some sympathy on Parliament Hill is evident. In 1983, the Trudeau government appointed an all-party committee of the
House of Commons to enquire into the whole question of Indian self-government. The findings of that committee, known as the Penner Report, represent an overwhelming endorsement of the concept. The report argues that the Indian Act is totally archaic and must be repealed in its entirety; and it envisages a new scheme in which Indian First Nations would enjoy extensive fiscal and cultural autonomy in a relationship with the federal government similar to that between the provinces and the Dominion. The Prime Minister himself gave every indication, both at the first ministers' conference on aboriginal rights (1984) and later, that he intended to have the principle of Native self-government entrenched in Canada's constitution. Although the government's official response to the Penner Report was less than sanguine about the possibility of such entrenchment, the government did declare its determination to "develop legislation to provide for the recognition of the status and power of Indian First Nations Governments." Essentially, what was being promised was a legislative, rather than a constitutional, approach to Indian self-government, although the latter was not ruled out.

That the concept will actually be implemented in the near future is less certain. Significant is the fact that, in order for Indian self-government to become constitutionally entrenched, the necessary amendment to Canada's constitution would require the consent of the provinces. However, at the first minister's conference on aboriginal rights (1984), seven of the ten provincial premiers refused to support a resolution calling for just such an amendment. The refusal stemmed, in part, from fears that the implementation of the concept would result in the loss of provincial land and resources, and in part also, from the belief that the concept was not widely supported by the Canadian public. Moreover, the recent land-slide election of a Conservative government does not bode well for implementation. Although it is too early to tell what direction the Mulroney government will actually take, there is a widely-held perception in the Native community that the new government will prove resistant, if not reactionary, to the whole idea of self-government.

In the final analysis, there also remains the nagging doubt as to whether or not any scheme of self-government -- whether conceded by a Conservative or a Liberal government -- would significantly depart from the long-standing goals of government policy. Certainly some Indian groups have expressed fears that self-government in practice may only be a new form of integration, one that would thrust Indians into mainstream society under the pretext of a self-determination analogous to that promised by the White Paper. In light of the government's century-old commitment to assimilation, those fears may well be justified.
NOTES


6. Ibid., p. 39.


12. Indicative were attempts in 1883 to dilute the authority of Chief Poundmaker. According to the local Indian agent, the chief "desired that the whole control of the reserve be handed over to himself and his councillors stating that he would undertake to oversee the agricultural operations of his Indians and that he did not want any interference on the part of the government officials..." In the end, the government decided that it would be "injudicious to accede to Poundmaker's suggestion," and instructions were issued to the farming instructor "to withhold rations from any Indians ... who refused to work and to commence this course with Poundmaker, giving him clear notice that the rule would be strictly carried out." Cited in Sluman and Goodwill, p. 32.

14. John Tobias, "Indian Reserves in Western Canada: Indian Homelands or Devices for Assimilation," Approaches to Native History in Canada: Papers of a Conference Held at the National Museum of Man, October 1975. ed. D.A. Muise (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1977), p. 94. In many cases, recalcitrant chiefs were summarily dismissed from office. In 1898, a Rain Dance was held on Piapot Reserve, despite the fact that the dance had been outlawed three years earlier. In retaliation, the government had Chief Piapot arrested and ultimately deposed. A similar fate was true of Chief Star Blanket. He was removed from office for slaughtering an agency cow without permission in order to feed those in his band who were suffering from hunger. In 1912, by which time Star Blanket was old and destitute, he was reinstated as chief and once more given his chief's allowance of twenty-five dollars, but only on condition that he abandon his opposition to having the children of his band sent away to residential schools. See Sluman and Goodwill, pp. 86-7 and 101.

15. Tobias, p. 94

16. Idem. Although evidence concerning passes is limited, there is no doubt that attempts were made to restrict the movement of Indians even though there was no legislative basis for doing so. Restrictions on the movements of Indians off the reserve were first proclaimed in 1885 in order to prevent Indians from joining the Northwest Rebellion. The passes remained in use in the Battleford area until at least 1918 and elsewhere in the prairie provinces until the mid-1930s. There is no evidence that they were used in other parts of Canada. See B. Bennett, "Study of Passes for Indians to Leave their Reserves," Treaties and Historical Research Center, October, 1974.


20. Tobias, p. 95.

21. The residential school was designed for students from the southern and central areas of the Territories, as well as from isolated communities and those too small to warrant local schools. The day school system remained in effect for remote communities where parents refused to part with their children. Consult D. Bruce Sealey, The Education of Native People in Manitoba (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1980), p. 30.

22. Ibid., pp. 29-31.

23. Tobias, p. 95.

24. Ibid., pp. 90-1.

[1984] 1 N.S.R.
A Summary of Federal Indian Policy in the Canadian West, 1867-1984

25. The nature of the Indian reaction is discussed in Ibid., pp. 96-7.


27. Ibid., p. 173.

28. Ibid., p. 178.


30. Idem.


32. Provisions for enfranchisement had been on the statute-books since 1857, but by 1881 only 57 of an estimated 90,000 Indians had voluntarily surrendered their status. As one critic noted in the House of Commons, at that rate it would take 36,000 years to enfranchise the remaining Indian population. The Historical Development of the Indian Act, p. 74.


34. Tobias, "Indian Reserves in Western Canada...," pp. 98-9.

35. The Historical Development of the Indian Act, p. 121.

36. Ibid., pp. 127 and 131.

37. Tobias, "Indian Reserves in Western Canada...," p. 99.


39. Ibid., p. 89.

40. The inadequacy of federal aid to urban Indians, compared to that given to those living on the reserve, is discussed in W.T. Stanbury, Success and Failure: Indians in Urban Society (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1975), pp. 70-81.


42. Ibid., p. 6.

A Summary of Federal Indian Policy in the Canadian West, 1867-1984

44. Idem.


48. Star-Phoenix (Saskatoon), 10 March 1984.

49. The White Paper was rationalized as an attempt to end the legal discrimination, by virtue of the Indian Act, that made Indian society disadvantaged and promised to make Indians full and equal participants in the cultural, social and economic life of Canada. White Paper, pp. 4-6.